Epictetus, for his part, admitted that he had never in his life met a single Stoic sage, if by this is meant someone who loved the world as it is, under all aspects, however atrocious, and who under all circumstances could refrain from either regret or hope. […I]s it not a sign that the theory falters, that amor fati is not merely impossible but on occasion obscene? If we must accept everything that occurs, as it is, in all its tragic sense or lack of sense, how can we avoid the accusation of complicity, even of collaboration with evil? […] Here, in my own opinion, is the strongest argument against the long tradition running from the most ancient practices of Oriental and Occidental wisdom to the most up-to-date philosophical materialism. What is the good of pretending to have finished with 'idealism', with all ideals and 'idols', if this proud philosophical programme of amor fati remains itself an ideal. (p. 194-195)

Not only am I unable to prevent myself from forming attachments, I have no wish to do so. Nor am I in the least ignorant as to the sufferings to come […] Therefore I must renounce the wisdom of Buddhism, as I renounce that of Stoicism – with respect and esteem, but also with a sense of unbridgeable difference. (p. 262)