Given the mountain of books that have been written about the Second World War, it is difficult to imagine that there is anything new to say in the subject. Yet for some time now a growing critique of the long-received wisdom has emerged, one that brings a new understanding to the factors that shaped the conflict and its outcome. James Holland's book ranks among the contributors to this critique. The first of a projected three-volume study of the war in Europe, he addresses the familiar narrative of the first 22 months of the war and offers some provocative yet convincing explanations for how events developed in the way that they did.

Holland makes it clear at the start of the book that his focus is on "operational history," or the effort to turn ideas and goal of the strategists into battlefield realities. This is a focus often missing from surveys of the war, and its use here provides for some reconsiderations of received ideas about the war. Here Germany's Wehrmacht is not the sleek, modern, panzer-driven force, but a mainly horse-drawn army that relies on a good deal of risk-taking and bluff. By contrast Germany's enemies, particularly the British, enjoy far more modern equipment and a greater edge in terms of their forces. This disparity helps to highlight the command failings, especially those of the French, which contributed to the Allied debacle in 1940. Yet the Germans themselves made numerous mistakes, many of which contributed to the prolongation of the conflict and set the stage for their defeat in the war.

An accomplished writer, Holland provides readers with an analytical narrative of the war that is both readable and interesting. While better editing could have cut down on some of the repetitions and sloppy errors, these are minor complaints given the overall quality of the book. It's one that everybody interested in the conflict should read, both for the arguments Holland makes and the overall enjoyability of the book. ( )

This is history on a grand scale. James Holland has limited himself to the war in the west, covering the period up to the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941. So in terms of territory, it reaches from the Arctic down to central Africa, from India across Europe to North America, and involves millions of people involved in the most devastating war ever fought. So, not very ambitious then.

Holland has done a brilliant job of it. Reviewers have focused on his 'myth-busting' and Holland has indeed done excellent work: he makes it clear that by the summer of 1940, it was not Britain standing all alone, but Germany. In picking a fight with Britain and its empire, and eventually the United States as well, Hitler had chosen the wrong enemy. While other historians may look back at the era and be amazed at how Britain and its allies eventually won the war, to Holland the amazing thing seems to be that the Germans ever imagined they'd have a chance of success. His focus on the seas, on merchant navies and access to resources, is spot on. So long as Britain had access to the entire world and its resources, and Nazi Germany remained behind a largely-effective Royal Navy blockade, the outcome of the war could be in little doubt.

Weighing in at over 700 pages, the only downside of this book is now I'll have to read the remaining two volumes -- so, there goes January ... ( )

Not a bad book but several factual mistakes.
These lessen the value of his suppositions