Applying Philosophy of Science

In the Welcome and Introductions thread, I stated:

…normative PoS has little bearing on what we (a geotechnical engineering consulting firm) do. This worries me a bit.

LolaWalser, asked:

Why does this worry you?

I think that the philosophy of science should work to advance the sciences and, in turn, the sciences should take methodological recommendations (in part) from PoS. I see problems in both directions. I worry that philosophers, with some important exceptions, do not perform the requisite work to bring PoS into the implementation level, and scientists ignore the potentially helpful insights and recommendations of philosophers and other methodologists.

For example, many sciences need to select models (curves) from data in order to make predictions and make important decisions. Model selection is a nontrivial philosophical problem with practical consequences. The usual method in many businesses involves using Excel’s built-in curve fitting by selecting a trend line from a set of equations of varying degrees and eyeballing the fit. This is “good enough” in some ways, but it certainly could be better, given the research done in the subject, and given the problem of over fitting (that is, ramping up the number of parameters to perfectly fit the data as well as noise).

A great example of applied PoS is Causation, Prediction, and Search, Second Edition by Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines. Therein they set forth a formal theory of causal inference involving Bayesian networks. Blurb: "The authors show that the relationship between causality and probability can also help to clarify such diverse topics in statistics as the comparative power of experimentation versus observation, Simpson's paradox, errors in regression models, retrospective versus prospective sampling, and variable selection." The authors have (with the help of others) developed TETRAD-- a software implimentation of their philosophical/formal ideas.

Your thoughts? Can/should philosophy of science be applied? How? Examples?

I think that the philosophy of science should work to advance the sciences and, in turn, the sciences should take methodological recommendations (in part) from PoS.

Do you also think philosophy of art should work to "advance art'"? What about, um, the philosophy of LOVE and its subject? :)

Frankly (and I'm fairly sure I speak for a large number of my colleagues) I have no interest in philosophy of science--NOW, after 16 years of benchwork. Once upon a time, a gentler, high-schoolish time, I may have entertained some such notions of philosophy--well, not exactly "advancing" science (science has done remarkably well all on its own, pre- and post-Popper et al.)--but at least, I don't know, mattering to it. As it turns out (she said, eyeing her Philosophiae Doctor wistfully), it doesn't.

But perhaps I'm a narrow-minded intellectual hick--and after all, what's true for my science/field may not be true for another. Still, as far as I can glean from my fairly wide trade reading (I have never in my entire professional career TALKED about PoS with my colleagues--nobody brings it up), it doesn't appear scientists in general think PoS any more useful or pertinent than I do. What's the problem?

Could it be that it's naive, useless and ultimately simply wrong to imagine modern philosophers "advancing" science, because they seem to have no idea of the realities and practicalities of research?

scientists ignore the potentially helpful insights and recommendations of philosophers and other methodologists.

I'd love to see a demonstration of a real life example of a scientific study which would have profited from professional insight from philosophers.

If I need to learn better modelling or statistical analysis, I'll turn to mathematicians; for help with experimental design, first of all to people with practical experience. I couldn't begin to trust a person with no practical knowledge of experimental research (students, of course, are there to gain that knowledge). I couldn't begin to trust someone who has had less math than I did (we might run into some geographical/national differences here as well... European scientific education, at pre-grad school levels especially, tends to be considerably more rigorous than the American one) and above all, did not use those skills in the situations I'm encountering.

Can/should philosophy of science be applied? How? Examples?

My answer: Doesn't apply/Don't know any. However! One way to determine whether PoS can contribute to science would be to have mature, finished PoSers (the more advanced their degrees the better) study science--go through the whole process, of course, grad school to postdoc to, ahem, probably another postdoc...

If these candidates perform significantly better than mere non-philosophical scientists (appropriately matched for age etc.--maybe also throw in a control group of, I don't know, sociologists? art historian-scientists?--don't want my experimental design called in question here!), your case is made.

A great example of applied PoS

I'll look this up and report if I find a way to use it.

Lastly, I hope I didn't sound unfriendly--and there was no intention to offend. Simply trying to convey a bit of your average scientific Joe's view.

"Once upon a time, a gentler, high-schoolish time, I may have entertained some such notions of philosophy--well, not exactly "advancing" science ... but at least, I don't know, mattering to it. As it turns out... it doesn't."

Philosophy by itself is certainly a wide and disparate field of knowledge, and certainly its a stretch to say that all of it has applications to science, but I think its a bit presumptuous to assume that logic, critical thinking and several other areas of philosophy have no bearing what-so-ever on scientific practice. I don't do calculations, work out the logic sequences or do the mathematical processing involved in computation when checking e-mail on my computer, but I won't deny that all of these things have a bearing in how the computer works to deliver spam to my inbox. Likewise, bench scientists may not directly apply PoS to their everyday work, but to say that it has no bearing, hasn't had a bearing and won't ever have a bearing on scientific practice seems a bridge too far to me.

its a bit presumptuous to assume that logic, critical thinking and several other areas of philosophy have no bearing what-so-ever on scientific practice.

And it's more than a bit presumptuous to assume a working scientist has had no acquaintance with logic and critical thinking because she has no use for PoS.

I see logic as part of mathematics--just like "calculations" and "mathematical processing". As for critical thinking, I think you'll find many people somehow manage to learn and employ it without holding hands with philosophers of science.

to say that it has no bearing, hasn't had a bearing and won't ever have a bearing on scientific practice seems a bridge too far to me.

I'll reserve my trust and most of my attention for people who know of scientific practice.

LolaWalser,

I had anticipated this sort of reaction from a scientist. Generally, there is a great deal of contempt for philosophy, perhaps due to its construal as being synonymous with fluffy, pomo, intellectual onanism. This is wrong. I'll try to explain.

Frankly (and I'm fairly sure I speak for a large number of my colleagues) I have no interest in philosophy of science--NOW, after 16 years of benchwork.

This is a strange group for you to sign-up for. ;)

I'd love to see a demonstration of a real life example of a scientific study which would have profited from professional insight from philosophers.

When I have time, I'll chose a specific example I am most familiar with, but for the time being:

Scientific disciplines founded by or having major contributions from philosophers: logic (Aristotle, Frege, Russell and countless others), economics (Adam Smith, Hume), psychology (William James), computer science (Godel, Church, logician precursors), probability theory, welfare economics (Rawls, Nozick), sociology (Auguste Comte, Marx), physics (Mach, Reichenbach)...

Methodological and conceptual contributions: inductive methods (Bacon, Mill), bayesian inference methods (Carnap), bayesian statistics (Ramsey, Seidenfeld), causal discovery (Spirites, Glymour), belief revision (Levi), object language/metalanguage distinction (Carnap), the role of simplicity in inference (Aristotle, Ockham)...

