Edwin W. Martin

This is a good book, but it isn't exactly revolutionary. It's main point is that the British and Americans both wanted to keep Communist China out of the Soviet camp. One tried engagement and one tried isolation, but neither worked. The Chinese Communists were too inflexible in what they wanted to compromise. They showed some more flexibility after the Korean War, but by then the British and especially the Americans were unable or unwilling to make any concessions. He makes some interesting smaller assertions, such as the British policy of engagement contributed to its retention of Hong Kong. And that Acheson's State Department was largely unmoved by the China Lobby. The argument on Hong Kong makes sense, but he didn't really prove it. The point on the China Lobby was a stretch based on some fairly thin evidence, including Acheson's own assertions later. Nevertheless, this is a good book that is more about US-UK relations than US-China. People interested in Anglo-American relations should give it a try.… (meer)