Neil C. Mangum

I was very happy to get this book to add to my resources for the Little Big Horn, I have collected many Custer books and a number about the Rosebud. But I was very very DISAPPOINTED. First of all, he very academically tells where everyone was and where they went during the battle, like moving little men around a battle board, but it was so confusing, it didn't add anything.

Mostly he doesn't seem to know much about Indians or the Sioux and apparently little about the battle it's self, nor it's true relationship to the Little Big Horn. How could this be as he worked at the LBH for many many years and must have discussed it with many many very knowledgeable people? The Little Big Horn is right next to the Crow Reservation??? I really really do not understand this, hence my disappointment. "The definitive work on the subject."????? No way!!! I gave him an additional star as there was some information I found interesting, very little, but it wasn't totally terrible?

Sherman & Sheridan were both concerned with the Indian problem at the time, Sheridan was in the field and the one who said, "the only good Indians were dead Indians", and he ran his department that way. That is also why he sent Custer to the Little Big Horn, even though he took him out of disgrace to do so, as he was known for killing Indians. So, they were not working to control the Indians on the reservation, which the author contends, they had every hope of killing some of them.… (meer)

A workmanlike description of the Battle of the Rosebud, by a National Park Service historian. The plan in 1876 was to have three US Army columns converge on northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana, where Plains Indians were supposed to have gathered. One column, under Colonel John Gibbon, left from Bozeman, Montana; one, under General Alfred Terry (with field command to Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer) left from Fort Abraham Lincoln in Dakota Territory (across the river from Bismarck); and one under General George Cook left from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming. The Gibbon and Custer columns could communicate, sort of, by the Missouri and Yellowstone Rivers; in order to send a message to the others Crook would have needed to send a courier back to Fort Fetterman where the message could be telegraphed to Omaha, then relayed to Chicago, then to St. Paul, then to Bismarck, then put on a steamboat to the mouth of the Yellowstone, then by courier to Gibbon or Terry or Custer in the field. This system was never actually used. The three columns were never intended to cooperate; instead it was assumed that the natives would flee from whatever force they encountered and perhaps run into another one.

So Crook marched north and west with three battalions of cavalry, one battalion of infantry, and assorted Crow and Shoshone scouts, packers, Montana miners, and miscellaneous, totaling around 1325. The Lakota and Cheyenne tracked the column and exchanged desultory shots now and then. Eventually, on June 17 1876, Crook encountered a large native force just over the Montana line at Rosebud Creek. The battle was confused; Crook found himself surprised in his camp at the base of some hills. In particular one of Crook’s units, under Lieutenant Colonel William B. Royall, advanced too far and was in danger of being cut off – although they eventually extricated themselves. Crook claimed a victory, but retreated back toward his supply base (to be fair, the other columns could get some supplies by river but Crook had to haul everything overland).

The battle was overshadowed by Custer’s defeat on the Little Bighorn just 8 days later. Author Neil Mangum notes that the natives didn’t behave they way the US Army expected; instead of harassing the column from a distance they engaged in open battle. He comments that in the shock of the Custer defeat, Crook was blamed – for not sending couriers to Custer and Terry and Gibbon to notify them of the number of Lakota and Cheyenne present, and for not pursuing after the battle. Mangum notes that there was no reasonable way Crook could have notified the other commanders – he had no idea where they were, other than somewhere north. He might have tried a pursuit – but might have ended up like Custer if he had. Another interesting claim by some critics is that if Custer had been in command at the Rosebud the natives would have been soundly defeated; but the flip side is if Crook had been in command at the Little Bighorn the results would have been more favorable to the US Army. Mangum notes that Custer at the Little Bighorn acted like a line commander, riding in with the attack instead of staying back and directing things; while Crook at the Rosebud acted like a field commander, finding a good place to observe the battlefield and directing troops well after the initial surprise.

The initial sections – a biography of Crook up to the battle – are an easy read. The written description of the battle is quite confusing. However, this is redeemed by excellent maps showing the positions of Crook’s forces at each stage; I only wish the maps had been integrated with the text rather than being in the end matter. There are photographs of the battlefield as it is today, and photograph portraits of some of the participants. A good third of the book is an appendix listing the complete rosters of the US Army units involved, and the after-action reports of each commanding officer.

The site is a Montana State Park, thanks to the efforts of the former owner, rancher Elmer “Slim” Kobold. I’ll have to visit next time I’m in the area.… (meer)