Robert K. Brigham

Reckless: Henry Kissinger's Responsibility for the Tragedy in Vietnam by Robert K. Brigham is a study of Kissinger's role in the Vietnam peace process. Brigham, Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations, joined the Vassar faculty in 1994. He is a specialist on the history of US foreign policy, particularly the Vietnam War.

For students of international relations, Kissinger is a powerhouse. He is often credited with creating the modern Realist Theory that opposed the Wilsonian Idealist position. Kissinger is also responsible for volumes of work on historical foreign policy. American policy in most situations has been driven by the realist model. A notable exception is the first Gulf War where a where a large coalition worked together extending beyond traditional allies. The inconclusive results of that conflict seemed to further instill the realist theory as America's policy.

Kissinger is also known for his tough stance against North Vietnam and the relentless bombings. What is new in Brigham's book is a clearer role of Kissinger's involvement with the Vietnam peace process. Brigham shows a Kissinger that is unsure, untrusting, and secretive. He blocks others including Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird. Both men had experience and the people under them to help settle the peace. Kissinger explained to Oriana Fallaci that he was a lone cowboy and that was admired in America. Kissinger believed only he knew what it took to end the war and worked against anyone who he disagreed with or would steal his spot.

Forty-five years after the direct involvement of US troops in the war, new information is coming to light. Kissinger has written volumes of information on the war and his role. His works secure his place a statesman, but there is more too it. Brigham makes the comment:

Like the internet, Kissinger provides huge amounts of apparent information, not all of it reliable. He's a conspiratorially minded theorist, and he often wanders far from the facts.

Reckless shows the costs and dangers of a "lone cowboy" running foreign policy. Although Kissinger thought back channels would provide a faster solution, our country had the channels for open communication and the bureaucracy that is not driven by ambition or personal emotions. Kissinger was very much like Nixon needing to be in charge and untrusting of almost everyone. He believed that his intelligence and America's military might could provide all of America's solutions in Vietnam. However, he lacked the understanding that the Vietnamese had been fighting outside powers since 1887 and were not about to give up. Reckless tells the story of hubris and failure in contrast to the polished history written the subject himself.… (meer)

Thanks to Public Affairs Books and Netgalley for an advance reading copy of the book. The views expressed are my own.
This is a detailed critical account of Henry Kissinger's negotiations with the North Vietnamese from 1969 through to 1973. It's not a biography of Kissinger and draws on biographical work by Walter Isaacson, Niall Ferguson, and others as well as Kissinger's own writings. There's no input from Kissinger himself: no interview and no indication that one was requested. Kissinger's rebuttal would be interesting.
The book discusses the co-dependent relationship that existed between Nixon and Kissinger. Nixon thought Kissinger was too emotional. In turn, Kissinger thought Nixon was moody and unpredictable. Early on in his presidency, Nixon created the "Henry Handling Committee" (Haldeman, Erlichman and Mitchell) to keep him "calm". This was a fascinating relationship which affected the course of the negotiations; Kissinger told Nixon what he thought he wanted to hear in order to let Kissinger continue the secret talks.
The author argues that Kissinger has spent a lot of time since leaving office documenting a record of his time in office to make him look good, despite evidence to the contrary. There is a substantial amount of documentation that supports a view that many times Kissinger misrepresented to Nixon what was discussed and agreed upon with the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris.
It is shocking that both NIxon and Kissinger ignored the South Vietnam government's views. They were never consulted about any of the substantial issues in the negotiations. South Vietnam was never a player in the talks. Similarly, Kissinger sidelined the U.S. State Department right from the beginning of the Nixon presidency. He worked to be sure Nixon did not follow advice from Defence Secretary Laird. Farther afield, Russia and China rebuffed Kissinger's efforts to have them pressure North Vietnam to soften their position. The result of all this was that Kissinger (and to a lesser extent Nixon) was left without allies. They did not have the support of the U.S. public. Kissinger thought he is the "smartest one in the room" (and perhaps he was) and therefore he believed he was the only one capable of solving the Vietnam "mess".
This book is a worthwhile read for students of world history as well as students of negotiation and conflict resolution. It's a real life "case history" of a negotiation with many lessons to be learned, an important one being to build alliances. It's a reasoned counterpoint to a substantial amount of what is written about Kissinger. Whether or not you agree with the author, it's worth the time and effort to read this book.… (meer)