The 1968 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to one of thefounders of public choice theory, James Buchanan, yet many peoplehave only the vaguest idea what public choice is. The book offersand unusually clear and accessible introduction to an importantsubject. McLean examines the workings of public choice from tworelated perspectives - collective action and the aggregation ofindividual preferences into social consensus. The book highlights the paradox at the heart of collectiveaction- that self-interest in the public domain is frequentlycounterproductive. National defense and clean air are things we allbenefit from - they are public goods - but we tend to resistcontributing to them. The first part of this book examines howgovernment choice in such areas is shaped, and by whom- politicalentrepreneurs, bureaucrats, interest groups and ordinary citizens.McLean uses the idea of a public market in which politicians sellwhat they hope voters will buy, and further considers how and whenpeople (and animals) co-operate to produce public goods evenwithout government coercion. In the second part of the book theauthor examines the consequences of combining individualpreferences, arguing that there is no straightforward way of addingthem up to form a 'social ordering' and assesing the implicationsof this both for electoral reform and for the status of 'the willof the people'.