In this study Lundstrom performs a signal service by rehabilitating the reputation of Frank Jack Fletcher and his performance in the classic carrier battles of 1942. Lundstrom finds a pragmatic leader who had to take into account inadequate resources, lousy logistics, unrealistic plans and still be able to foil Japanese offensive strokes. Lundstrom does a good job of showing that many of the supposed failures of nerve attributed to Fletcher can be pinned down to the chronic logistical limitations of the USN until the "Two-Ocean Navy" came on line and the small reality lost on many Americans at the time that the USN was just not as good as it thought it was.

As for why Fletcher has not been remembered better, in part that is due to the man's disinterest in polishing his reputation, but mostly because he was a convenient scapegoat for many parties; these include the USMC, the Brown Shoe Mafia of the USN's aviation community (Lundstrom does a fine job of illustrating the failures of that crowd at Midway) and the general sense that the command complex associated with the Guadalcanal campaign were all culpable of ineptitude at some level. Add Samuel E. Morison's general disdain and you have the explanation of how a man who won three fleet actions can be virtually forgotten, instead of having a reputation rather akin to Gen. George Thomas of Civil War fame. ( )