Problems faced by scientific inquiry and identified by philosophers: the problem of induction (Hume), underdetermination of theory by evidence (Quine), Dutch book problem (Ramsey)...

Specific software for discovery: *edit* MYCIN (created by a student of Hempel's), TETRAD...

The history of science is to a large degree intermingled with philosophy. See History of Tweentieth Century Philosophy of Science for more details.

Now, you might be tempted to make an ad hoc move to say that when it was helpful, it was science (or math/logic), and when not, it is philosophy, but that is a philosophers (re)definition game. ;)

No offence taken, by the way.

#4

Those are all wonderful appeals to authority, but if you're not interested in doing anything other than touting your credentials and ignoring what anyone else has to say, why are you even posting here? Last time I checked "working scientists" are not the arbiters of all things science.

EDIT: In fact, probably my favorite working scientist launched his career from the seat of his desk in a patent office after failing to get a job in academia. Given that the history of science is littered with autodidactics, self-funded entrepreneurs and anyone with enough genuine curiosity, I find the claim that only a bench chemist knows whats up incredibly silly.

I had anticipated this sort of reaction from a scientist.

Glad I didn't disappoint!

Generally, there is a great deal of contempt for philosophy,

There is? You shock me. Yes, I'm well aware of the travails of postmodernism and its spats with science, but, first, we don't all need to be lectured on what philosophy is (or was) beyond this category or cajoled into "tolerating" it. I love classical philosophy and if I were talking to an ancient Greek I'd very proudly describe myself as a philosopher to hiim. (I still sometimes talk of science as "practical philosophy" but only to people who don't need my background and idiosyncrasies explained.)

This is a strange group for you to sign-up for. ;)

Actually, I didn't sign up for it, nor do I intend to. Unless you wish to pay me to jeer from the sidelines... :) No, sorry, as I said I personally have no interest in PoS, but I will be checking occasionally to see what sort of crowd you draw.

When I have time, I'll chose a specific example I am most familiar with, but for the time being:

Really, a specific example of a scientific study which would profit from professional philosopher's insight is all I need. I certainly DON'T need this appallingly condescending rundown of history of philosophy and science. Are you SERIOUS?! I've been to school, sir--probably for much longer than you. I've even read a few books on the subjects!

Look, I'll try to keep my good humour (I started replying to your post as I was reading it, never expecting this ridiculous "History of philosophy for dummies" capsule) and assume you're simply naive, or have never in your whole life talked to a scientist. How in the world do you expect me to have graduated HIGH SCHOOL without philosophy? History? Logic? Mathematics?

Piece of advice: never underestimate the general education of a stranger. Is it because Americans seem to have lower expectations when it comes to schooling?

Now, you might be tempted to make an ad hoc move to say that when it was helpful, it was science (or math/logic), and when not, it is philosophy, but that is a philosophers (re)definition game. ;)

Is it now? Told you I'm a philosopher!

It is quite clear philosophers are feeling a bit rudderless these days, toppling from all-encompassing "love of wisdom" to... indeed, I'm not sure what.

>6 Yiggy:

I find YOU incredibly silly. :)

How condescending you are.

This

"Piece of advice: never underestimate the general education of a stranger. Is it because Americans seem to have lower expectations when it comes to schooling?"

Is rich when you jumped into this thread with your PhD on your sleeve talking to everyone like imbeciles who need some more schooling.

>8 LolaWalser:

Johnny and I have have both been pretty cordial in this thread. Every response you've made has been either.

1) How we shouldn't bother discussing with you because you know more, so we should just go away because we won't be listened to anyways.

2) Ad hominem replies.

3) A rebuke about how arguments are beneath you (because you've studied them before, its ok we'll trust your word) rather than a reply to the arguments and their relevence themselves.

If you're not interested in actual discussion, please go somewhere else.

johnnylogic,

I find your example interesting. I know the Spirtes et al. work slightly (I've met Richard Scheines a few times, and I've played around with the models in their TETRAD software package). It always struck me that they seemed to be doing essentially statistical work with philosophical lingo. There's a huge literature in statistics on causal modeling (Jamie Robbins, Don Rubin and Judea Pearl being a few of the bigger names in the field), and I think most statisticians feel that this topic is part of our field, rather than part of philosophy. While Sprites and friends obviously borrow heavily from statistical methods, there seems to be little awareness of the extent to which they might be duplicating, or at least partially overlapping, previous work.

I'm probably somewhere along the spectrum between you and Lola here. I think that philosophy has a great deal to offer science. For instance, philosophers are well trained to think about causality per se, and naturally there's an exceedingly rich and ancient tradition of work in this field. But is a philosopher still a philosopher when he's constructing Bayesian networks to test causal hypotheses? Isn't he doing statistics? It reminds me of a joke I once heard, that analytic philosophers would wear lab coats if they thought they could get away with it. (I think the joke was told of a specific analytic philosopher, but I don't remember whom.)

I'm not concerned about philosophers stepping on my professional toes and I don't think there's any need for interdisciplinary pissing matches. Heaven knows, every part of statistics overlaps with somebody else's backyard. But I do think there's sometimes a too vague boundary between PoS and S. The danger is that philosophers can end up confidently doing crap (or at least redundant) science, and scientists can end up confidently basing their work on and publishing crap philosophy. It seems kind of paradoxical, but I think that sharper boundaries can foster more rather than less cross-pollination of ideas.

Any thoughts, anyone?

I think the term "philosophy of science" is a diservice to its own intended subject matter. The original post spoke of methodology, which is probably a accurate way to describe what everyone seems to be talking about. It's about "How do you find out what is true?" Now, that may seem like fluff and diapers, but that's only by historical association. Past philosophical attempts to discover "truth" have been riddled with such fluff and have been, consequently, rendered obsolete. That doesn't mean that the philosophy of science is destined to the same fate.

Put simply, the teaching of scientific methodology is terribly poor. The subject of Science in education has largely been populated with scientific facts rather than the process of doing science itself. Pick up any science book and what you'll mostly find is not science. It will have things that scientists have discovered and found out, but science is really about HOW you find things out. A Science text that does nothing but tell you what you should accept as true is just as bad as a theological manuscript. It's no wonder that some poorly informed adults see Science as just another belief system. It's because most of science is TAUGHT as a belief system instead of as a method.

Good practices in scientific methodology are actually reflections of how humans learn. We learn through the experience of cause and effect relationships. Any practice that helps a scientist to experience and identify cause and effect relationships between natural phenomenon will take them closer to understanding how the universe works. This can include anything from the use of scientific instruments that help us observe phenomenon that are outside our own normal sensory range, to the use of repeated trials to add to the reliability of an observation of a possible cause and effect relationship.

