Thought-provoking, although the thoughts are not necessarily pleasant. At first I thought this was yet another blame-America-for-everything book, because author George Fiefer does, at one point, suggest that the US is to blame for Pearl Harbor because the tremendous insult of Commodore Perry’s mission lurked hidden in the Japanese consciousness for 80-odd years. However, it has some redeeming qualities. The sections on Japanese history and Japanese politics are quite good.


Japan, of course, had remained “closed” since the early days of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Foreigners, except Chinese, Koreans, and Dutch, were forbidden to enter Japan at all, the Chinese and Koreans could only come to Nagasaki, and the Dutch were limited to the artificial island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay. In turn, Japanese were prohibited from traveling abroad, and no Japanese that did could return.


Rumors spread that foreigners or Japanese who intentionally or unintentionally violated the prohibitions were treated with extreme cruelty. Fiefer claims this is untrue. There were many unintentional, quasi-intentional, and intentional contacts during the “closed” period. Some daimyos were quite eager for trade, and did semi-clandestine business with American whalers that put ashore in Hokkaido. The official policy was to treat castaways and ships in distress humanely (by Japanese standards); the harshest part of this is that shipwrecked sailors could only be picked up in Nagasaki, which meant if you were wrecked in Hokkaido you were transported – under guard, but not badly treated – all the way to the other corner of the country. Ships that approached the coast were sometimes fired on, and sometimes just ignored; since the heaviest coast defense guns Japan possessed at the time were 3-pounders, the shelling was not very effectual – one unarmed merchant vessel attempting to return a shipwrecked Japanese fisherman was shelled for 18 hours (without taking any damage) before giving up. The story that made the rounds most often was the treatment of the crew of the Lagoda; in the Western version, the castaways were imprisoned and beaten before being turned over in Nagasaki. What actually happened (according to Feifer) is the Lagoda was never shipwrecked at all; the “castaways” were deserters that had stolen a couple of ships boats and rowed ashore; they were not exactly the cream of American crews and fought among themselves and harassed Japanese villagers and women until they were imprisoned; one died in prison but it isn’t clear whether that was from “ill-treatment”; and the rest were eventually returned intact to Nagasaki. Nevertheless it was the nasty rumor rather than the facts that spread around the world. Thus one of Perry’s specific charges was to ensure a Japanese “agreement” to treat wrecked sailors kindly. The rest of his orders from Millard Fillmore were benign; Perry was supposed to “request” trade with America and port rights, and was not to use violence except in self-defense.


Fiefer’s main gripe with Perry, then, is that he greatly exceeded his orders. He demanded to be allowed to present Millard Fillmore’s letter to “the Emperor”, threatening to march to Edo and do it in person. He demanded negotiations be held in places of his choosing, and, what Fiefer considers the worst behavior, he sent some “gifts” ashore with two white flags and instructions on how to use them if the Japanese wanted to surrender. The “white flags” were never mentioned in the official report, but both Perry’s crewmen and Japanese witnesses reported them in their memoirs.


The critique of Perry and his actions is devastating; one of Feifer’s previous books was on the WWII battle of Okinawa, and he must have acquired particular affection for the Okinawans, since he’s particular harsh on Perry’s visit to them (the bell from a Okinawan peace temple was stolen and graced the US Naval Academy for years, until being returned in the 1970s, and Perry and his entourage forced their way into Shuri Castle despite Okinawan protests).


The problem with the books comes from the overall treatment of Perry. While the historical section proper is well organized, the discussion of Perry is disjointed and scattered through the text. While Perry gets some damning with faint praise, or praising with faint damnation, what the book really needs is a set of bullet points emphasizing the pros and cons. Therefore:


*Perry was a harsh and threatening negotiator, repeatedly “practice-firing” his cannon to make absolutely sure the Japanese realized the relative value of their 3-pounders. A diplomat instead of a military officer might have been a better choice. He also exceeded his orders.


*Perry’s actions caused great distress to the Japanese. Almost the entire city of Edo (at the time, the second largest city in the world) evacuated out of fear.


*Perry had no clue as to the delicate balance of politics in Japan. The Shogun was mentally retarded and government affairs were handled by Abe Masahiro, essentially the “prime minister”. Lord Abe tried to keep everybody happy, and was not very successfully; Perry only tried to keep himself happy.


Now the other side:


*Somebody would have “opened” Japan eventually; and the Americans were probably a better choice than (say) the Russians.


*Perry’s attitudes were typical of the time and projecting modern values back into history is consistently worthless.


*Feifer quotes a Japanese student getting her PhD at Columbia: “Perry? I’m all for him. Without him I’d be pouring tea and arranging flowers.”


As I said, it’s thought provoking; like most Americans I was of the general impression that Perry was a wonderful benefit to Japan. I now am disabused. I’m still of the impression that the pros outweigh the cons, but I’m more aware of the cons and I grant their effect. Worth a read. ( )