Gao Wenqian

Zhou Enlai has fascinated me for a long time. A survivor of every political and military conflict twentieth century China had to offer, he obviously was a consummate strategist, which implies a concomitant ruthlessness. Yet somehow in the western press, he had escaped the odium so often reserved for other ranking Chinese leaders. Instead, the west portrayed him as somewhat patrician, a Confucian style throwback amongst the Maoist thugs. While I did think of him as a positive force in Chinese politics, I wanted a more balanced assessment, which proved difficult to find in English. Once again LT provided the answer and I found this book.

Gao Wenqian the author, was a true insider. He was the official biographer of Zhou Enlai for the Chinese Communist Party Central Research Office for Documentation, spending ten years researching Zhou and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. After the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, Gao decided it was time to leave China. This process took several years. During that time, aided by helpful westerners, he smuggled out file cards with his research notes. Gao wound up at Harvard for a time, where he wrote this book.

Originally published in Chinese in 2003, it was immediately banned in China. The Chinese edition dealt with the last ten years of Zhou's life, 1966-1976, a period which coincides with the Cultural Revolution and the beginnings of its aftermath. It discussed Zhou in relation to those events. In 2007, the book was translated into English.

At first I found the book disappointing. There was a lot of background on the history leading up to the founding of the People's Republic of China and its early history; information that has been covered at length elsewhere. It wasn't particularly specific to Zhou, although it was interesting to get the Chinese perspective. Reading the translators' note later, I discovered this section was an addition to the English language version for those who might not be familiar with this history.

Then Gao got to the start of the Cultural Revolution and the book got really interesting. By the time he got to Lin Biao, I couldn't put it down. Like other authors, Gao suggests that Chairman Mao lived in fear of a Khrushchev succeeding him and destroying his legacy, a reference to Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin. In 1966, Mao's designated successor was Liu Shaoqi. Following the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the years of famine, Mao was on shaky ground. Fearing potential overthrow by the Leninist Liu, who favoured strong control from the top versus Mao's more populist style, Mao decided to purge Liu and other revisionists in the party. Gao argues that Mao unleashed the Cultural Revolution and his wife Jiang Qing in order to do this. To Mao, Liu was "the Chinese Khrushchev".

Gao says that Mao " adopted a circuitous strategy of 'uniting with Lin Biao, grabbing on to Zhou Enlai, rectifying Deng Xiaoping, and attacking Liu Shaoqi'. This way, Mao set out to confuse Liu Shaoqi, while leaving potential allies like Zhou Enlai in political stalemate. What did this do to Zhou? It told him who the current intended targets were, and furthermore warned him that he could easily be one in the future.

Zhou's last ten yearas were spent trying to maintain his position while fighting off attacks from the left, and trying to ameliorate some of the devastation caused by the revolution, which at times was perilously close to all out civil war. This involved active participation in some of its policies, passive acquiescence in others, and abject self criticism when required. Every move was governed by his interpretation of Mao's wishes.

Does this mean that Zhou Enlai was without principles? Gao says that although early in his career Zhou outranked and outshone Mao, the need for Mao's military abilities convinced Zhou to subordinate himself to Mao. Without winning the battles against the Japanese and the Nationalists, the People's Republic of China could not come into being. Once the People's Republic was established, with Mao as Chairman and Zhou as Premier, Zhou decided never to challenge Mao for the leadership. Mao needed Zhou for his pragmatic administrative skills and his brilliant abilities at foreign relations, but feared him for just these reasons. Zhou realized the only way to keep his position was to appear to wholeheartedly support Mao.

Zhou suffered through struggle sessions, through dangerous political attacks, was denied medical treatment for cancer, but was never purged. In death he has not had his legacy revised and rewritten, although this almost happened in the months immediately following his death. Gao feels that what saved Zhou from this fate was Mao's death just eight months after Zhou's. Those who succeeded Zhou, in particular Deng Xiaoping, had benefitted from Zhou's quiet help over the years and had no reason to denigrate him.

In his introduction to the book, Andrew Nathan says Gao gives Zhou credit for softening the impact of Mao's policies, for protecting a number of people, for keeping the country going, for trying to restart the economy, and for achievements in foreign affairs. Yet he also makes clear that without Zhou's support Mao could not have kept the disaster going as long as he did. Mao needed Zhou. Although Zhou may not have had the power to overthrow Zhou, he could have withdrawn his support (paying, to be sure, the ultimate personal price) and Mao would have been unable to go on as long as he did. By working to mitigate the effects of Mao's rampage rather than to oppose them, he became Mao's enabler.
Should the man be condemned for supporting Mao or praised for moderating his programmes? This fascinating book presents a detailed examination of the dynamics between the two men, reenforcing the idea of Zhou as a Confucian, in service to the master, desperate to maintain harmony and reduce conflict by all means. Whether he succeeded, whether he was justified, the reader can determine. Gao sums up Zhou Enlai was neither the god current Chinese official have put on a pedestal, nor the unequivocally evil person whom anti-CCP types have portrayed... Zhou Enlai was an enormously complex man, hard to define and even harder to understand without a full appreciation of the difficulties... that beset China during his lifetime.… (meer)