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Bezig met laden... How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969door Alain C. Enthoven
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A work of enduring value and lasting relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort. Robert S. McNamara took office in 1961 convinced that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the services, should control the evaluation of military needs and should choose among alternatives for meeting those needs. His device was a new system for allocating defense resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), whic Geen bibliotheekbeschrijvingen gevonden. |
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Google Books — Bezig met laden... GenresDewey Decimale Classificatie (DDC)355Social sciences Public Administration, Military Science Military ScienceLC-classificatieWaarderingGemiddelde:
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For anyone interested in recent history or contemporary politics, there are fascinating insights about the establishment of the United States as a superpower, the evolution of nuclear strategy, the role of NATO and the management of the Vietnam War.
The McNamara era was marked by tension between the military and his civilian advisers. The authors, key civilian advisers, argue that the Defense Secretary cannot rely on military advice being unbiased, and he needs an independent source of civilian advice if he wants to make better decisions. This attitude is scattered throughout the book, but dealt with in Chapter 3 in particular. This caused me to suck on my teeth. I was a civilian manager working in the Australian Department of Defence. While some of this had elements of truth, it underplayed the importance of military expertise (military officers have a level of knowledge on how war is fought that cannot be easily picked up by the civilian analyst) and the attitudes promote a culture of confrontation rather cooperation (aggravating the attitudes the authors complain about). ( )