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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996)

door David J. Chalmers

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What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? In 'The Conscious Mind', philosopher David J. Chalmers offers an analysis on these hotly debated issues, as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness.… (meer)
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Toon 5 van 5
Very agreeable story in Elizabeth I times ( )
  t29 | Feb 12, 2018 |
A disappointing book. Chalmer's willingness to propose specious arguments is surprising for a serious intellectual. He argues from admittedly counter-factual examples as if they provided evidence. He argues that because he can conceive of a brain-less zombie, that human consciousness must not depend upon the human brain. This is such a specious line of argument that the entire book becomes uninteresting. ( )
2 stem ddowell | Apr 28, 2010 |
Only the cognitive mind can be explained reductively; phenomenal consciousness is a non-physical feature of the natural world. ( )
2 stem Benthamite | Oct 10, 2008 |
A must-read for any student of philosophy. ( )
1 stem Beelzebug | Dec 31, 2007 |
One of the very best philosophy books on consciousness. ( )
1 stem anandrajan | Jul 13, 2007 |
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It may be that some are unwilling to accept the possibility of conscious thermostats simply because we understand thermostats too well. We know everything about their processing, and there seems no reason to invoke consciousness. But thermostats are really no different from brains here. Even once we understand brain processing perfectly, there will still seem to be no reason to invoke consciousness. The only difference is that right now, what is going on inside a brain is enough of a mystery that one may be tempted to suppose that consciousness is somehow “located” in those brain processes that we do not yet understand. But as I have argued, even coming to understand those processes will not alone bring consciousness into the picture; so here, once again, brains and thermostats are on a par.

One might be bothered by the fact that one could build a thermostat oneself, without putting any consciousness in. But of course the same applies to a brain, at least in principle. When we build a brain (in reproduction and development, say), consciousness conies along for free; the same will go for a thermostat. We should not expect to locate consciousness as a physical component of the system! Some may worry about the fact that a thermostat is not alive; but it is hard to see why that should make a principled difference. A disembodied silicon brain of the sort discussed in the last chapter would arguably fail to qualify as alive, but we have seen that it might be conscious. And if the arguments in the last chapter are right, then the fact that a thermostat is not made up of biological components makes no difference, in principle.
It is pointed out, for example, that the organization of our brain might be simulated by the people of China or even mirrored in the economy of Bolivia. If we got every person in China to simulate a neuron (we would need to multiply the population by ten or one hundred, but no matter), and equipped them with radio links to simulate synaptic connections, then the functional organization would be there. But surely, says the argument, this baroque system would not be conscious!

There is a certain intuitive force to this argument. Many people have a strong feeling that a system like this is simply the wrong sort of thing to have a conscious experience. Such a “group mind” would seem to be the stuff of a science-fiction tale, rather than the kind of thing that could really exist. But there is only an intuitive force. This certainly falls far short of a knockdown argument. Many have pointed out that while it may be intuitively implausible that such a system should give rise to experience, it is equally intuitively implausible that a brain should give rise to experience! Whoever would have thought that this hunk of gray matter would be the sort of thing that could produce vivid subjective experiences? And yet it does. Of course this does not show that a nation's population could produce a mind, but it is a strong counter to the intuitive argument that it would not.

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Once we realize how tightly a specification of functional organization constrains the structure of a system, it becomes less implausible that even the population of China could support conscious experience if organized appropriately. If we take our image of the population, speed it up by a factor of a million or so, and shrink it into an area the size of a head, we are left with something that looks a lot like a brain, except that it has homunculi—tiny people—where a brain would have neurons. On the face of it, there is not much reason to suppose that neurons should do any better a job than homunculi in supporting experience.
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What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? In 'The Conscious Mind', philosopher David J. Chalmers offers an analysis on these hotly debated issues, as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness.

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