Hugh BichenoBesprekingen

Biblioteca Historia de España
Encuadernación en tapa dura de editorial ilustrada. Cinta de lectura. Ilustraciones en b/n.

The battle of Midway ranks not just as one of the pivotal battles of the Second World War, but also as one of the most important naval battles in history. Over a three-day period in June 1942, a force of three American carriers changed the course of the war in the Pacific theater by sinking the core of the Japanese strike fleet. The decisive nature of the battle has ensured it considerable attention from historians, who have spent much time and ink examining the factors involved in the American victory and the Japanese defeat. Hugh Bicheno’s generously illustrated study is not the first of these or the most detailed, but it offers the reader both a careful recounting of the battle and an analysis of the elements that shaped its outcome.

Bicheno’s basic argument is that, far from being an unavoidable defeat, the Japanese disaster at Midway was the result of a succession of mistakes born out of arrogance. Some of these stretched back to before the war, with an overall strategy against the United States dependent on too many assumptions that the Americans would react as the Japanese expected. Added to this was an arrogance built up over six months of victories, campaigning which left the Japanese fleet exhausted. By contrast, the Americans benefited from intelligence decryptions which alerted them in advance to Japanese intentions and allowed them to plan for a successful counterstroke. Yet Bicheno continually notes the factor of chance in shaping the outcome, from the illness that replaced “Bull” Halsey with Raymond Spruance, to off-course scouts coming across the enemy fleet. Together they provide a compelling portrait of the chaos of battle, from which it was the Americans who would emerge triumphant.

Though a military historian, Bicheno is not a specialist in the Second World War or in naval warfare. While this gives him a relatively fresh perspective to the conflict, the lack of original research limits the novelty of some of his more provocative challenges to the received wisdom about the battle. Nevertheless, with its useful tables, judicious analysis, and copious use of maps and pictures, Bicheno’s book is an enjoyable and stimulating study of the battle of Midway, one that can serve as a provocative introduction for any newcomer to the historic naval clash.

The battle of Lepanto was a titanic naval battle between declining empires that lives on its faded glory. In Barcelona, one can marvel at the reconstructed galley of Juan d'Austria. In Venice and Madrid, one can admire giant commemorative paintings. Long considered one of the decisive battles of the world, it wasn't decisive at all. Instead, the Ottoman defeat only momentarily stopped its absorption of the remains of the Venetian empire. Together with the successful defense of Malta in 1565, the battle of Lepanto marks the division of the Mediterranean Sea into an Eastern and Western zone of influence (which was broken up by the new naval powers of France and Britain).

Hugh Bicheno's book consists of a good, readable account of the battle (part II), with a lot of meaty appendices and excellent maps. In contrast to most authors on the battle, Bicheno downplays the influence of the Venetian galleasses, according them mostly a nuisance value and giving the victory to the superior Spanish soldiers. Given, as Bicheno himself refers, that the Ottomans rebuilt their fleet with a focus on artillery and included galleasses into their arsenal, I tend towards the majority opinion. I agree with Bicheno about the poor showing of the Venetians. In their defense, unlike the rich Spaniards, they had to husband their forces. Apart from Crete and fortresses on the Adriatic coasts, not much of the Venetian empire remained to rebuild their strength.

The first part of the book is a mixed bag of facts and opinions, pertinent or not, valid or not; somewhat like a fireside chat with a slightly demented uncle chasing his personal dragons. In the case of Hugh Bicheno, this happens to be a rabid anti-Catholicism, which I thought had long died out in the United Kingdom, and the paradoxical need to both connect the battle of Lepanto to recent events in Afghanistan and defend Islam from accusations of aggressiveness. The comparison of the huge, modern and highly cultured Ottoman Empire to the landlocked, isolated and backward warlords of Afghanistan is not really helpful in understanding the battle.

Overall, read part I for amusement and with a grain of salt or skip directly to the more valuable part II. The best part of the book are map 3 illustrating the Mediterranean currents and wind patterns as well as the ships' order of battle in the appendix.½

This is the only book that I've read about the Falklands war and I don't feel the need to read another. The author does a great job of mixing the strategic political aspects with the nitty-gritty and detail of the conflict. There is also a healthy dash of polemics thrown in, with the MoD receiving some harsh criticism - some of it possibly unfair.

