This book brought a major revision to how I viewed the causes to WWI. For example, I hadn't known that the plot to murder Archduke Ferdinand originated from inside the Serbian Government. I also was still under the impression that the German head of state launched the war. He didn't. No wonder the Germans were so perplexed at the Paris Peace Conference after the war. I was also clueless as to the role French finance played in 1) Arming the Serbian Government and 2) Developing Russian railways for their military machine. There are plenty of surprises in this book. One feeling I had leaving the book was that the Russian people deserved better leaders. It's so tragic that the good ones, like Stolypin, got assassinated along the way. Russia replaced one set of nincompoops with an even worse group. ( )

I found this book harder to read than I expected, which I think reflects the complexity of the subject matter, and the point the book is making. It tracks the various threads that led to the declarations of war in July and August 1914, and how decisions were made under faulty assumptions and wishful thinking as well as determined policy. ( )

A detailed, nuanced, objective history of the origin of the first world war. Other more superficial and perhaps entertaining accounts now seem misleading. Clark discusses the effects of the print media, of the absence of single strong executive decision makers, of the complex motivations of the participants, and of the absence of the various international mediating organizations that now exist. He also starts out with a detailed discussion of Serbia and the Balkan wars. Others mention the assassination in passing, as a triggering event only. ( )

A comprehensive account of WW1's diplomatic background and the July Crisis, and one so detailed that I think few general readers will see a need to read another book on the subject. I must admit to flipping through chunks on the Balkan Wars and French political scandals, and I can't imagine many but the most obsessed of diplomatic history buffs doing otherwise.

The sections on Serbia in particular are fascinating, however, including those on the 'plausibly deniable' links between the authorities and nationalist militants, and on the diplomatic language used to obfuscate further this murky underworld.

The author refuses to be drawn into a blame-game on the question of why the Serbian-Austrian conflict escalated into the Great War. However, three themes struck me as critical:

Firstly, military plans locked states into mobilisations that they could not scale back or pause without great risk: Germany's Schlieffen Plan and Russia's logistical plans in particular were virtually immutable. Foreign Secretary Edward Grey and Britain's military planners had given France the impression of a commitment to her defence which had never been confirmed by the Cabinet, but which in the end it decided had to be upheld.

Secondly, many leaders were obsessed with preserving the "firmness" of their response to opposing states, equating conciliation with weakness, in effect relying on the other side to back down in a game of chicken. Each side considered it the responsibility of the other side to back down, even though to do so would be as hard for the other side as for one's own. The problem with chicken is that if nobody backs down, there will be a horrendous smash; if both sides back down together and build trust by mutual concessions, there need be neither a smash nor a humiliating surrender.

And thirdly, among all these diplomats, there was no statesman. Nobody put aside the interests and biases of their own 'raison d'etat' to focus on finding a way to resolve the problem of the whole system. Germany and Russia might have jointly recognised the danger of escalation and come together to mutually pause their mobilisations and to mediate between Austria and Serbia, instead of backing their allies to the hilt. Even when pauses were made they were made reactively and separately rather than cooperatively. Too much focus on winning the deadly game of brinkmanship led to neglect of how to avoid the disastrous smash-up when nobody backed down.

Of course, the greatest tragedy of WW1 was that those who lived through it learned its lessons all too well: in the run-up to WW2, British policy in particular was obsessed with preserving peace at all costs, when a sharp armed retaliation against an aggressor might have done more to secure it in the long run. There is wisdom in the proverb, 'Speak softly, but carry a big stick'. ( )

I've always wondered out a (seemingly) isolated assassination in the Balkans lead to a global conflict and changed the direction of the 20th century. Well, now you'll know. It still won't make a bunch of sense how people could paint themselves into corners that lead to global war, but then again, it's complicated. ( )