Milan W. Svolik

This book is at its best when the author discusses the problematic nature of dictatorial rule in general terms. The dictator's first problem stems from his lack of popular legitimacy: he has to ensure that citizens acquiesce to his rule. The second problem is power sharing: he has to share power with a coalition. By sharing too little or too much the dictator risks opposition and revolt.

The author discusses these two dilemmas in relation to such variables as military involvement and the institutionalization of political parties for authoritarian purposes. He focuses mostly on the internal dynamics of authoritarian coalitions. The threat posed by the general populace or foreign powers are not discussed much. The author presents a number of examples which nicely illustrate that each dictator has to solve his own dilemmas, and that most of them fail to keep their rulership in balance for very long.

The general discussion and case studies are of high quality. The bibliography offers numerous avenues for further study and application. The author also offers formal mathematical models to illustrate some of his arguments, but I think they are superfluous and unnecessary. The assumptions made at the beginning simply re-emerge in the final equations, with no analytical gain. It always surprises me that political scientists don't realize how vacuous their mathematical models are. Thankfully they can be easily skipped in this work.

In any event, I think this book is very much worth reading if you want to understand how authoritarian political systems (may) work on the inside. Its most important lesson is that dictatorial rule comes in many forms, just as democracy does.… (meer)