James H. Willbanks

I own a variety of books about WWII generals. This is an interesting edition from the perspective of professional schooling in the Army and how it contributed (or not) to the outcome and performance of the Army's 5 star generals. 4 out of 5 seemed to benefit for the better. MacArthur was rather full of himself and it seemed he was rather cool to whether others could train him better than what he already knew. But credit is given to him for his strengths (and notes to his weaknesses).

I had not read much on Hap Arnold so learning of his background and influence on the Army Air Corps was interesting.

The 5 mini-biographies are written by different authors (all from Army schools) so their writings are not totally consistent, but still readable.

Decent addition to my library.… (meer)

It's been about twenty-plus years since Keith Nolan's account of Lam Son 719 was published so it was high time that someone revisited that operation and this book probably represents about as good an accounting as one is likely to get. While keeping in mind that there is nothing here to change my sense that we could have ever saved Pres. Thieu and his administration from ultimate failure one does come away with a lot more respect for the long-suffering average ARVN trooper and how they were let down by flag-grade officers chosen mostly for their political reliability and not their military capacity. Further, as the title implies, the whole concept of launching a corps-sized assault sending the cream of the ARVN into the teeth of the strength of the PAVN was probably always a dubious concept and it does not reflect well on Creighton Abrams to have backed it in the first place; but wishful thinking was always the soul of the American experience in Vietnam. More sadly, such wishful thinking is still alive and well today.… (meer)

If you have been reading about the Vietnam War since the fall of Saigon, much of the material in this fine synthesis will be familiar to you. However, if you're looking for a one-book examination that will give you the sweeping strategic and operational perspective of the war from 1968 to 1975, this is the study for you. What you will not get is an easy assignment of blame, and I suspect that Willbanks' even-handedness infuriates the partisan with legitimate claims to their bitterness. In the end though, Willbanks finds Vietnamization to have mostly been a failure and, if you push the implications, you have to conclude that the key American mistake was LBJ's halting embrace of the "big war" strategy at the very outset in 1965.

Also, though it is not really the mission of the author, this book often leaves you wondering about the strengths of the Hanoi government, and how much was victory due to Beijing and Moscow providing support to the end, to patriotic fervor for a united Vietnam, or to unabashed Bolshevik bloody-mindedness by Ho Chi Minh and his successors. I doubt that it's possible yet to write this book.… (meer)