Bicheno has a background in intelligence and direct experience of Argentina and the UK armed forces which he uses to present what reads as a very balanced account of the conflict. That said, he makes no qualms about expressing his opinion that the Argentines were the aggressors and places the war in the context of the 'Dirty War' waged by the junta on its own people. The Labour Government prior to Maggie and the FCO also take a bit of a hammering for the appeasement that the author (plausibly) asserts led directly to the Argentines believing the UK would not fight.

At the detailed level, the maps and descriptions of the topography of the battlefields on the Falklands are very clear and are interwoven into the text to a degree that surpasses any military history that I've read.

In summary a great read - informative, entertaining and in places laced with black humour and irony. It is not, however, dispassionate nor is it a 'guns n ammo' account of the war.

Readable, if sometimes confusing, account of the renaissance mercenaries, in particular the rivalry between the Malatestas and the Montefeltros

Vendetta offers sumptuous color illustrations, good maps, a tourist guide and plenty of data appendices. If only the main text conformed to this high standard. Alas, this difficult-to-read book is in severe need of an editor.

Bicheno's unbound ambition led him to include copious amounts of undigested information in an Old Testament-like procession of names and places. Barbara Tuchman has postulated an excellent rule: Never introduce a name without locating and characterizing the person or place, a rule Bicheno breaks like no other author I read before. A sample (p. 32): "But at the same time he was in secret contact with Cardinal Legate Ottaviano degli Ubaldini, sent by Pope Innocent IV to take control of Massa Trabaria and the Foglia valley. When this was discovered the Omodei-controlled podestà of Rimini sent a letter to the Imperial Count of Romagna, under whom the local lords were assembled at Imola, to arrest Mastin." This is partly the fault of his attempt to cram 200 years of local, regional and European history into thirty pages. An all but impossible task for even a master author. The main protagonists only enter on page 135, which leaves barely one hundred pages to present their twin biographies.

In contrast to the dramatic title, the story lacks a showdown, partly the fault of Bicheno's chapter structure, partly the "fault" of their biographies: Vendetta conjures up images of sneaky murders and intrigues. These two neighbors and competing professional soldiers, however, are better characterized as rivals who met, opposed but also collaborated on the battlefield, in the cities and at the courts of Italy (like today's management consultants vying for the multinational companies' business). Like small-scale farmers with a second job today, they were caught in a trap: In order to sustain their territorial possessions, they had to tender their services to more important lords. This in turn prevented them from consolidating and expanding their local holdings. Thus, at important junctions, these professional soldiers would abandon their mission to cater for a local emergency (or a petty conquest), rendering their masters furious, but were unable, most of the time, to resolve the local problems in their short-time intervention.

The book's nuggets suffer from a complete lack of footnotes or even chapter notes. At the most, Bicheno will cite an author's name, leaving it to the reader to find the page of the text or idea quoted. This not only transgresses the professional standards, it also diminishes the value of Bicheno's research and findings. Instead of directing his readers to his Italian sources, one is left with a rather cursory bibliography.

The book is tainted by Bicheno's need to vent his (sometimes directly contradictory) opinions. Unless one happens to be a extremely narrow-minded English Tory, and even then, one will cringe from reading the rants directed at Marxists, lawyers, academics, Europe, American imperialism, Islam, government bureaucracy, global warming, ... A sample (p. 76): "The otherwise incomprehensible solidarity of Western leftists with Islamists whose world-view is violently hostile to their own may stem from a common psychopathology: submissives need to submit - to what or to whom appears immaterial." Apart from this vile fact-free insult of leftists, one wonders why these submissive leftists have not yet volunteered to submit to the superior ideas of Hugh Bicheno (as he himself proclaims, content does not matter)? Why venture abroad when you can be insulted in your armchair? Again, an editor might have restrained the author. Bicheno himself recommends Maria Grazia Pernis and Laurie Schneider Adams' Federico da Montefeltro & Sigismondo Malatesta: The Eagle and the Elephant, probably a better choice.½