If hindsight is 20/20, then historians must be an eagle-eyed bunch, right? Not necessarily, as author Leon Cooper admits. His monograph, “The War in the Pacific: A Retrospective” sets out to examine the war strategies of the U.S. in defeating Japan during World War II. His premise seems to be that many lives were unnecessarily lost fighting superfluous battles ordered by vainglory commanders and politicians for dubious reasons. After examining the origins in the early 1900’s of the war strategy known as island-hopping, Cooper concludes that the Chain of Command was fixated on that strategy and never sought alternatives. He notes that the strategy was based on old battleship technology that did not fully take into account the growing power of aircraft to defeat the enemy.
Cooper saves his most scathing criticism for the top generals and politicians. He lists numerous instances where FDR, MacArthur, Nimitz, and Halsey allowed self-interest or petty issues to overrule the good of the country or the safety of soldiers. For instance, FDR refused to appoint a top commander in the Pacific as he had done in Europe in appointing Eisenhower. His thinking was to keep MacArthur and the others at each other’s throats and to distract MacArthur from running for President. As a result, Cooper contends, many battles were fought needlessly and did not contribute to the defeat of Japan.
Although this examination of the War in the Pacific is most illuminating, it contains one flaw, which Cooper does own up to. In addition, the usual what-if fallacies listed, the most compelling is the assumption that nothing would have been lost by standing down for a re-examination of strategy. The idea that Okinawa or Saipan could have been postponed to await the atomic bomb test is specious. First, any change of operations like that might have tipped off the enemy that something was happening. It also pre-supposes a successful bomb test; a result by no means assured at that time. No, in defense of the men concerned, better to proceed ahead and evaluate new weapons as they were proved. “The War in the Pacific: A Retrospective” is a worthwhile, thought-provoking examination, but like all provocative works, its vision is a little short of 20/20. ( )