The middle volume of what will be close to the definitive study of Germany's 1942 Offensive in Russia, this exhaustive book makes use of the best available documentary evidence to give you a block-by-block examination of the actual fighting in Stalingrad, up until the point that Stalin was ready to unleashed the offensive that sealed the doom of Germany's Sixth Army. If there is a key insight it's that both sides were fighting with fewer resources than older sources have suggested, with Glantz & House documenting the mutual slaughter in close detail. The authors also make the key point that the real failure of 1942 was not the test of wills in Stalingrad, but the culminating failure of the German effort to conquer the oil reserves of the Trans-Caucasus region.

While it is no fault to say that this is not the first book about the battle of Stalingrad you should read, I'll admit that I found the maps a little disappointing; in particular, maps that did a better job of relating the fighting in Stalingrad proper to the operations mounted to take pressure of Chuikov's Soviet 62nd Army would have been appreciated. This is a small complaint in relation to the greater achievement of the authors.

It should also be noted that German air superiority into late 1942 played a large role in this campaign, but that is mostly just alluded to in this book. Those who would like to have a better sense of the campaign in three dimensions should consult Joel Hayward's "Stopped at Stalingrad" and Christer Bergstrom's "Stalingrad: The Air Battle."

One also comes away wanting to know more about how the Soviet naval forces kept men and supplies flowing into Stalingrad, as this has to be an epic story in and of itself. ( )