Although this is not the first book you should read about the still controversial battle, Brooks has a lot to offer the informed reader. Essentially, Brooks is seeking to answer the question how this all wound up looking like a tactical failure for the Royal Navy, which entails lining up all the factors that went into John Jellicoe's thinking as commander of the British Grand Fleet. What it essentially boils down to is that while Jellicoe verged on the notorious for his fear of underwater weaponry, he did have legitimate reasons for those fears; this still didn't prevent him from seeking decision when the chance presented itself. However, losing contact with the German High Seas Fleet overnight is always going to look like a dodgy matter, particularly since it's the communication procedures that Jellicoe established himself that failed him. Still, no British commander would have taken on the Germans in their own waters, when there was no real need. Perhaps the most useful point that Brooks makes, in the course of a really excellent examination of the night-time skirmishing between the two forces, is that the British destroyer force was scattered and decimated at dawn, and that alone was a factor that would have given any commander legitimate pause. ( )