I've never read anything like it. A relatively brief brilliant analysis - no footnotes, no references. The author lived in Germany during the war. Discusses Hitler's achievements, successes, mistakes and crimes. He uses achievement to mean an individual accomplishment, and success to mean an accomplishment in competition (Leistung and Erfolg?). Interesting commentary on the Nuremburg trials. My only complaints are that he holds that Hitler's brand of anti-semitism was alien to Germany and came from Eastern Europe, which seems unsupportable to me, and, in his conclusion, claims that Hitler was not a true German, unlike someone like Luther (?!...http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/anti-semitism/Luther_on_Jews.html) ( )

Azért érdemes ízlelgetni a címet: Megjegyzések Hitlerhez. Szerény cím – jelzi, hogy van itt ez a Haffner, aki pontosan tudja, ő nem történész, „csak” publicista, de hát azért megjegyzései neki is lehetnek, ugye. Nem érdemes tőle semlegességet várni, egyfelől azért, mert ugyan mondja már meg valaki, miért kéne semlegesnek lenni Hitlerrel kapcsolatban (én sem vagyok az, és nem is akarok az lenni*), másfelől pedig megengedheti magának, hogy kvázi személyiségprofilt csináljon a Führerhez. Egy olyan kijelentés, miszerint Hitler tulajdonképpen kollektív öngyilkosságot akart elkövetni egész nemzetével együtt (amiről persze a nemzetnek nemigen volt tudomása) egy történész számára talán értelmezhetetlen volna, mert szándékot tulajdonít (néha meglehetősen intuitívan) a tények mögé, de ebben a kötetben ez simán elfér – pláne mert magam is egyetértek vele. Persze ettől függetlenül nem hibátlan kötet – több esetben pontatlan, például túldimenzionálja a harmincas évek német „gazdasági csodáját”, más esetekben pedig (az emberiségellenes bűnök kapcsán) olyan evidenciákat közöl, amik ma már közhelyszámba mennek**. Még az érdekesebb passzusokról is (amikor rámutat a hitleri elképzelések – gondolatnak nem nevezném őket – kibékíthetetlen belső ellentmondásaira***) elmondható, hogy különösebben forradalmi megállapításai nincsenek – ezek alapján kijelenthetnénk, hogy e könyv valamiféle laza ismeretterjesztő olvasmány, gyorstalpaló azoknak, akik Hitlert eddig rendszeresen összetévesztették Chaplinnel. De azért erről többről van szó.

Haffner ugyanis gondolkodik. Hipotézist gyárt, és ezeket a hipotéziseket be kívánja vinni a köztudatba, egy olyan köztudatba, ami igazából szeretne minél kevesebbet tudni az egészről. Remek észrevételei vannak – például rávilágít Hitler államellenességére, arra, hogy cselekedeteivel sorra bontotta le az intézményeket és az államiság egyéb kellékeit. Ezzel tulajdonképpen saját személyéhez kívánta kötni Németországot, mintha nem is feltételezte volna, hogy Németország nélküle is létezni fog. Haffner továbbá sejteni engedi, hogy Hitler, bár talán maga is démoni személy, ugyanakkor egy démoni közhangulat terméke is – amiből kiókumlálhatjuk, hogy egy újabb démoni közhangulat akár megszülheti a maga újabb Hitlerét. Ami annál könnyebben történik meg, minél kevésbé vagyunk hajlandóak eszünkbe idézni nemzeti múltunk árnyékos oldalait. Hitler úgy foglalta össze a zsidók bűneit, hogy a zsidó „végső célja más népek elnemzetietlenítése, elfattyúsítása, a magasabb rendű fajok színvonalának csökkentése, valamint a fajok összekevert katyvasza fölötti uralom” – és amikor a szuverén országok szuverén lázálmainak kinyilatkoztatásai kezdik ezt a tónust utánozni, a „mások” démonizálását eszközül használják, világvégével fenyegetnek, amit csak drasztikus eszközökkel lehet megelőzni – akkor muszáj felismerni a hasonlóságot az előddel. Mert ha a hasonlót nem ismerjük fel, akkor azt se fogjuk látni, amikor ugyanaz lesz.

* A tényszerűség, az más. És Haffner tényszerű – tekintve, hogy tényszerűségeket közöl, csak éppen nyelvhasználatában nem leplezi Hitlerrel szembeni jogos ellenszenvét. De ne is leplezze.
** Bár hogy a kötet megjelenésekor, 1978-ban ezek mennyire voltak evidenciák, az jó kérdés.
*** Jelesül: hogy Hitler két fő elmélete nem békíthető össze. Egyfelől azt állította, hogy a történelem a fajok (illetve képviselőik, a nemzetek) egymás elleni küzdelmének története, másfelől meg azt állította, hogy a zsidók azért üldözendőek, mert fel akarják számolni a nemzeteket. Tehát kvázi azért utálta a zsidókat, mert azok, felszámolván a nemzeteket, felszámolták volna a fajok örök harcát is. Egy világ, állandó háborúk nélkül – khm, elég borzasztóan hangzik. ( )

当時評価された面も含めて、ヒトラーの実績、失敗、誤謬、そして犯罪性を論じた一冊。
ヒトラーのナチス・ドイツがユダヤ人を迫害・虐殺したことと第二次大戦でドイツを敗北に至らせたことはよく知られているが、彼らの加害はそれだけでなく、国家そのものの破壊という形で戦後のドイツ国民全てに対してにも及んでいたことにも言及しており、原著者が決して価値観を共有し得ない決別すべき過去であると考えていることを強く窺わせる。
恐らくドイツ語原著もそうなのだろうが、非常に読みやすく、引き込まれる文体で書かれている。 ( )

Juste ce qu'il faut, d'intuition, de démonstration, de perspective. ( )

A dilettante made by history, making history

The first 30 years of Hitler's life were a failure, despite obtaining two Iron Crosses in the First World War. Not having finished secondary school, Hitler lived off his pension as an orphan and the occasional sale of his paintings. Even with his Iron Crosses, he never made it to officer. He did enjoy politics feverishly though.

