Amitav Acharya
Auteur van The End of American World Order
Over de Auteur
Amitav Acharya is Professor of International Relations at the School of international Service, American University, Washington, D.C.
Werken van Amitav Acharya
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Politics in Asia) (2000) 14 exemplaren
Civilizations in Embrace: The Spread of Ideas and the Transformation of Power. India and Southeast Asia in the… (2012) 10 exemplaren
Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective (2007) 9 exemplaren
The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary (2019) 8 exemplaren
Age Of Fear: Power Versus Principle In The War On Terror (Marshall Cavendish Signature) (2004) 7 exemplaren
Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia (Politics in Asia) (2010) 7 exemplaren
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Politics in Asia) (2014) 3 exemplaren
Regionalism and multilateralism : essays on cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific (2002) 3 exemplaren
Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation (2007) 3 exemplaren
Human Security: From Concept to Practice -- Case Studies from Northeast India and Orissa (World Scientific Series on… (2011) 2 exemplaren
An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Prospects for Control (Pacific strategic papers) (1994) 1 exemplaar
The ASEAN Regional Forum : confidence building 1 exemplaar
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He argues that the north/south divide is the most consequential divide in international order – more so than north-north and south-south disputes – principally because of the underlying disagreement of leadership; i.e. the rejection, by many in the global south, of a posture of suzerainty to the global north. He cites in part the non-aligned movement, but places greatest emphasis on the growth of regional blocs throughout the world. Even as scholars in the north ostensibly lament the marginalization of the south (while doing little to address the matter), this lamentation overlooks the agency that the south has exercised locally and on upon the global order writ large. This agency, he contends, is ongoing and significant.
Throughout the work, Acharya describes a “multiplex” global system – one in which the dominant players might have an outsize role, but in which even the smallest actors still retain their own agency to shape the framework in which they maneuver, through policies and alliances suited to their particular interest. He particularly emphasizes different manifestations of national and personal security, and of positive and negative sovereignty, whose localized constructions create different archetypes of the world, which in turn influences the shaping and diffusion of global norms and institutions – ultimately altering the framework, rather than simply accepting its constraints.
The logic however stumbles somewhat on the premise of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), in which, under the auspices of the UN, states that fail to protect the basic rights of their citizens are subject to outside intervention. R2P (and the ICISS from which it is derived) is a universalist concept; Acharya meanwhile heavily promotes regional differentiation and the use of regional organizations to this end, yet this is somewhat discordant with most such occupations flying the blue banner of the UN – a global organization – with fiscal, personnel, and material contributions from whichever states can be convinced to contribute them.
Acharya does admit some of the shortcomings of his emphasis on regional institutions as a vehicle through which non-polar states, in that they may be limited in their efficacy due to internal politics, and due to their inability to forestall interventions by more powerful outside states. Among the weaknesses not discussed is the universalist tendencies that exist endogenously within these institutions; for example, how ECOWAS – a regional economic alliance – was suitable to lead a military force, under the R2P umbrella, in to Gambia in 2017.
At its core, this is an anecdotal, rather than empirical, work; Acharya makes no attempt to demonstrate his thesis through analysis of data, but rather provides a handful of conforming examples (repeatedly referencing the 1955 Bandung Conference, for example) to illustrate the point. This approach has its place, but leaves open too many alternative explanations. For example, in the post-Cold War era, this phenomenon could be a byproduct of a larger number of “poles” more willing to compromise to gain the allegiance of peripheral actors.
In reading this, I am reminded of a 2003 article by Alexander Wendt: “Why a World State is Inevitable.” Written at a time when internationalism was at its apex, this article declared, analogous to the “end of history,” that continued consolidation through regional and global bodies (such as the EU and WTO) would ultimately lead to a single world state. I wrote (but did not publish) a rebuttal to that article, arguing inter alia that global heterogeneity (economically, socially, and in state-society terms) would always be too great for any uniform state to bridge.
This book follows a similar path, albeit on a higher order. Acharya goes to great lengths to dismantle the idea that international universalism is the natural endgame of foreign affairs, instead arguing that any equilibrium in the international order is transitory, and that individual states can and must define their own paradigm based on their particular history, alliances, and neighborhood. At the end, he goes so far as to declare the liberal international order to be on life support. To that end, I find myself largely agreeing with his argument. At the end of the book, although I’m disposed to agree with Acharya’s general ideas, I find myself not yet sold on the idea.… (meer)