An interesting account of various more-or-less half-baked schemes to stage bomb or missile attacks against the US during WWII. The German’s problem wasn’t getting to New York - a FW200 commercial transport had done a non-stop flight from Berlin in 1938 - but getting back again. Even after the fall of France, and the acquisition of bases on the Biscay coast, no Luftwaffe aircraft had the range. The discussions among the German high command about various ways to pull off the Amerika mission make for fascinating reading. It reinforces my long-held opinion that although the Third Reich had plenty of world-class engineers and scientists, the managerial skills dated back to the 17th century. Whoever spoke to der Führer last had his project approved. This lead to an entire air force of paper designs and prototypes: the BV 222 and BV 238 flying boats, the Do 214 and Do 216 flying boats, the Fw 238, the Fw 300, the Ta 400, the He 177, the Me 264, the Me 364, the Ju 290, the Ju 390, the Ju 488, and various other designs that never even made it to the RLM series-number stage. Of these, the most promising were the Me 264 and Ju 390, both of which had a single flying prototype. Neither had quite the range originally promised and neither actually flew a combat mission (there’s an urban legend that a Ju390 got within sight of New York in 1944; this isn’t mentioned in Luftwaffe over America and the range shown for the aircraft in this book shows that at best it could have reached Newfoundland, the Maritimes, and perhaps the northern tip of Maine.)


Various range-increasing methods were tossed about and rejected - rocket-assisted takeoff, towed takeoff behind an He 111-Z, mid-air refueling, a one-way mission with He 177s with the crews crash-landing or parachuting in the US, seaplanes refueling from U-Boats, land planes landing n Greenland and refueling from U-boats, and converting captured French long-range seaplanes into robot bombs. Of these, the most promising was mid-air refueling, and the Luftwaffe successfully tested this technique with Ju 90 transports. Mid-air refueling of either a He 177 or Ju 290, both operational (well, in the case of the He 177, marginally operational) could have allowed either aircraft to reach New York and return; refueling the lone Me 264 or Ju390 would have allowed a single-plane raid well into the interior of North America. Although the idea was discussed, it fortunately never got beyond the arm-waving stage. Although Hitler had delusions of New York in flames, the Luftwaffe realized that even the most optimistic projections for aircraft availability and capability wouldn’t have allowed for anything more than a few nuisance raids. Although a few Luftwaffe officers tried to persuade their commanders that even a nuisance raid would be valuable (oddly, nobody seems to have used the Doolittle raid as an example) they couldn’t get the ear of Hitler or Göring.


There’s also a discussion of proposed missile attacks. A U-boat successfully tested an underwater launch rack for 21-cm artillery rockets but no one seems to have suggested an attack on a US city with these. The US was very concerned that U-boats would be adapted to launch V-1 pulse-jet missiles, and (although this was kept very secret) that these would have nuclear warheads; however the Germans never seriously considered launching a V-1 from a U-boat. However, a follow-on to the V-2 that would be able to reach North America was under development and launch silos were actually constructed in western France. Similarly, an underwater launch container for the V-2 was successfully tested from a lake, and several such containers were constructed before the Third Reich collapsed.



In the last chapter, the author allows himself some speculation. This includes the possibility that V-2s would be equipped with nerve gas warheads (the author points out that a large number of V-2s were found at two nerve gas storage facilities after the war); the “urban legend” that the Germans tested several nuclear weapons (based on various eyewitness reports of unusual events); and a similar report that a single A10 “Amerika” missile was test launched. These make interesting reading but can’t be taken seriously.


Extensively documented (although most of the references are in German) with excellent photographs and line drawings of aircraft. Fortunately, while the Germans had lots of outstanding aircraft on paper, the Allies had pretty good planes in the air. ( )

Estupendo estudio sobre los intentos de bombardeo a Estados Unidos por parte del III Reich. Sumamente interesante en cuanto a la descripción de los entresijos político-militares en la toma de decisiones, lo cambiante de la situación a partir de 1944, los vaivenes de Hitler y el mismo Alto Mando, la falta de una clara estrategia.

Creo que el libro está algo descompensado. Dedica poca atención al tema de los misiles y similares y se extiende demasiado en los Luft-46. La parte sobre la Atómica, los misiles submarinos, etc. es simplemente asombrosa. ( )

What's particularly valuble about this book is how Griehl examines long-range aviation in the wartime Luftwaffe from the program level, as that gives you a better appreciation of what the trade-offs were at the mission and hardware levels. This is not to mention that it gives you more insight into the limited resources behind the cool planes, and how the noose was tightening around the neck of the regime from a relatively early point in time. It might be noted though that there is relatively little on the strategic considerations on actually striking the United States, though that is probably more a commentary on the level of strategic analysis in the Third Reich than anything else. ( )