Thomas Wildenberg

This 2010 volume takes a look at a topic not covered well in contemporary naval ordnance literature--U.S. torpedoes. I am familiar with both authors from reading previous individual efforts. This is the first volume on which I have seen the authors work together. Wildenberg is well-known for U.S. Navy historical topics while Polmar is better known for contemporary naval analyses either of naval systems or of strategy/policy. Polmar has much background as a naval analyst, having performed this role for years for both Congressional and Department of the Navy clients. On the surface, this combination of authors should produce a quality publication.

This book weighs in at a paltry 268 pages, of which 72 are dedicated to four appendices, endnotes, a bibliography, and the index. The authors also provide two pages of perspective, a page of acknowledgements, a brief explanation of torpedo nomenclature and designations, along with 16 numbered chapters. The first six chapters spanning pages 1-70 take the history of this weapon from its inspired origins during the American Revolution to the beginning of World War II. Chapters 7 through 12 cover the World War II experience in 78 pages (almost 40% of the book). The remaining chapters totaling some 48 pages are left to take the story through the post-World War II period to the 21st century.

The perspective pages of the book highlight and bemoan the lack of scholarship concerning the development and operational use of what was the most complex weapon systems used by the Navy until the Missile Age. Based upon my reading, the authors have not filled the gap they describe. The reading through Chapter 12 is fine, although I think the authors could take a page or two from Norman Friedman's writing book and describe the military-industrial complex associated with this specialized ordnance. As bureaucracies are major contributors to the story of the U.S. torpedo, their part in the history represented in this book is neither properly documented nor understood. Furthermore, there are parts of this book that other works and authors speak better to--why repeat it unless you need filler material to complete this book?

The post-World War II part of this book is just not up to snuff. My suspicion is that records classification issues impact the work on these chapters, as the Navy still resists the full declassification of any torpedoes beginning with and coming after the Mark 37. That being said, one can't help but notice that Friedman provides significantly more detail in the various volumes of his series of "World Naval Weapon Systems" books, so the information about these torpedoes is certainly available in the public domain--it's just not in this book.

Overall I found this book to be a disappointment. One can see more details about the Civil War and World War II eras in separate books on these subjects, and the postwar weapons' histories are simply too shallow for a reader interested in this topic. Given the relatively high MSRP for this book (although the title can be found deeply discounted at some outlets), I just don't think I got my money's worth.… (meer)

In which a noted naval historian dissects the legend of the great airman and it's hard to not come away with the intended impact that Billy Mitchell was probably his own worst enemy and truly deserved his court martial. That said, I do get a little sense of misplaced smugness at the end of the book where Wildenberg considers the paltry accomplishments of the USAAF level bombers at Midway. I would dryly note that perhaps the real lesson that one should take away from this, and which Wildenberg does allude to in passing, is that the lack of Army-Navy defense cooperation between the world wars served no one well and it certainly would not have hurt for there to be an effective USAAF anti-ship and maritime recon capacity in place; consider the fate of the "Prince of Wales" & "Renown." The Navy arguably had enough on its plate making aircraft carriers work without pursuing high-performance land-based aircraft.… (meer)

A professional life of one the United States Navy's master technocrats; Joseph Reeves having been at the cutting edge of the gunnery revolution of the early 20th century before becoming the father of carrier strike force doctrine in the USN. This is before turning into an apostle of operational readiness in the Thirties. Though it's no fault of the author, seeing as Reeves was apparently not given to recording his personal opinions for posterity, it would have been fascinating to know what the impact of the Schley-Sampson feud after the battle of Santiago had on the man, seeing as he was right in the middle of it as an engineering officer on the USS Oregon, and whether this is the origins of the man's distaste for the cut and thrust of bureaucratic battle.… (meer)