More than anything, it is the misunderstanding of scientific methodology that prevents the general public from being able to evaluate findings. Perhaps the discussion of methodology will be of little benefit to a scientist who is already well steeped in the methods and procedures typical of their own area of expertise, but it could be of great benefit to non-experts. In turn, if the layperson and the student have a better grasp of scientific methodology, that also helps the expert because then they are less beset with people who might not appreciate their own work.

#5-Johnnylogic:

Thank you for the reference to the downloadable History of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science. For an overview, and a preparation for these discussions, it is terrific.

As a layman, I have no credentials for this discussion, but I do think that scientific experimentation is hampered by insufficient understanding of statistics, or manipulation thereof.

As an IT person, I welcome the new interrelationship with computer science, just as the previous interrelationships with logic, linguistics and semantics broadened the scope of philosophy.

From #1 "The usual method in many businesses involves using Excel’s built-in curve fitting by selecting a trend line from a set of equations of varying degrees and eyeballing the fit."

This may be the business practice but it by no means describes science - even plain old bench chemists and the even worse biochems people would never get away with "eyeballing the fit"!

I wouldn't regard the philosophy of science as the arguments over which regression analysis is most appropriate for a given problem. that is a particular statistical argument, to be considered by statisticians and the conclusions communicated to others in associated fields through journals etc.

To me I 'd regard PoS as a discussion over the peer review process, falsification of theories, and confirmation bias. which is what ispired this group.

It is all very well saying "scientists accrue data and then look for the most parsimonious explanation, all the while striving against the merest shadow of confirmation bias and to actively falsify any theory thats been proposed." but at a practical individual level that simply is not possible. Data isn't painstakingly accrued - There are reams, miles and years of data*. Falsification and confirmation bias are looked after by the peer review process, and the other individuals whose theory your new theory contends with.

As a practising scientist I too would prefer not to recieve info dumps of philosophical history, being already well aware of the fact that there are competing methods. (methodology is the study of methods something which is already taught in science)

* anyone know of the proper units for data - bytes?

#15: Regarding units, statisticians like to talk about datapoints. So how about points, kilopoints, ..., petapoints, etc. :)

All,

Wow. I didn't expect such a relatively rarified subject to recieve so much immediate attention-- I am pleasantly suprised. I should clarify my modest claims.

PoS, in order to be a more fruitful discipline, should pay attention to implementation-level concerns in science and try to meet what I call Hausman's challenge ("Philosophers of science have learned a great deal about science, but the knowledge falls short of any usable algorithm for scientific practice or theory choice,” Daniel M. Hausman, The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, Introduction): PoS should aim for providing such usable methods, though they have thusfar not (largely) met this goal. PoSt is well situated to do this because of its theoretical, interdisciplinary nature and emphasis on logical and mathematical tools. Also, philosophy has always been the incubator of sciences

I do not claim that PoS is, or should be, the sole authority in things methodological, nor that it always meets this goal. Some work by philosophers of science is junk (maybe even a majority of it), but this does not mean that philosophers have nothing to contribute.

My infodump in #5 was meant to illustrate the many contributions of philosophers to science, many of which can be used to refute the claim that philosophers do not, or cannot, advance science, as I understood LolaWalser to be making.

johnascott,

Spirtes et al. are, from what I know, very much in the mainstream of causal inference, and have their names attached to nontrivial theorems, as do some of their students (Christopher Meek, for instance). I leafed through Pearl's book Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference last night, and noticed that nearly half of the bibliography refers to the work of philosophers.

Causality has been the subject of philosophical interst before there was a discipline of statistics, and continues to borrow ideas from other disciplines, as needed. Philosophy is promiscuous like that-- for many this is part of its appeal. i am not sure how to properly divide science from PoS, as they tend to meet when any sufficiently abstract, or speculative question is entertained.

Lunar,

I couldn't agree more.

reading_fox,

Biochems have more rigorous standards than some disciplines, particularly those out of the research field, and in the applied sciences. My point is that methods should be backed by sound theory.

Regarding model selection, I do not think disciplinary boundaries are worth enforcing, generally. PoS should be in dialogue with the sciences, and model selection is a problem wherein exchange can result in mutual benefit; Simplicity, Inference and Modelling : Keeping it Sophisticatedly Simple and The Nature of Scientific Evidence: Statistical, Philosophical, and Empirical Considerations are excellent examples of this sort of interaction, where philosophers contribute by exploring the ramifications of particular methodologies, explicating their interrelationships and proposing changes.

Writing these posts is surprisingly time-consuming, but I promise to eventually elucidate the application issue with examples from the intersection of machine learning and PoS.

Finally, a relevant quote:

"There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination." —Daniel Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995.

I should mention that the reference above--Hickey's History of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science--is a bit idiosyncratic in its treatment of PoS, and contains some rants, but it not a bad free starting place. The entries of Stanford's Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy are better, but more focused and advanced.

>11 scottja: johnascott,

nice post. However, I think the question of boundaries obtains between PoS and mathematics and it's sub-fields, logic, statistics etc. and not between PoS and science. Science is a sort of philosophy (a fascinating topic on its own, no doubt), but PoS isn't science, any more than philosophy of mathematics is mathematics or philosophy of art art.

Btw, people should take care not to conflate this abbreviation (PoS) for Philosophy of Science with philosophy, or PoSers with philosophers in general. My previous posts dealt explicitly with the former (I thought that was clear enough, but apparently not to all...)

>15 reading_fox: reading fox

chemists and the even worse biochems people

I probably ought to pretend I didn't see this... Dissing biology is so 19th century, dear colleague!

almigwin:

I do think that scientific experimentation is hampered by insufficient understanding of statistics, or manipulation thereof.

Manipulation actually presupposes a very good understanding of statistics, not its lack. Be that as it may, I find your statement perplexing in its generality. Is there evidence of a massive shortage of statistical understanding/manipulation across all scientific fields, or are you simply saying it is good we should understand and apply statistics properly? I can at least assure you that for my part, I have relied on collaboration with biostatisticians whenever the complexity of data required it--as I believe is quite routine. I also rely on physical chemists to prepare my microbubbles, on engineers to build my sonic probes, and on medics to identify suitable subjects for our studies. IOW--it is common scientific practice to ensure our competency by working in multidisciplinary teams.

johnnylogic:

Biochems have more rigorous standards than some disciplines, particularly those out of the research field, and in the applied sciences. My point is that methods should be backed by sound theory.

More rigorous standards of what?

Next, is your contention that biochemistry and applied sciences have laboured all this time employing methods without the backing of "sound theory"? If it is, can you show it is true?

Now, assuming that it is true (to speed things up--I personally think it's a ridiculous statement--Not Even Wrong), what does it tell you, if the achievements of science so far have been produced "without" the backing of sound theory--such as you envisage?

And thank you for this quote, it provides a fitting conclusion:

"Philosophers of science have learned a great deal about science, but the knowledge falls short of any usable algorithm for scientific practice or theory choice,”

#19 - I am currently working with biologists so I felt a little bit entitled!

