David French (2)Besprekingen

Discussions of British strategy during the First World War usually frame it in terms of a debate between “Westerners,” or the politicians and generals who wanted to focus British military efforts on the fighting in France and Belgium, and “Easterners,” or the ones who sought to open up fronts elsewhere in the hope of breaking the grinding stalemate. In this book, the first of two volumes he wrote examining the development of British war aims and the ways British leaders sought to achieve them, David French rejects this framing as a distorted product of postwar memoirs from the major figures involved. Instead he frames the debates as less a matter of “where” and more a question of “how”: namely, how the British could best accomplish their goals of maintaining the Entente and defeating Germany while ensuring that Britain would emerge from the war as the strongest of the belligerents. The hope was that by achieving these aims, Britain would maintain be in a position to dictate the terms of the peace and maintain their position as the dominant power in the world.

To argue his case, French begins his book by examining prewar British policy and the main people involved in making it. Here his focus is on the Liberal government of H. H. Asquith, though he also notes the important role played by the civil servants in the Foreign Office in influencing what were at times sharp disagreements on how best to advance British interests in an increasingly polarized international environment. These debates were unresolved when the war broke out in August 1914, forcing policymakers to take decisions based more on the course of events. Here the figure of Lord Kitchener looms large, as French sees his advocacy of the New Armies as key. Not only did this undermine the “business as usual” approach involving a war waged with the Royal Navy and financial subsidies that was favored by many politicians, but with the British army only reaching its maximum strength by early 1917 it would be in a decisive position to dictate terms to the exhausted participants on both sides of the struggle. Until then, it was a matter of playing for time to achieve this position.

After establishing Britain’s underlying approach to the war, French then examines the response of policymakers to events as they unfolded over the next two years. Here his focus is predominantly on the high politics and the strategic views of the major actors, addressing their interpretation of developments from the standpoint of British interests and their overall goals in the war. What emerges in these chapters is the gradual shift away from prewar strategies and assumptions, which were driven by the demands of a war increasingly different from the one the British expected to fight. Yet for all the numerous ad hoc adjustments, policy deviations, and failed efforts that the British undertook during this period, their strategic goals remained the same, serving as the lodestar guiding British decisions throughout the early years of the conflict.

Though French’s book covers ground that has long been trod upon by other scholars, the author succeeds in providing a provocatively fresh interpretation as to how British policymakers approached the war. While it suffers to a degree from a too-rigid exclusion of consideration of domestic considerations, such as home-front politics and morale, it’s easy to see why his book and his follow-up volume have become the starting point for anyone seeking to understand the development of British strategy in the First World War. Even if one disagrees with some of French’s conclusions, it’s a book no one interested in the subject can afford to ignore.

While examining the sometimes-lauded and sometimes-derided regimental system of the British Army, the author finds an institution with a great deal more flexibility than it's usually given credit for but notes that the basic issue is that the regiments never quite resolved the problems that they were meant to be an answer to under the Cardwell reforms. In particular, the hope that embedding military units in a (hopefully) supportive community would meet the manpower needs of overseas service in the empire never quite came to pass. While the better sort of working-class man might respect the army and support the empire, it didn't mean that he was prepared to forego marriage and establishing himself in his trade for the sake of that empire. The other basic problem is that while Britain could afford a military to defend the country or a military to engage in overseas service, it could not afford both, and that was the essential problem of mobilization during the world wars and a problem that remains today, as the British military posture continues to diminish since this book has been published.

This book focuses on the performance of the British Army in the campaign in North West Europe in 1944 and 1945, and to a degree on that of the B.E.F. in France in 1940. It also covers the pre-war political and military build-up (or lack of it) before the outbreak of the Second World War.

The author has undertaken significant and in depth research. Some of the information he has unearthed is very informative. For example, I found the details on the dangers of being a platoon commander and the average time in command before being killed or wounded sobering.

My concern is that this book (as its title indicates) only concentrates on the campaigns in France and North West Europe. It only touches upon Italy, Sicily and Tunisia, and hardly mentions the Western Desert or South East Asia. I am also sceptical about some of the conclusions reached. For example, I question the references to Major General ROSS (GOC 53 Infantry Division) and not so favourable about MONTGOMERY's style of leadership.

In summary, I do recommend this book to any military historian. It is well researched and is very thought provoking.

When I read the description of this book from Amazon I thought it would be either a. boring or b. repetitious of books I have read previously. Neither was true. Even though I have knowledge of the strategies Britain used during the war, this book explained the underlying goal of the various strategies. For example, why was Lloyd George so interested in moving artillery to Italy for use against Austria-Hungary? Outwardly, the goal was to knock away Germany's allies. However, that was partially true. A large part of the goal was to remove Germany's allies, but to sacrifice the troops of Britain's allies to do so. Britain could shelter her own forces to save them for the final assault against Germany, thereby gaining most of the credit and most of the bargaining power at the ensuing peace conference. That is just one example.

I found this book very informative, and not the least boring. Highly recommend it to those interested in the behind scenes strategies of WWI.

PS...France and Russia, as well as the USA, were not immune from this type of planning......

This is a very interesting book. Not only does it discuss how British strategy and war aims evolved during the first two years of the war, it also gives great insight into what it takes to run a major, modern war. Well researched. There is a great deal of political, economic and logistical information is this volume; it can become confusing. That actually is a good thing. If this information is confusing to the reader, who probably has knowledge of WWI, can you imagine what this situation was like at the time for Asquith, Balfour, Churchill, Grey, Lloyd George, et. al. dealing with incomplete information, guesses, wrong data? After reading the book I did achieve an understanding of how British strategy and war aims evolved during this period. However, the unexpected story on how the war was run by the British for me surpassed the in value the original purpose of the book.

This book is hard to come by; expensive if you want to purchase it. I obtained my copy via the Illinois State Library system search process. The book I read previous to this one was: Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 by Brock Millman. As you can see I read them backwards. I should have read the volume by David French first, then the book by Millman. If you are interested in rreading these books, I suggest you read David French first.

Over all a great read. Provides significant insight into British poicy making, politics and how the British government ran the war during the first two years.

If you're looking for an incisive examination of the woes of the British army in the Second World War, and how those flaws were overcome, this is the book for you. While there are any number of relevant points one can talk about, to a large degree the author boils it down to the tensions between an authoritarian organizational culture trying to operate with a machine-age doctrine that really demanded a high level of decentralization. Add to this lapses in training and professional education, more missions then could be adequately covered, and the costs of crash mobilization, and one has a picture of why British operational competance was so hard bought. What this was not about is hangovers from the 19th century, World War I trench warfare, an overfondness for horses, or regimentalism on the brain.

If one has a complaint, it would have been nice to see a comparison of how the process by which Britain's army in Asia gained competance compared with what happened in the Mediterranean and Western Europe. But one can only put so much in one monograph.½