Of all the history books I have read, this one might be the most Aristotelian in its style. The author's prose is strict and consistent in its no-nonsense, no-embellishment approach, much like the old philosopher's works. Each chapter starts with a clearly phrased question, continues with a detailed review of much historical evidence and wraps up with the answer. In answering each question the author relies on the combined weight of several pieces of evidence from across centuries and from various geographical locations rather than on any particular case study.

This isn't an easy way to write a book because it could easily degenerate into a mere recital of weakly connected citations, but the author joins the disparate sources together masterfully into a concise whole. Not many historians balance their detailed source material with broad general arguments as skillfully as she does. It is clear that she has studied economics and social science more widely than any history curriculum would require, and she puts all of that knowledge to good use. As far as the methodology of historical writing is concerned, this book therefore sets a new standard and I sincerely hope that other historians emulate it.

As for its subject matter, this book is an attack against overly positive views of European merchant guilds. Medieval merchant guilds strived for, and were often granted, commercial monopolies. Some modern historians have argued that this was a good thing because the guilds facilitated commercial security and contract enforcement, provided solutions to information problems and kept prices stable. The author challenges each of these claims in turn.

The thrust of her argument is twofold: (1) Merchant guilds were not always beneficial to the economy, and in many cases they were directly harmful. Rulers granted commercial monopolies not for reasons of efficiency, but for their own benefit. Well-organized guilds with monopolistic rights could help the king fend off political and financial threats from the nobility in return for their exclusive privileges. This collusion hindered both economic development and (this final conclusion is my own, not the author's) the emergence of political representation. (2) Alternative institutions for solving the problems of commerce existed, even inclusive ones which served everyone. They were utilized by many merchants and performed functions that state bureaucracies would later appropriate, but even though they functioned well in many places their development was slow in the shadow of the monopolies. As the author puts it: particularized trust was a substitute for generalized trust.

Just like Aristotle's works, this is a book that most readers probably would not read a second time. The reason is the same in both cases: the argument is so clear and comprehensive that when you finish the book you will consider the matter settled, at least for the next 1500 years.