" I do not think disciplinary boundaries are worth enforcing"
Well in principle yes, you are quite right. In practice however it takes too long to become sufficiently trained in one field to start contiplating sufficient mastery in another field in order to re-invent the wheel for your particular experiment.

#19 LolaWalser,
Your explanation of the way you work and your committment to interdisciplinary research construction is admirable, but I don't think it obtains everywhere. There is a place where business goals and scientific standards don't always mesh as well as they might.
I have been thinking of the way pharmaceutical companies and medical groups do clinical trials. Their sampling techniques are not always so terrific. It may be that you can not always create the proper sample if you are dealing with human populations, volunteers, or people with rare diseases.
The Food and Drug Administration decides on approval based on these studies.
See Vioxx or Thalidomide.
I would have to do a lot of research to give examples of the manipulation of statistics for economic gain, but one example is the tobacco industry.

#21: I actually think clinical trials are typically conducted with a very high level of statistical sophistication, both at major pharmaceutical companies and in academic medicine. Certainly, no major clinical trial in industry goes ahead without extensive biostatistical expertise, generally in the form of doctoral-level supervision of the experimental design and data analysis protocol. And the best medical journals involve statisticians in the peer review process, and papers submitted without evidence of expert statistical guidance (usually in the form of a statistical co-author) are routinely turned away.

I can't speak with any knowledge about the thalidomide situation (which was some time ago now), but the trouble with Vioxx really had nothing to do with flawed clinical trials. It was a case of excessive off-label prescribing. The risk/benefit ratio of the Cox-2 inhibitors looks very different for the population of individuals with severe inflammatory disease for whom the drugs were indicated (and on whom the drugs were tested) than it does for the millions of folks with minor aches and pains who ended up getting prescriptions.

The problem was the marketing, not the science. In the case of Vioxx and, much more egregiously, tobacco, there was outright deception involved. If corporations want to break the law to make a few bucks, no amount of statistical expertise is going to stop that. A tighter and less politicized regulatory environment might help, though!

I'm certainly not arguing against learning statistics. Hey, I think everyone should learn statistics! :) But I don't think that widespread statistical ignorance is the source of the problems you see, almigwin. I think it's just good old venal greed and corruption.

22: It looks like I was blaming the wrong folks, and blaming statistical ignorance when it was greed. But I do know that drugs have come onto the market that had not been tested long term. A lot of the use of estrogen, for example, turned out not to be so safe. In future, I think I had better read these posts, and let the professionals do the speaking out.

#23: Please don't stop posting! I think it's highly detrimental to science when scientists only talk to each other. We all have blind spots, as individuals and as disciplines, and these are often easier to see from the outside.

Your point about long-term testing is absolutely right. In principle, this is another kind of cost/benefit decision on the part of the regulatory agencies. The cost is the cost of unknown long-term side effects. The benefit is the benefit of being able to treat sick people ASAP. So, in theory, the FDA should be rushing through approval for, say, drugs designed to fight particularly lethal cancers, whereas they should be more cautious in approving (your example is a good one) hormone replacement therapy to alleviate uncomfortable symptoms of menopause and help prevent osteoporosis. (Although, since the hormones were medically available long before they became a standard regimen for menopausal symptoms, that one wasn't so much in the FDA's hands.)

But in practice, this has been an area of particular politicization, with trendy treatments for diseases that have powerful advocacy groups getting through faster than they should, and medications with lower profiles or with any whiff of political controversy (think women's reproductive rights) getting stonewalled.

There's an interesting situation going on right now with the Merck HPV vaccine. It's already been approved, of course, but there's considerable debate over whether it should be made mandatory, with many opponents of mandatory vaccination citing the lack of long-term testing as their main concern. Of course, some of the opponents of vaccination are fundie nutjobs who seem to think a few thousand cervical cancer deaths each year are well worth it if it means that there's some vague chance that teenage girls might be paranoid about sex before marriage, which makes the whole issue a little murkier to me. I guess I'm running well off-topic now. Sorry!

#24:
Thanks for not objecting to my non-professional opinions.
The HPV situation is a complex blend of attitudes toward pre-marital sex, and concerns about government interference in parental decisions.

It seems obvious to me, that because of the 'statistical' proof of early sexual activity on the part of minors in this society (due to cases of std's and pregnancies), it would be a very good thing if all girls were immunized. Also, puberty is occurring earlier and earlier, due to diet, hormones in food and unknown elements.

But our combination of puritanism and lots of sex in the media will probably make this a fight like abortion.
We are really very 'schizy'. (Cognitive dissonance).

Lola- Why was Quine elected to the NAS?

Johnnylogic, in an earlier post, you were dismissive of a potential argument against contributions to science from philosophers of science:

Now, you might be tempted to make an ad hoc move to say that when it was helpful, it was science (or math/logic), and when not, it is philosophy, but that is a philosophers (re)definition game. ;)

I'm not yet completely disabused of the notion you're arguing against here. (Let me re-emphasize that I'm not a doubter of the utility of PoS to S altogether - my intuitive position is more that the ideal contributions are more, say, "structural" and less detailed than Spirtes' work.) As I mentioned earlier, the Spirtes work really seems like science (specifically, statistics) to me, with a surfeit of philosophical-sounding lingo.

So let me put it to you (and everyone else) directly: What is philosophy of science? What distinguishes it from science? And if your answer is that nothing distinguishes it from science in some cases, why shouldn't we see philosophers of science as scientists with possibly suboptimal scientific training in those cases?

Isn't it the purpose of Pos to define the function of science,
the nature of scientific truth,
the methods to be used in science, (hypothesis and experiment construction, replication of results), types of sampling,
peer review,
responsibility to attempt to refute others findings, and the limits of inference from data?

The role of science in the world and what if any power scientists should have in determining or controlling public policy as in the NIH or the FDA could be considered within the scope of pos.

Well said, almigwin, thanks. I think your view more or less coincides with mine, except that I'd consider "types of sampling" to be more a technical statistical issue than a PoS issue.

29-If the sampling is poorly constructed, sloppy or inadequate, the whole edifice crumbles.

But you may be right that it is a technical rather than a philosophical issue.

Would you consider medical ethics or what is called bioethics a part of pos?

#30 - That's a good question. I suspect that bioethics is usually considered a subspecialty of ethics, which would be a specialty of philosophy generally, rather than a subspecialty of PoS. But maybe one of the philosophers in the group can address this. Certainly there are unique issues in bioethics that are distinguished from generally ethical issues by their impact on the scientific enterprise as a whole.

LolaWalser(#19),

Biochems have more rigorous standards than some disciplines, particularly those out of the research field, and in the applied sciences. My point is that methods should be backed by sound theory.

More rigorous standards of what?

More rigorous standards of experimentation, modeling and methodology in general.