In 1919 the bohemian joined a right wing political party that would lead to his rise and fall. His private life remained poor, but his political life became ever more intense, but was just as much a failure as the first 30 years of his life. His life lacked everything that gives human life meaning, warmth and value: education, profession, love and friendship, marriage, parenthood. During his political career Hitler showed a permanent acceptance of suicide. His relationships to other people where those of a loner, shunning every intimacy. His education was that of a newspaper reader. Only through his experience at the front did he obtain some knowledge of military matters.

Reichskanzler was his first job, which he performed as an artist, reading only those documents that interested him and often indolently waiting for inspiration. There is no development in his character, which was characterised by will power, braveness, stamina, mercilessness, vengefulness, faithlessness, cruelty, and a complete lack of self reflection.

With controlled anger, Sebastian Haffner needs just a few pages to analyse the character of Adolf Hitler at the beginning of this short biography. The same sharp pen is sometimes somewhat repetitiously used in the otherwise excellently composed description of the Fuhrer's rise and fall. The book is a consistent analysis of both the person and the specific circumstances that marked the most disastrous period of German history. With this book Mr. Haffner helped to crash the left-wing opinion of the structural German Sonderweg from Prussian Obrigkeitsstaat with its elite of Junkers to Nazism. Unlike the Prussian state, Hitler had an ideological programme.

Hitler grew up in an age of much more political involvement of citizens. Nationalism and socialism were the leading ideologies. Hitler combined a specific form of nationalism with anti-Semitism and later with a dose of socialism. His anti-Semitism was rooted in eastern Europe, but also common in Vienna. He put his nationalist ideas into practice by moving to Germany in 1913. In 1919 he decided to go into politics to ascertain that no second revolution like in 1918 would occur. For Mr. Haffner, this decision decided the full domestic political programme of Hitler's life (page 21). His foreign policy ideas came in the 1920's assessing Russia as the true enemy.

When he joined the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, he discovered his talent to hypnotise the masses through his often rambling speeches. This and his clear political purpose must have given him the idea to be unique and the desire to become Fuhrer. This would be ascertained on party level with the founding of the NSDAP and on a national level as Reichskanzler after the death of Hindenburg. Hitler set up the state in a way that made him irreplaceable. No constitution, dynasty, Politburo or other long-term requirements could obstruct the execution of his ideas. This also put tremendous time pressure on him.

Hitler had an excellent organisational talent, which he used to turn the NSDAP into an effective and dynamic power base. His Wirtschaftswunder was a formidable result, mainly accomplished by his finance minister. Both economically and diplomatically German re-armament was second success. His personal decision to found tank divisions against the will of the German military establishment helped to win early victories in war. Nazi Germany offered the majority of citizens the same kind of community as the later German Democratic Republic, which Mr. Haffner considers a socialist aspect of Nazism.

The period from 1930 to 1941 (with the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece) was an unprecedented string of successes, with the French campaign the greatest. The later years were a complete failure, although no change in Hitler's character, influence, or determination can be determined. It was the quality of his later opponents that brought his demise. Hitler never tried to break the Allied coalition. At the same time, during his rise domestic opposition was limited mainly to the former right wing elite, who did not recognise the Weimar Republic in the first place.

Hitler did not consider himself a typical political Pragmatiker, but a rare case of a Programmatiker, who tries to implement a political programme. His programme of national (and mono-racial) struggle and war (against other peoples and Jews) could never work however. The pre-industrial programme of Lebensraumdid not include statehood or the logic that peace always follows war. Besides, Germany was too weak compared to the other powers to ever conquer the world. He really believed he would find global sympathy for his murderous anti-Semitism. With it he created an extra enemy.

In 1938 most of Europe between France and the Soviet Union had been incorporated into Germany or had come within its sphere of influence. Hitler had no interest in consolidation. War came in 1939. His calculation of British neutrality had proven wrong. However, again Hitler could have opted for consolidation. He offered peace to unconquered Britain, not to France, a loner's blunder against logic.

In 1941 Hitler failed to apply Montgomery's first rule on war (i.e. to never march on Moscow). Hitler had no plan B. After failing to conquer Moscow, Hitler inexplicably escalated trouble by declaring war on America. It was a decision he had taken alone, without even consulting his generals. After failing in Moscow he would try nothing politically or diplomatically to stem the coming tsunami.

Mr. Haffner uses his desire for "industrial genocide" as an explanation for the latter. It was beyond normal war crimes that Mr. Haffner deems best forgotten after the end of the conflict. The decisions required for the murder of Europe's Jews were all taken shortly after the Moscow turning point, when victorious conquest became impossible. The genocide was the only victory still possible.

In the last nine months of his rule Hitler aimed for the total destruction of Germany. With Aktion Gewitter he ordered the arrest of all candidates that could have potentially formed a new government and could have negotiated peace. His hatred of Jews, Poles, and Russians now turned against his own people. The Ardennes offensive was another personal mistake. Mr. Haffner sees it as one of the expressions of Hitler's aim of the total destruction of the German people, which had failed him.

In the afterword of the Dutch edition, Frits Boterman explains how much Mr. Haffner's analysis is the product of his own upbringing and experiences. Mr. Boterman is critical of Mr. Haffner's opinion to see Hitler as a "deus ex machina" who pulled all the strings while things just happened to Germany. By concentrating on Hitler as a person, the role of others and the circumstances he found loose their importance. I concur. ( )