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Richard J. Aldrich has written extensively on the secret service. Co-editor of the journal Intelligence and National Security, he is currently Director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies and Professor of Politics at the University of Nottingham

Werken van Richard J. Aldrich

Secret Intelligence: A Reader (2009) 27 exemplaren
GCHQ: Centenary Edition (2019) 21 exemplaren

Gerelateerde werken

Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989 (2013) — Medewerker — 6 exemplaren

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Algemene kennis

Geboortedatum
1961
Geslacht
male
Nationaliteit
UK

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A comprehensive history of GCHQ, the British government's electronic and signals intelligence agency. This book is essentially a picture of world intelligence-gathering since World War II, told through the lens of the one agency, GCHQ. The focus is, indeed, relentlessly on that organisation, and so major events of the Cold War are only referred to if GCHQ had any part in their story; and where events or individuals went on to meet particular ends, unless GCHQ was directly involved in that end, they just drop out of the story - so nothing on the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the members of the Cambridge spy ring are namechecked but not otherwise mentioned.

The book is quite lightweight on actual espionage activities; though there are tales of derring-do, they usually involve fairly ordinary people rather than archetypal 'secret agents'. Nonetheless, where GCHQ did play a major role in a campaign, such as the Falklands war, there is much of interest, though surprisingly often that turns out not to reflect well on successive British governments. The book is laid out in thematic chapters dropped into a broader chronological framework; but this does sometimes make the story a bit non-linear, and the reader may find themselves bouncing around in time a bit as earlier events are referred to out of sequence if they fit better into the narrative to make some point or other. There are nonetheless illuminating snippets of information from time to time, such as a new insight into the death of the Vatican banker Roberto Calvi. In broader terms, the book gives a good overview of the so-called "special relationship" between the UK and the USA, though again this is seen solely through the eyes of the signals intelligence community.

The book is quite revelatory over the role of various commercial or quasi-commercial bodies, such as Cable & Wireless or Standard Telegraph & Cable, who played a far deeper role in signals intelligence than previously recognised. And Aldrich also reveals that, contrary to popular belief, after Churchill ordered the destruction of the first true computer, Colossus, at the close of the war, two other examples of that machine from Bletchley Park outstations were carefully dismantled and taken to Manchester University, where they formed the basis of Britain's first publicly-acknowledged computer, the so-called Manchester Mark 1.

The book is generally non-partisan, though former prime minister Tony Blair is called out over mistruths he repeated in the days before the second Gulf War. However, one exception to this is Aldrich's coverage of the banning of trade unions in GCHQ, where he adopts the default view of the British political establishment, that trade unions in general are hotbeds of dissent and radicalism; or, as Margaret Thatcher put it, "the enemy within". Aldrich cites as evidence the direct Soviet financial support for the 1983 miners' strike, but otherwise advances no further evidence of infiltration.

I was a civil service trade unionist through the 1980s, 90s and the first ten years of the current century. I had some brief contact with the GCHQ campaign, or rather the ending of it, as the particular grouping within my union was the home for the reformulated GCHQ trade union after the incoming Blair government restored trade union rights in 1997. I was at our union conference that year when the lifting of the ban was announced, and as an executive member had some minor role in the stage management of the announcement. Aldrich shows no understanding that the earlier disputes within GCHQ were often demarcation disputes between different unions, as civil service trade unionism was originally organised on strict grade and specialism grounds, which sometimes led to anomalies where different specialisms were brought together. The first strike in GCHQ, in 1955, was the result of such a demarcation dispute between the Civil Service Union (representing messengers, cleaners and other ancillary staff) and a body called the Government and Overseas Cable and Wireless Operators' Association (which eventually was absorbed into the Communication Workers' Union because of their connection with Post Office Telephones [later British Telecommunications, or BT]). Partly to avoid having to declare the clandestine nature of GCHQ's work, and partly to avoid unnecessary clashes with unions ostensibly in the private sector, trade unions were not restricted in GCHQ until Margaret Thatcher, a noted supporter of free trade unions as long as they were in Poland, decided to bring in a ban following general unrest across the civil service, including GCHQ, on matters of national pay in the early 1980s. Yet fears of "Reds under the bed" were already being addressed by the security services. Following David Stirling's abortive plot to seize power from Harold Wilson in the early 1970s, and Stirling's subsequent claim to have placed "loyalist" subversives in the civil service, MI5 recruited a number of "official moles" to report on and block subversive activities within the civil service trade unions. Having either dissuaded Stirling's recruits or failing to find any, the brief of these moles was broadened to act against (real or imagined) leftist subversives. The resulting internal conflicts within the civil service trade unions caused unrest for years, the Civil & Public Services Association (CPSA) becoming known as "the Beirut of the British trade union movement" as a result. These facts are by now well-known, yet Aldrich pays them no attention whatsoever because they were not unique to GCHQ.

