Very clear and compelling arguments! ( )

While reading theory for my class on cognitive linguistics I saw Searle in the citations and grew curious. Was it the same Searle that I picked from the shelf at random? There was once a mystique to this Searle fellow, producing books of good introductory philosophy with excellent cover art that could change the way a girl thinks about thought. It's strange to be in an environment where my professor is an associate of Searle's. I'm still being introduced to this world of academia.

I remember being struck in particular when Searle discussed solipsism, which seemed to reflect ideas I thought might be individual to me, or which I thought of but didn't have a word for. This is quite a good little project though the closing distance between Searle and myself is the oddest thing. ( )

In a well-written book Searle brings a glimmer of sanity to the fractious debate about the mind as he shows how the most popular positions (such as material monism and Cartesian dualism) are untenable. Reliable arguments require reliable terms. Searle discusses how all traditional arguments are doomed from the start because they can be shown to use unsuitable terms.

Then Searle attempts to find some middle ground which is consistent with current scientific knowledge. He hypothesizes mentality must be causally reducible to biological processes but ontological irreducibility. In this way he discusses the generalities of consciousness, the structure of intentionality, free will, mental causation, the makeup of the unconscious, and the operation of perception and self.

As with all the common positions, his suggestions rest on good deal of hope. Thus he is prepared to admit he does not have answers to more basic questions about the origins of free will and thinking. Indeed like others he poses his questions in a presumptive way eg how does a cosmos made only of matter and fields exhibit consciousness. I enjoyed reading the book. However, time will tell how tenable his position is. ( )

The formal specification of the properties of conscious thought is a difficult subject, made more so by the dualism inherited from Descartes. How can a non-physical entity, as a mind is under dualism, effect physical change, and how does this mind ensure that the physical world exists? This book tries to explain these matters, with mind conceived of as a state of the physical brain. Searle believes that thought is not complietely determined by predictable physics, and thinks there are some quantum interactions that inject freedom into thought. This was difficult to understand, requiring re-reading in parts. ( )

Says that dualism, materialism, behaviorism, functionalism, computationalism (akin to strong AI), eliminativism, and epiphenomenalism are all false. "Biological naturalism," he says, offers the right way to think about consciousness. Other chapters address intentionality, mental causation, free will, the unconscious, perception, and the self. On the whole, I think I prefer Dennett.