This historic book may have numerous typos, missing text or index. Purchasers can download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. 1906. Not illustrated. Excerpt: ... IX. PHILOSOPHY AND THE STATE I Republic, V. 471 c to VI. 503 c] 471 c to AFTER this interlude Socrates can no longer postpone 474 a meeting the third and greatest of the 'three great waves' of the argument: All that has been said of the ideal state is excellent, and we can say a great deal more about it; but is it possible? Before revealing the paradoxical secret which he has got in store, Socrates makes some preliminary remarks on the relation of ideals generally to reality. An ideal, he tells us, is none the worse for being unrealizable. We started with asking, What is justice? and that means, What is justice in itself or as such? Now we must not expect any human being whom we call just to be, so to say, embodied justice, but must be content to regard justice as a -napibeiyna or pattern, to which the justest man approximates most nearly, but only approximates. In other words there will always be, in Plato's phraseology, a certain difference between things as they are in themselves (rd 8ma), and things as they come into existence in our actual experience (ra yiyv6ieva)1. 1 Ct, for example, 485 B. The same difference may be expressed as the difference between the ideal and the actual. Justice being of the nature of a pattern for human action, we may say boldly that what we decided to be the ideal community is the truth of human life; true human life would be as we have described it. All actual forms of human life are to a certain extent falsifications of the truth; they fall short of it. When we are asked to show the possibility of an ideal, we must first lay down that no ideal is actually possible, and that to expect it to be so is to misunderstand it. i-For it is in the nature of things that action should get less hold of the truth than words (A DEGREESis), or,