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Bezig met laden... Fallout: Conspiracy, Cover-up and the Deceitful Case for the Atom Bomb (editie 2018)door Peter Watson (Auteur)
Informatie over het werkFallout: Conspiracy, Cover-Up, and the Deceitful Case for the Atom Bomb door Peter Watson
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"The justification for the atomic bomb was simple: it would defeat Hitler and end the Second World War faster, saving lives. The reality was different. [This book] dismantles the conventional story of why the atom bomb was built. Peter Watson has found new documents showing that long before the Allied bomb was operational, it was clear that Germany had no atomic weapons of its own and was not likely to. The British knew this, but didn't share their knowledge with the Americans, who in turn deceived the British about the extent to which the Soviets had penetrated their plans to build and deploy the bomb. The dark secret was that the bomb was dropped not to decisively end the war in the Pacific but to warn off Stalin's Russia, still in principle a military ally of the US and Britain. It did not bring a hot war to an abrupt end; instead it set up the terms for a Cold one to begin. Moreover, none of the scientists recruited to build the bomb had any idea that the purpose of the bomb had been secretly changed and that Russian deterrence was its new objective. Fallout vividly reveals the story of the unnecessary building of the atomic bomb, the most destructive weapon in the world, and the long-term consequences that are still playing out to this day."--Dust jacket. Geen bibliotheekbeschrijvingen gevonden. |
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Google Books — Bezig met laden... GenresDewey Decimale Classificatie (DDC)940.532273History and Geography Europe Europe 1918- World War IILC-classificatieWaarderingGemiddelde:
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His main arguments are that the British didn’t share their intelligence that the Germans had given up trying to develop nuclear weapons, that the US didn’t share information with the British about Soviet infiltration in the Manhattan Project, and that neither treated the Soviets as a true ally. He mostly discusses those who were involved - the scientists, some of whom would have refused to work if they had known such information, and military leaders such as Leslie Groves, who were driven by their own egos to pursue the project and use the weapon.
So, did it change my mind? Did it tell me anything I didn’t already know? Not really. The book is rather tedious reading for most of it, although there was some interesting information about Klaus Fuchs, the atomic scientist and spy who continually provided information on the project to the Soviets. Other than that, I think he fails to make many of his arguments mostly by what he fails to address. He is so wedded to the idea that the bomb was only meant as a demonstration for the USSR that he fails to consider reasons Japan was a legitimate target. His argument about Japan’s “peace feelers” never touches on what those were (because they were never truly serious or supported by the facts). He also bemoans the fact that Roosevelt and Churchill didn’t share their information with Stalin, saying they didn’t act like allies. Yet he ignores his details of extensive Soviet espionage - hardly the behavior of an ally!
Yes, Groves was egotistical and driven by personal ambition. Yes, some scientists had reservations afterwards regarding the work they had done. And it’s certainly conceivable that there was more than one audience in mind when the bombs were dropped (which I think is hardly a “dark secret”). But I feel Watson is at best overly optimistic - or at worst naive - in too many of his conclusions. He cites Richard Rhodes heavily, whereas there is no mention of many others who’ve argued the opposite point of view, and buried his arguments convincingly. And I was somewhat disturbed by his high praise for the spy, Fuchs, as well as his reliance on the goodwill of Joseph Stalin. There’s some interesting history here, and it’s told in a fairly readable manner. And while I can agree with some of his minor points, I wasn’t swayed because he fails to address too many issues. ( )