Michael Tesler
Auteur van Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America
Over de Auteur
Michael Tesler is assistant professor at the University of California, Irvine, and the coauthor of Obama's Race, also published by the University of Chicago Press.
Werken van Michael Tesler
Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America (2018) — Auteur — 61 exemplaren
Tagged
Algemene kennis
- Geslacht
- male
- Woonplaatsen
- California, USA
- Opleiding
- University of California, Los Angeles
- Beroepen
- Associate Professor of Political Science
- Organisaties
- University of California, Irvine
Leden
Besprekingen
Misschien vindt je deze ook leuk
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Statistieken
- Werken
- 3
- Leden
- 97
- Populariteit
- #194,532
- Waardering
- 4.3
- Besprekingen
- 5
- ISBNs
- 12
But given that, it does seem like there are a few shaky points. One is that the book, several times, kind of reverses itself (at least in part, and possibly not at all if/once I reread it.) Case in point, 80% of the book builds up the conclusion that "Its race, stupid," but then the last chapter (and some content elsewhere) points that the partisan loyalty and the entirely predictable party-flip-after-two-terms mechanics also predict Trump's victory (or that, at least, his victory slots right into that, much the same statement.)
Perhaps this is due to there being three authors, with different chapters being written by different people (and hence different "voices", different phrasings and points being stressed, etc.) Or, the authors themselves don't quite buy the simple summary they themselves made on at least one podcast where I heard (all of them) interviewed.
Another shaky point is assumptions. At an early point in the book, the authors cite a paper that "plausibly" concludes (in their paraphrasing) that since voters didn't vote for more progressive economic policies, that they were not worried about economics. Fine, as far as it goes (and this makes sense with their findings that many Trump voters where economically liberal, conservative voters.) But how many conservatives do you know who, when asked by political scientists, call for more socialist/progressive economic policies? At least in the US, we just got off years of Tea Party activists calling for the opposite (because they believe e.g. less regulation and "free markets" will solve economic problems.)
And finally, I worry because of how much some of this all rests on just making calls. (What doesn't, at base, and especially in something as complex as political/social science, right? I know.) Example: a plot is shown with, if I remember correctly, different quartiles (or maybe it was quintiles) and when they recovered from the 2007-2009 economic crash. It shows income (or wealth, I should really find this plot again) the curve of each... quintile. Anyway, the point was that the second highest earning group had recovered something like 12 to 18 months before the election and, because people vote on their recent economic history and not their long-term history, economics was not a part of the election. But that seems crazy to me... and maybe I'm just wrong. But if I'm struggling for say 2007-2008 to 2015, and at 2015 I finally break even and then by 2016 I'm up 0.25% or something... I'm still thinking about it.
As weird as it might seem, I'd like to see more data and explanation here. But more sociological and/or anthropological data about this kind of stuff. I feel like political science is working at the edge of its expertise here.
Anyway, in some ways, these points are picking around the edges (see 3.5-star comment above, and a 4-star rating, thanks to Goodreads.) But as someone who thinks, "Of course it's about race and ethnicity and culture and religion; the US is an expanding experiment in heterogeneity and everyone seems to keep forgetting that that is WEIRD," and, "Uhh, duh, racists," I didn't come away as convinced as I feel I should have.… (meer)