One might characterise aporetic argumentation in the following terms. An aporetic argument is such that it generates a state of puzzlement (aporia in its subjective sense) by way of the equality of opposite reasonings, that is, by way of a problem or difficulty (aporia in the objective sense) put forward in the course of philosophical investigation. Furthermore, an aporetic argument can play a crucial role in structuring one's investigation. Faced with an intellectual roadblock, an inquirer might find either that the reasons on either side of a contradiction only seemingly balance each other out and thereby come to identify the more promising way forward, or that there is indeed a compelling case for equipollence, in which case the inquiry needs to take a new turn or come to a halt. At any rate, due consideration of the relevant aporiai seems to result in epistemic improvements of one kind or another.

The fourteen papers collected in this volume, all but one deriving from a conference held at Trinity College Dublin in November 2014, deal with the topic of aporetic argumentation in the Greek philosophical tradition from the Presocratics to Damascius. Given the thematic and chronological breadth of their chosen subject, it is a rather impressive achievement of the contributors that, as the editors maintain, they show the above analysis of aporia to be dominant, at the very least, from Aristotle to prominent representatives of Neoplatonic thought (see the introduction, esp. pp. 6-7). The volume does an excellent job of weaving together a more or less continuous narrative of the emergence and persistence of aporetic inquiry, while also displaying a wide variety of philosophical commitments and outlooks with which it can be combined.