Next, is your contention that biochemistry and applied sciences have labored all this time employing methods without the backing of "sound theory"? If it is, can you show it is true?

Now, assuming that it is true (to speed things up--I personally think it's a ridiculous statement--Not Even Wrong), what does it tell you, if the achievements of science so far have been produced "without" the backing of sound theory--such as you envisage?

To quote a scientist, "There is nothing more practical than a good theory." We are able to do quite a lot without theory in many areas of human endeavor. However, theory may allows us to systematize, optimize, predict and control where we could not do so before. I could imagine breeders making the same argument before Mendelian genetics.

What makes you think that science as currently practiced is optimal? How would you suggest our methods be improved, if not by reasoning about and a theory of its methods? This is just PoS. Can you give me a specific example of PoS and how it is as useless as you claim?

reading_fox (#20),

Well in principle yes, you are quite right. In practice however it takes too long to become sufficiently trained in one field to start contiplating sufficient mastery in another field in order to re-invent the wheel for your particular experiment.

True, such a division of labor is necessary. None of this argues against dialogue between PoS and other disciplines, rather, I would think it speaks for it.

johnascott (#27),

Are you arguing against Spirites, et al's tone or content? Can you give some examples of superfluous "philosophical-sounding lingo"? You seem to be using 'philosophical' as a synonym for inexact.

Pearl at least seems to value PoS. He was cordial at the American Philosophical Association meeting, where he defended Causality, and in the frontmatter, he thanks philosophers: "James Woodward, Nancy Cartwright, Brian Skyrms, Clark Glymour, and Peter Spirtes have sharpened my thinking of causality in and outside philosophy." An Amazon search in the book itself yield's multiple references to Spirites, et al, wherein he addresses their substantive points, not to dismiss them.

The redefinition move is a vacuous way to win any argument, like the no true scotsman fallacy. That is what I object to.

So let me put it to you (and everyone else) directly: What is philosophy of science? What distinguishes it from science? And if your answer is that nothing distinguishes it from science in some cases, why shouldn't we see philosophers of science as scientists with possibly suboptimal scientific training in those cases?

Philosophers of science are concerned with the understanding the nature, methods, theoretical products and success of the sciences. PoS uses the traditional methods of philosophy (conceptual analysis, explication) to this end, but also mathematical, logical and naturalistic methods are used as well. If you wish to call people who pursue such questions methodologists or gavagai, I don't care-- I'm just interested in the questions. Basically, science involves the use of hypothesis formation, modeling, experimentation, and test in an effort to discover, explain, predict and control natural phenomena. PoS and science are primarily distinguished by the level of abstraction and can benefit from each other (see Machine Learning and the Philosophy of Science (PDF) by Jon Williamson for an excellent overview of a mutually beneficial interaction between the disciplines).

almigwin (#28)

Good summary.

#33: Thanks for the definition and the Williamson link - I'll give it a look. Just for the record, I don't "object" to Spirtes' work at all. I don't know the substance well enough to object or approve, but as far as I know it's well regarded by those who do know it. Nor am I trying to win any arguments, vacuously or otherwise. I'll save that for when I eventually get around to making a case for Bayesianism :)

I'm just working through the issue that the subject matter and methods of Spirtes work clash with my admittedly lay understanding of the subject matter and methods of PoS. (Again, this understanding was summarized well by almigwin in #28.) I can see that the use of the phrase "philosophical-sounding lingo" may have sounded dismissive. I was just trying to express my impression that this kind of work was essentially statistics, though possibly superficially not-statistics.

My concern with boundaries stems from my observation of different subdisciplines of statistics independently and wastefully developing essentially the same methods. It's all too common that a longitudinal trials specialist in biostatistics may find herself struggling with an issue that was solved by time series specialists in econometrics 20 years ago, but she would never know where to look for the solution or how to recognize it when she saw it, because of differences in language and notation between the two disciplines. My hypothesis is that these problems would be mitigated if it were clearer to all where longitudinal analysis ends and time series analysis begins, so that my hypothetical biostatistician would be able to recognize that she had just run into a fundamentally econometric problem, and would know to consult with an econometrician or to look in the econometric literature.

I'm concerned that the same sort of situation might apply in areas where PoS overlaps with science. (I suppose causal modeling is such an area.) It may be, as you imply, that the boundaries are not all that important after all. It's just an issue that sprang into my mind because of my relationship to your example in #1.

Johnny, I hate to join in this debate, as I'm not very interested in Philosophy of Science, but could you please read these questions again and answer them properly:

>Lolawalser:Next, is your contention that biochemistry and applied sciences have laboured all this time employing methods without the backing of "sound theory"? If it is, can you show it is true?

Let me simplify: do you think that all the achievements of biochemistry etc. have been serendipitous, discovered by methodologically blind people groping around?

You replied

>johnnylogic: theory may allows us to systematize, optimize, predict and control where we could not do so before.

Does that mean biochemists operate without any knowledge of biochemistry (which is the so-called "theory")?

Does that mean they have not been capable of systematizing, optimizing, predicting and controlling anything before?

Do you realize how absurd such an argument sounds?

>Lolawalser:Now, assuming that it is true (to speed things up--I personally think it's a ridiculous statement--Not Even Wrong), what does it tell you, if the achievements of science so far have been produced "without" the backing of sound theory--such as you envisage?

You did not reply to this question, but never mind.

>johnnylogic:What makes you think that science as currently practiced is optimal? How would you suggest our methods be improved, if not by reasoning about and a theory of its methods? This is just PoS.

Why do you think the enhancement or correction of methodology belongs to some metaphysical or "logical" (analytically) realm? Does it occur to you that methodology comes about according to the nature of the experiment at hand, and that modifying or changing methods is inherent to the work of doing science itself, rather than requiring a philosophy of praxis as a crutch to fall back on?

Let me put it another way - say you are an inventor, with a concept but no tools or materials. What would be your first step? Do you sit down to "theorize" about the practice of building? Or do you familiarize yourself with the science or engineering required, try to make an educated guess about what you need based on your learning and experience, and attempt to build your concept? And when aspects of your construction fail, or you realize what you have built is something different from the concept you envisaged, do you not automatically try other methods or expand your concept? This is a very simplistic example and I am no scientist, so someone can feel free to correct me here, but what I am getting to is that I think your 'philosophy of (practice of) science' sounds redundant to LolaWalser because it already is immanent in the act of doing science. Sure, you can specialize in a philosophy of a particular scientific method (but I don't call that philosophy) when you are engaged with that scientific method, but do you realize how meaningless such a philosophy is by itself, as a field of its own, divorced from any reference to real data, actual experimentation, etc.?

>fluffy, pomo, intellectual onanism

These comments always make me chuckle, particularly in the light of tautological arguments with little or no definition of concepts, from allegedly critical, consistent and rigorous 'philosophers'.

