Christopher Layne

I read this in preparation of attending graduate school in the Fall and found Prof. Layne's book both insightful and interesting. It presented a view of American foreign policy and grand strategy that I had not thought of or particularly noticed before, and discussed how it has affected international relations in general since World War II. Layne's general premise of changing the way that America works internationally to become a more efficient nation, while lowering national debt and the less than friendly views of the country overseas, is a realistic, and in my opinion, fairly easily implemented. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in American Grand Strategy or someone interested in a fresh perspective of how to improve America's position in world affairs.… (meer)

Even though I may be biased having taken Christopher Layne's class on International Law in graduate school (where I learned there was no such thing as international law), I must admit that the book was both fascinating and insightful. Anyone that really wishes to understand how the Wilsonian ideology of liberalism has affected all aspects of American Foreign policy since WWI should read this book. Not only does Layne offer a straight-forward, often blunt analysis of American policy--often stating things as they are rather than how policymaker's rhetoric claim things are--he offers a vision of improvements needed in U.S. foreign policy.

He argues that rather than seeking to maintain our role as global ("extra-regional") hegemon, the U.S. needs to focus on becoming an offshore balancer. Rather than fighting unnecessary wars on the periphery, policymakers should work on foster a multipolar emergence on the Eurasian continent freeing the U.S. from needing to safeguard states from potential wars fought in those areas. Until convinced otherwise, I am a huge fan of this plan. What purpose can U.S. hegemony serve in Eurasia? Is the threat to U.S. economic interests real given a great power rivalry elsewhere? When has the U.S. suffered because Europe was multipolar in the past?

By deinvesting American forces from both sides of the Eurasian landmass, the U.S. can more effectively serve as both a balancer to any potential new hegemon in those areas and avoid costs associated with any internal rivalries in regions outside U.S. interests. Why do American policymakers insist that troops need to be maintained to protect Taiwan when it poses limited benefit to U.S. interests? Aren't we just asking for trouble (something the U.S. is notorious for doing--see the two World Wars)?

To avoid unnecessary overstretch, avoid hegemony and become an off-shore balancer. Hopefully this book and classical realism begins to catch on in policymaking circles in the wake of the Iraq War to ensure less ideology and more morally rooted realism permeates decisions. Can you tell this book helped make me an unabashed interantional realist?… (meer)