There are a worrying number of factual errors which I have been able to spot: Bletchley Park's codebreakers are described as working in 'nissen huts' [sic: as 'Nissen' was a personal name, it should have been capitalised], but anyone who has visited Bletchley will know that the codebreakers' huts were not Nissen huts (mass-produced wartime huts formed out of a curved roof of corrugated iron sprung from ground level with brick infilling at the ends and named for their designer) but were traditional prefabricated timber buildings. The author seems to think that 'nissen hut' is a generic name for any prefabricated building in a military or quasi-military setting. He also cites the RAFs wartime electronic counter-measures flying unit, 100 Group, as having only been created at the end of the war, when it actually came into being in 1943. Other errors have been noted, which gives rise to concern over what errors exist elsewhere.

Having damned with faint praise, I will nonetheless say that this is a highly worthwhile book, surprisingly light reading and offering an insight into a very secret world. It is certainly more detailed over the role of GCHQ in more recent conflicts, especially as these fell into the era where GCHQ's role and activities were coming under greater scrutiny. In the closing chapters, Aldrich looks at the increasing role of signals intelligence in a world of ubiquitous computing and communications, and sounds warnings about the various schemes to capture, store and cross-reference all telephone conversations, e-mails, web searches and website visits. It is now almost impossible to live "off the grid", no matter what some might think; Aldrich feels we are victims of our own desire for ease of access to everything the Internet brings us. We have created our own Panopticon; Aldrich sees GCHQ as the mirror within. In this, he is not wrong.
… (meer)
 
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RobertDay | 2 andere besprekingen | Aug 17, 2022 |
A UK centred (although not exclusive) history of Signals Intelligence from the 2nd world war through to the current day. Initially slow it becomes more interesting later on as the timeline catches sup with events that are of recent relevance. At times it is somewhat repetitive, and frequently features lists of names and dates that are not interesting, there is much input from American sources, nothing at all on the more active human intelligence side. Also suffers from a hammer problem - everything is seen solely through the lens of sigint, which sometimes leads to exaggerated claims of its own importance. However later chapters covering the Iraq War and the rise of the Internet are of interest to anyone who has an interest in public affairs. It goes a little way into explaining why the 'Intelligence' services failed to predict several notable conflicts but the sucesses that were prevented are much harder to elucidate.

The book is well referenced and compiled from 'open sources' - government documents that were declassified and released to the public archives. The author chose not to include interviews with serving officers so there are no contraventions of the Official Secrets Act. - Although according to the author during his promotional lecture circuit he was deliberately evasive in publishing times so that the government were too slow to censor anything. All the sources are available to be read by anyone who has the patience to trawl through the vast vast volumes in search of the nuggets that perhaps GCHQ would have proffered not to have had released. It took the author 10 years to write.

The general structure is a look at how GCHQ evolved, from the early Bletchly Park WWII years, through the decades in turn. There is some degree of jumping about, and points (and at times sentences) from one decade are repeated in the next. There is not an over-guiding narrative, which makes it a quite bitty to read, A few key incidents from each decade are analysed for how they affected the general focus of GCHQ's activities. It is quite clear that the USA provided a lot of direction for GCHQ's activities even though originally GCHQ was the innovative partner in the relationship. The other key activity was the degree to which GCHQ limited access to their output. This made quite a lot of difference to whether or not GCHQs work was actually useful. In many cases important information was received by one hand, but never understood or disseminated to the other. The author does attempt to explain how this could happen, and generally does s in an impartial manner leaving it to the reader to decide if it was a good idea or not.

There are several interesting facts, and a good explanation of some areas of recent history, but overall it is somewhat slow and complicated exploration of an area that obviously has a lot more interesting stories still to tell.
… (meer)
½
 
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reading_fox | 2 andere besprekingen | Apr 1, 2013 |
Good secondary research, but somewhat rambling in the mid-section. Indeed, the focus of the book drifts around somewhat unpredictably, and whilst the chronology of the evolution of GCHQ from its wartime roots is well set-out, the book only really becomes interesting in the very final chapters, where the reactions of former intelligence luminaries are set against the dramatic increase in the apparatus of surveillance. Worth reading, but only to someone already interested in the field.
½
 
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gbsallery | 2 andere besprekingen | Oct 8, 2010 |

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