Let me simplify: do you think that all the achievements of biochemistry etc. have been serendipitous, discovered by methodologically blind people groping around? Does that mean biochemists operate without any knowledge of biochemistry (which is the so-called "theory")?

No. What reading of what I have posted would prompt these questions? Theory of scientific methodology, not an individual science. Science's success has come with reflection about method (see Galileo' or Newton's writings for plenty of methodological talk) and it is certainly not serendipitous, but possibly suboptimal given the many outstanding methodological questions hanging about. Of course, how would we know if such considerations get shut down before we even consider them?

I have not claimed that there is a philosophical or theoretical prerequisite to doing science, just that it may help our scientific practice to reflect on and refine our methods with the logical, mathematical, and conceptual tools available to us.

Why do you think the enhancement or correction of methodology belongs to some metaphysical or "logical" (analytically) realm? Does it occur to you that methodology comes about according to the nature of the experiment at hand, and that modifying or changing methods is inherent to the work of doing science itself, rather than requiring a philosophy of praxis as a crutch to fall back on?

Where did you get "metaphysical" from? Replication would require us to be able to individuate components that do not magically arise from "the experiment at hand". How are we to compare experiments and results without identifying relevant commonalities and differences? If we are to automate the practice, as is the goal in machine learning, we certainly must do more than wave our hands at context of experimentation and discovery-- we are forced to model the process, which means using the aforementioned conceptual tools.

Wow—we have two people now that engage in debate, but are not interested in philosophy of science. Does anyone else want to try to satisfy this peanut gallery?

johnascott (#34),

Sorry for my tone. The potential for useless reinvention is exactly the reason why disciplines should communicate with one another.

I was just trying to express my impression that this kind of work was essentially statistics, though possibly superficially not-statistics.

I believe that their work is more than just statistics-- causal modeling happens to be a subject where there are philosophical and scientific stakes. What does it mean for one event to cause another? What is the nature of causation? How may we distinguish causation from accidental conjunctions? These all go back at least to Hume. Again, call it what you may, the questions are contemplated by philosophers, and if "just statistics" manages to be a good answer to them, then so be it. So far, the philosophical and scientific communities have collaborated pretty well on the topic.

Johnny- Existanai seems to have so many loaded assumptions that it's not worth engaging her. She is trolling. Case in point: notice the assumption that logical truth is analytic. This is not the sort of claim one gets to throw around without argument, at least, not post-Quine.

I also get the feeling that these people are painfully unaware of the truly fruitful dialogs happening between people in, for example, theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics (the same goes for theoretical biology). These are precisely the sort of areas that philosophers are well equipped to engage in, because the interpretive parts of certain empirical results quickly devolve into philosophical speculation. Just look at the Bell inequalities and the way in which they seem to force us to give up on certain common sense assumptions about the physical world. It's worth asking what, exactly, they might force us to give up and whether or not there is any way of saving our classical, realist intuitions from Bell's beast. Are the Bell inequailites really the nail in the coffin of any and all EPR-style hidden variables theories, or could stochastic (i.e. non-deterministic) hidden variables theories be proffered that allow us to save EPR style realism (which is something we may might want both on an intuitive level and on on a methodological level). From there we might ask a further question: to what extent, if any, does anti-realism effect the sort of science one does. Does one need, as Einstein thought, to hold onto realism come what may? Why or why not? These seem like questions worth asking.

>Me: Does that mean biochemists operate without any knowledge of biochemistry (which is the so-called "theory")?

>johnnylogic: What reading of what I have posted would prompt these questions?

This: "My point is that methods should be backed by sound theory."

And this: "To quote a scientist, "There is nothing more practical than a good theory.""

And this: "However, theory may allows us to systematize, optimize, predict and control where we could not do so before. "

Etc.

Apparently it's still not clear to you. If you need a good theory to to systematize, optimize, predict and control where we could not do so before, your implication is that 1) methods as they exist today are insufficient for the work of science, and/or 2) could be much improved, consequently leading to 'better science', and/or 3) there are some 'a priori' truths regarding science or scientific methodology, a la Kantian metaphysics, that determine the scope of what science can or should discover, and if these a priori truths are established, science will flourish, in whatever pre-defined way.

Firstly, you have not even attempted to explain what you mean by science, which is diverse by definition and by method. There is always crossover of course - you can study part of a tree bark at a subatomic (physics), molecular (chemistry - bonding etc.), or cellular (biology) level, but to state the obvious again, there is also enough distinction that an expert in quarks doesn't become an expert in barks. What makes 'scientific method' in theoretical physics, which is often purely mathematical at first, has little or nothing in common with the scientific methodology of a botanist.

In the first case, if the current methods are insufficient, then that does not explain how science in whatever form continues to be effective, reliable, and in practice, so your suggestion is useless. In the second case, if you want to suggest 'improvement', then you can only do it through science itself, which in my opinion is well within the domain of science and not philosophy - you cannot establishes rules for botanical methodology through pure logic, and you cannot gather black holes and white dwarfs in a laboratory to carry out tests on them. Even assuming that you want to separate the thinking-through of methodology from science, and call it a philosophy, then such philosophy can only exist as a highly specialized field that supplements a particular kind of scientific research. Because when it's decontextualized, it loses any meaning and value. Again, since you have not attempted to define anything, I can only assume that by philosophy you mean the current academic practice, and not all of philosophy since the start of recorded time.

If, however, you think a philosophy of science can and should transcend the work of science, that its ideas or principles are above and beyond specific, topical methodology, then you are merely engaging in metaphysics. Whatever the philosophical value of Kant etc., I think anyone who even vaguely remembers science from their school days should understand that a search for 'a priori' principles of knowledge are completely redundant and unnecessary where the work of science is concerned, as evinced by the existence and effectiveness of all of science itself. A physicist does not need to know whether a reality exists within or beyond the physical reality he is studying, or an ulterior knowledge exists beyond his physics, because they have no bearing at all on his study, reasoning or conclusions, which are in any case self-consistent. Whatever the philosophical implications of such a rejection, they don't matter to physics because physics is defined by restricting itself to the observable, palpable, testable, and so on. So a hunt for such transcendent principles is utterly pointless.

All the examples you have provided, of recent philosophers having a dialog with and 'aiding' scientists, is merely the critical thinking of one person coming to the help of another, an example of seeking other ways of approaching a problem, other opinions, even from outside one's field in the hope of breaking out of one's own limited approach - because everyone's mind is limited in some way and requires a little inspiration or shaking up once in a while. This, for you, is academic philosophy, but not for me - it is philosophical, certainly, but no more or no less than what non-philosophers are capable of (a point I have made before.) To oversimplify the point greatly, there is the famous anecdote of Kekule making a breakthrough with the structure of benzene, establishing that it was a ring of carbon, a notion that apparently came to him when he dreamt or thought of a snake eating its own tail; based on such an anecdote, however, I wouldn't really want to hypothesize about the usefulness of dreaming to science, although I'm sure there's a little history of that too.

