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Bezig met laden... De eenheid van lichaam en geest (1949)door Gilbert Ryle
Art of Reading (114) Filosofía - Clásicos (217) Bezig met laden...
Meld je aan bij LibraryThing om erachter te komen of je dit boek goed zult vinden. Op dit moment geen Discussie gesprekken over dit boek. Reasoning that comes off as cloying and pedantic, frequent seeming misrepresentations of the position Ryle argues against (although it's very hard to tell, since he doesn't give explicit references to books he thinks get things wrong), terminological distinctions which don't match up with my everyday understandings of words (which explicitly clashes with Ryle's supposed plain English style), a literary style which comes off as someone who loves Wittgenstein but isn't nearly as clever... Doesn't matter how many of his conclusions I agree with or feel kinship with, this book is a flop stylistically. geen besprekingen | voeg een bespreking toe
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First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a 'sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work' on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called 'the ghost in the machine': Descartes' argument that mind and body are two separate entities. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney and is essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today. Geen bibliotheekbeschrijvingen gevonden. |
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Google Books — Bezig met laden... GenresDewey Decimale Classificatie (DDC)128.2Philosophy and Psychology Philosophy Of Humanity The Human Condition MindLC-classificatieWaarderingGemiddelde:
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Um excelente livro, focado em filosofia da linguagem, que ajuda a evidenciar equívocos filosóficos diversos e mesmo quando discordamos com argumentos, a formular com mais cuidado o conhecimento sobre o que é dito mental. Dois poréns: a imagem do fantasma na máquina é bastante legal, mas a concepção de cartesiano de Ryle monta um espantalho da visão mais complexa e nuançada do próprio Descartes. Também, filosofias da mente informadas pela neurociência e pela psicologia atuais reintroduzem abordagens e considerações que seriam descartadas por esse livro, por apoiarem-se fora da linguagem e da filosofia, para depois construirem seu arcabouço teórico. Mesmo assim, acredito (sem muito aprofundamento, entretanto) que a construção da importância da normatividade de Ryle sobrevive, a evitar excessivo reducionismo científico. ( )