Reading this volume on the heels of Jeremy Black's "Logistics: The Key to Victory" gave me a better perspective on military logistics than could be achieved in the later volume--I'll explain the why later in the review. Van Creveld's work is groundbreaking in three ways. First, he takes a long and unflinching look at a topic avoided by the vast majority of military historians. Second, he has the courage to revise decades and centuries-old thinking on military campaigns and leaders. Third, he applies statistical analysis (admittedly theoretical) to historical campaigns, which wither debunks conventional historical canon or alters the narrative.

Martin van Creveld is an Israeli military historian specializing in strategy, tactics, and logistics. Having received his PhD in History in 1971, he was still a young author when he penned "Supplying War", publishing the book with Cambridge University Press in 1977. This is a relatively slim book at 284 pages, including bibliography, endnotes, and index. There are only 8 chapters, each chapter containing four to seven titled subchapters. The 2004 second edition adds a postscript covering the 30 years between editions, including an analysis of the then new Revolution in Military Affairs. This review looks only at the first edition.

The book proceeds chronologically. Chapter 1 is introductory, discussing war as it developed in the Age of Gunpowder and Absolutism where plunder and magazines served as the bases for an organized army's logistics in the 17th and 18th century. Chapter 2 surveys the Napoleonic era, examining two specific campaigns--Austerlitz in 1805 and Russia in 1812--from a logistical perspective. Chapter 3 takes a look at Prussian Army logistics and the Etappen system of the mid-19th century, culminating in the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. The impact (or lack thereof) of the use of railroads in military logistics is the focus here.

Chapter 4 takes on the logistics of World War I's von Schlieffen plan along with von Moltke's modifications, where we see the railroad/motorized supply system for the first time. Chapter 5 concentrates on Germany's World War II Operation Barbarossa, where the Wehrmacht's partially motorized logistics system proved wanting in the vastness of Russia's sprawling landscape. Chapter 8 continues van Creveld's analysis of the Wehrmacht's logistics, this time with Romme's North African campaigns of 1941/42. There being no use for horse-borne logistics and with limited railway infrastructure in the desert, the Afrika Korps had to completely rely upon motorized transport to meet its logistics needs. Chapter 7 is about the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe in 1944, examining how the totally motorized Anglo-American armies under Eisenhower approached the invasion of Germany, with logistical analysis of the apparently never-ending broad front/narrow front debate that railed the Allied commanders in September 1944. Chapter 8 wraps up the author's case using elements from the previous chapters.

This was an interesting and challenging read--van Creveld is a demanding professor who expects his students to be well-read in military history. The book abounds in name-dropping, and the author does not spend the time to explain who these personalities are--so the reader should be prepared before embarking on this read to gain the most benefit. In Chapter 8, van Creveld makes a number of points, one of the most significant being his prediction that armies of the late 20th century are limited in their offensive operations to about 40 miles a day consistently. Interestingly, the US Army's ground forces in 2003's Operation Iraqi Freedom could gain upwards of 60 miles a day; however, it took the better part of three weeks for the 3rd Division to move the roughly 400 miles between the Kuwaiti border berm and Baghdad, an average of perhaps 20 miles a day..

When compared with Black's work, "Supplying War" is still a hallmark work. I think Black got carried away in looking at all that van Creveld did not cover; after all, the earlier author admits that he limited his focus to come up with a readable volume. Black's book is well-nigh unreadable because it covers so much unfamiliar ground--the logistics in conflicts little-known in Western circles. Moreover, I find van Creveld's analysis more applicable to modern military logistics.

For a military historian, "Supplying War" is a must for the library. ( )

In the Introduction the author clarifies that “logistics” refers to “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.” He examines how the problems of moving and supplying armies have been affected through time by changes in technology, organization, “and other relevant factors,” and how logistics in turn have influenced strategy.

Before even engaging in battle, Van Creveld asserts, a commander must make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with the necessary calories to keep them useful as soldiers; to ensure there are available routes to carry them to the right place at the right time; that there are sufficient means of conveyance and support for whatever system was used, whether horse, wagons, or tanks, for example; and how logistic factors might limit an army’s operations, just to name a few important concerns. It is a critically important subject, yet one often overlooked in military histories.

Because the topic is so broad, the author concentrates on the period between 1805 and 1944 and focuses primarily on battles fought in the West. He begins however with an extensive introduction that covers the 17th and 18th centuries.

The book, which includes maps and extensive statistics, shows how important the “tyranny of logistics” is not only to strategy and tactics in battles, but to their outcomes.

It is so fascinating to read about how much logistical concerns affected generals ranging from Napoleon to Rommel, from Hitler to Eisenhower. There is literally never a dull moment in this book. ( )

Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the "nuts and bolts" of war. He considers the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, often mentioned (but rarely explored) by the vast majority of books on military history. By concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, van Creveld is also able to offer an original reinterpretation of military history.

As described by the reviewer below, this book deals with logistics at the strategic level and uses seven relatively modern campaigns (up to and including WW2) to chart the development of military logistics since the seventeenth century. Notable omissions include a discussion of how armies dealt with the issue prior to this period and the logistics of naval or air warfare.

A particularly interesting and unexpected aspect of this book is that it draws a number of conclusions about the campaigns and leaders covered that successfully challenge the prevailing wisdom in this area. For example, the failings of Rommel in North Africa are laid bare, as is the impracticability of the Schlieffen plan and the fact that the German railway system contributed little by way of advantage to the army in its defeat of France in 1870. The book also refutes the misnomer that Napoleon was ill-prepared for the disastrous advance on Russia in 1812. The new edition contains an interesting, if brief, discussion of modern military logistics and the increased profile recently associated with the subject.

In summary, this book is very readable and provides coverage of a subject much neglected by the popular literature. Supplying war also contains a wealth of information about seven key military campaigns viewed from a perspective that seeks to determine what outcomes were achievable, rather than simply intended. ( )

There is an expression in the US military: “Amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.” And this is made crystal clear in this book which explains in detail why so many great campaigns in history, such as the German invasion of the Soviet Union, faltered because of totally inadequate logistics planning. The author is the world authority on military logistics. Absolutely first rate. ( )