>Where did you get "metaphysical" from?

See above.

>Theory of scientific methodology, not an individual science. Science's success has come with reflection about method (see Galileo' or Newton's writings for plenty of methodological talk) and it is certainly not serendipitous, but possibly suboptimal given the many outstanding methodological questions hanging about. Of course, how would we know if such considerations get shut down before we even consider them?

Galileo and Newton were establishing a foundation for further work, or defending themselves against arbitrariness and untested faith, so your example is redundant (like your earlier examples). Since the beginning of this thread you have been conflating the historical practice of science, ancient philosophy, the foundations of modern scientific method, and mostly contemporary academic philosophy, when doing so makes the very premise of your argument invalid because you can then equate almost anything in philosophy before 1800 with almost anything in science before 1800. As we're all aware these fields were not even distinct until two to three centuries ago and even now, people like yourself insist on there being underlying principles or 'commonalities' when the world is perfectly content to operate with complexity and diversity and difference. Why is that so hard to accept?

>If we are to automate the practice -- we are forced to model the process, which means using the aforementioned conceptual tools.

Why automate anything? I've answered this too above.

>it may help our scientific practice to reflect on and refine our methods with the logical, mathematical, and conceptual tools available to us.

A philosopher or series of philosophers or scientist arguing for carefully established rules of method does not convert 'scientific methodology' into philosophy any more than the original, philosophical hypotheses about the universe make astronomy a philosophical or humanitarian field. We are covering the same ground again: if you do want to call all critical thinking philosophy, then science and engineering and architecture and even, say, manufacturing or industrial design are 'philosophy', or at least their 'theoretical' parts are. And if they are not philosophy, then you have to stop and define the differences, as any non-fluffy, non-onanistic philosopher is expected to do. And yet again, if the question is irrelevant, we are free to call both critical thinking and the current academic field philosophy. And you should not be insisting on the importance of 'philosophy of science' as something above and beyond the work of science itself, or we will soon also need a 'philosophy of sports' to tie up all critiques of sport with the sports themselves, to 'round out' the athletes and further modify the 'underpinnings of their applied technique'.

-----------------------------------------------

In brief, your argument is weak if not terrible. It's certainly not up to the high standards of 'logic' you've set up, as evidenced by your dismissal of so-called 'pomo' figures.

And since we are only going round in circles, let me offer you a way out with a cue from the fluffy onanists:

At what point can critical thinking about a subject be said to have become systematized? In other words, at what point along the way from the 'naive' biology of Aristotle to the current science of biology did observation and inference establish a model called science? In what category should we place medicine, or psychology, if they both rely on scientific method but do not have the consistency or predictability or blunt applicability of other sciences?

These are interesting questions about science that, on the one hand, require a knowledge of science and, on the other, do not try to take the place of science but merely offer a perspective or history of it, and attempt to investigate cultural and other issues that may or may not be of scientific concern. These are some of the types of questions attempted by the so-called post-modernists you look down on, and, even if one does not agree with their conclusions, their arguments are far more sophisticated and mature in that they do not attempt to pose as an essential part of science or claim to be 'aiding' science. If they do end up aiding science, that is incidental, not a call for the creation of a new faculty at universities.

If the above is what you mean by "philosophy of science" - or perhaps questions concerning bioethics, or the role of political manipulation of science to serve right-wingers, etc. then yes, there is a "philosophy of science", that is of some interest. But it certainly doesn't exist as a template for all science - there are no Forty Seven Commandments or whatever.

-----------------------------------------------

>Does anyone else want to try to satisfy this peanut gallery?

The 'peanut gallery' does not seek satisfaction but, at the very least, a well-exemplified, well-reasoned and non-tautological argument from self-professed philosophers or philosophy hobbyists.

>Existanai seems to have so many loaded assumptions that it's not worth engaging her. She is trolling.

It's "he", my dear girl.

Name calling 'peanut gallery' troll' et al, is not going to be useful. I thought this group wanted input from those at the sharp edge of science, to aid in the practical interpretation of PoS. Hence almost by definition such people will have 'assumptions'. If PoS does have real benefit to practical science then, if those assumptions are faulty, PoS will be able to clearly identify why.....

'Science' as a whole is very very broad with many different ways of operation, possably mroe progress may be made by isolating one hypothetical instance of 'real' science and seeing what insights the PoS 'experts' can bring to it.

I'm completely unfamiliar with what mathmaticians do as a day job, so maybe statistics or the like is not the best case - maybe a typical recently phD qualified biochemist or synthetic chemist working for 'Big Pharma' ?

They would be part of a team, investigating potential new targets for a chosen area - we'll pick lung cancer maybe - so at a week to week level, they'll be growing cells, testing them with compounds, do they multiply/die/remain constant.

IS that a reasonable hypothetical case?

If it is - what can PoS bring to that work?

I have been following along and while I am not qualified to actually participate in this discussion as such, when I see this

In brief, your argument is weak if not terrible. It's certainly not up to the high standards of 'logic' you've set up, as evidenced by your dismissal of so-called 'pomo' figures.

in an arguement that has several logical falicies in itself, I wonder at the hubris of the poster. As an observer the arguements of one or two of the posters are convincing for thier opponents side.

Maybe it is merely that the definition of PoS has not been stated clearly enough. I will admit that it could be my understanding of the definition which could put the arguements in a different light.

My statement about "fluffy pomo onanists" was meant in parody of a mistaken view of philosophy, so try not to take it personally; I do not dismiss "continental" philosophy the way that you dismiss analytic philosophy.

Firstly, you have not even attempted to explain what you mean by science, which is diverse by definition and by method.

I have (see #33). You have chosen to overlook it. I am not interested in giving the sufficient and necessary conditions for membership in the set Science.

What makes 'scientific method' in theoretical physics, which is often purely mathematical at first, has little or nothing in common with the scientific methodology of a botanist...etc.

Really? Is human reasoning so heterogeneous so as to not admit any common description? I'm not suggestion some totalizing, once-and-for-all purely logical characterization of science. I'll settle for understanding parts, as we can.

Even assuming that you want to separate the thinking-through of methodology from science, and call it a philosophy, then such philosophy can only exist as a highly specialized field that supplements a particular kind of scientific research. Because when it's decontextualized, it loses any meaning and value.

Is this true in all contexts?

All the examples you have provided, of recent philosophers having a dialog with and 'aiding' scientists, is merely the critical thinking of one person coming to the help of another, an example of seeking other ways of approaching a problem, other opinions, even from outside one's field in the hope of breaking out of one's own limited approach - because everyone's mind is limited in some way and requires a little inspiration or shaking up once in a while. This, for you, is academic philosophy, but not for me - it is philosophical, certainly, but no more or no less than what non-philosophers are capable of (a point I have made before.)

If by science you mean all the methods of mathematics, logic, experiment, and critical thinking in general, then I guess we have to do it through science. Nothing like forcing the answer definitionally! Who's being tautological? The activities of institutionally and self-described philosophers in following their line of inquiry are not doing philosophy; they are just critically thinking. OK. I am just interested in the questions. I don't care what label you give it.

As we're all aware these fields were not even distinct until two to three centuries ago and even now, people like yourself insist on there being underlying principles or 'commonalities' when the world is perfectly content to operate with complexity and diversity and difference. Why is that so hard to accept?

I am content with both difference and sameness-- to the extent we find helpful similarities in method, we may systematize; where we cannot find common ground, we wont. I am no enemy to diversity. Good strawmanning, though.

>If we are to automate the practice -- we are forced to model the process, which means using the aforementioned conceptual tools.

Why automate anything? I've answered this too above.

There are very good practical reasons to automate scientific processes, including the production of expert systems for diagnostics, AI for exploratory satellites and robots (NASA), filtering spam, etc. There are also good theoretical reasons, as programming theories of inference tends to make clear the assumptions being made, and reveal relevant constraints (computational, time, etc.).

>Does anyone else want to try to satisfy this peanut gallery?

The 'peanut gallery' does not seek satisfaction but, at the very least, a well-exemplified, well-reasoned and non-tautological argument from self-professed philosophers or philosophy hobbyists.

Happily, I do not see it my duty to convince you, when your conclusions is forgone. I have tried to provide examples of philosophers of science aiding science, historically, and contemporarily (which was the original question), but you have defined that possibility out of being; you selectively ignore the content of my posts and you fill the gaps in with uncharitable assumptions.

I have a more than full time job, a young child, and a fence in need of building, so I will leave you to dance with your straw men.

reading_fox,

I would prefer reflecting on problems in machine learning, as I have some experience there, and the commonalities are particularly revealing, in my opinion. Unfortunately, it is unavoidably mathematical, and may turn-off some discussants. Nonetheless, if anyone is interested in discussing ML problems and PoS, I am game. This should, perhaps, be done in another thread.

>Readafew: an arguement that has several logical falicies in itself, I wonder at the hubris of the poster.

You are welcome to point out all the fallacies you see. And not to worry, I don't have that high an opinion of myself.

>I am not interested in giving the sufficient and necessary conditions for membership in the set Science.

Not needed, but your definition as stated would apply to a number of things, such as architecture. Although I am no scientist of any stripe myself, I think you just don't get how multifarious and complex the various sciences are, and speaking of them all together as "science" only makes one's argument analogous to those of religious fanatics who lump everything outside religion as one great mass of heresy.

>Is human reasoning so heterogeneous so as to not admit any common description?

Again, human reasoning does not by itself constitute philosophy or require philosophy to exist.

>I'll settle for understanding parts, as we can.

Well, good - learn and do science. Those are the 'parts' you speak of.

>Me: Because when (philosophy of science) is decontextualized, it loses any meaning and value.

> johhnylogic: Is this true in all contexts?

How many decontextualized contexts can you think of? Sorry - your question is so amusing I couldn't resist. Seriously, how many cases can you think of where a philosophy of science as I described it, being an appendage to a scientific area of research and used by the particular scientists to think about their own practice, is meaningful outside of the particular scientific field?

>If by science you mean all the methods of mathematics, logic, experiment, and critical thinking in general, then I guess we have to do it through science... Who's being tautological?

Again, you simply don't understand that science is too much of a blanket term (and even as a blanket term, not well enough defined by you.) Each science will have its own approach, methodology etc. to solve its own kinds of problems, and it does not need to refer to a philosophy textbook to discover for itself what the most effective methods of investigation, research etc. are.

>The activities of institutionally and self-described philosophers in following their line of inquiry are not doing philosophy; they are just critically thinking.

No, this is what you fail to get again. If you are following a line of inquiry within certain bounds, well and good. If you are trying to wax poetic about already existing, self-consistent fields and offer pretty hypotheses with no practical/professional understanding of the field itself, in the hope that your pretty hypotheses are some day going to supplement, or 'improve', or reinvent some of those fields, then - to put it very gently - your ideas are as relevant as all metaphysical imaginings, and whether you are a philosopher or a waitress or a tennis player, your imaginings have equal weight (or lack thereof) to the science in question, and should not necessarily be considered representative of your profession :).

Anyone can offer some valuable help to science. This does not necessarily make them de facto scientists, or philosophers of science, etc. whatever their professional designation. It does not necessarily elevate the 'help' to the level of science either.

>There are very good practical reasons to automate scientific processes

Sorry, my question was intended to be: why do you think you need 'philosophy' to automate anything in science? Why do you think science is deficient in creating its own solutions?

>I have tried to provide examples of philosophers of science aiding science, historically, and contemporarily

These examples are not what you claim them to be.

>I do not see it my duty to convince you, when your conclusions is forgone... I will leave you to dance with your straw men

This is quite amusing, because you haven't even bothered to directly reply to many of the questions you were asked. This is especially ironic in light of the fact that as a non-scientist (like myself), heading a group of mostly non-scientists, about what you call the philosophy of science, you barely address any valid criticism from the only two or three scientists on this board. Never mind me - if you can't convince them, and can't post at least one clear example of the philosophy of science 'improving science', how much more progress are you going to make in the broader world? Do you always hope to appeal to people within the inner circle of your kind of reasoning? If so, why go to all the trouble of elaborating a 'philosophy' for the good of hundreds of other fields and millions of people all of whom you shoehorn under the label 'science'?

The great strawman in all of your own arguments is that science as it exists now is incapable of devising solutions to its own problems, and somehow needs something 'added' to it, some 'performance booster' as it were - and that's what your little philosophy of science is there to provide.

It's not my duty to convince you either, but I at least offered ways for you to bolster your argument.

All of us have greater priorities, by the way. So, if I don't hear from you - take care and have fun.

My 2 cents worth of observations:

- first, I think the whole idea of attempting to "answer" this question is amusing.

- As a practicing 'scientist', my experience has been that most scientists may say they are 'uninterested' in PoS when in fact they confound this with also being painfully unaware of PoS.

Nevertheless, at the risk of (intentionally) oversimplifying, one reason everyday science does not always engage with PoS is that PoS is often concerned with the assumptions of science- and pragmatically it is unproductive for those who are practicing science to question (on a day by day basis) their working assumptions while the assumptions are 'working' (i.e. progress is perceived to be occurring).

I do not feel the need to justify my interest in PoS from a perspective of a working scientist- although, I will admit, that for me, when I follow a particular question in my field to its logical end (or fundamental beginning) the question reduces to a question of PoS.