Law, Order, National Unity, and Fear Kill Democracy

We often hear how fragile democracy is, especially today when our own nearly 250-year old one is under daily seize by those charged with preserving it. While somewhat flawed by organizational issues and a grayish style, University of Illinois historian Peter Fritzsche nonetheless does readers a great service by illustrating just how fast things can change. The change comes when those with anti-democratic ambitions take over, even when they have the support of only the minority, as did Hitler and the Nazis in 1933.

So, how did Hitler and his cohorts do it? For starters, it was their intention to do eliminate fledgling German democracy. Part of Hitler’s genius rested in his insistence on gaining power politically rather than by open revolt. He took full advantage of conflicting political factions in Germany at the time: those wishing authoritarian rule; those continuing with democracy; and those embracing communism. After Hindenburg agreed to his chancellorship, Hitler moved swiftly to rally the skeptical and quash recalcitrant opponents. He sealed the deal by crowning his regime with a sort of democratic legitimacy, the March 5 elections, the last in Germany until after the war.

Hitler benefited from Germany’s seething post war psyche. Onerous conditions placed on Germany by the Allies, a wrecked economy, lots of idle hands, the disbelief of losing, and the belief that a nefarious cabal engineered defeat, these created fertile ground for Hitler’s message, that the country needed to rally around the national spirit and unity of 1914, to recapture it in a new Third Reich (the first two being the Holy Roman Empire and the German Empire that ended in 1918). This proved a powerful idea for German’s of every stripe, whether they liked or disliked Hitler’s methods. After Hitler took the reins in 1933, regaining the glory of Germany’s past, its rightful place on the world stage, this became a powerful motivation for unity. The Nazis engineered the expression of this national unity in a variety of ways: masses marching, uniforms, patriotic music, mass gatherings, and focused media messaging, especially via radio.

Then there was people’s desire for law, order, and stability. The years after WWI ended were pretty tumultuous and some would say licentious, especially in Berlin. Political rivalry, as well as poor economic conditions, caused much of this agitation. Street fighting became common and once the Nazis had built up their brown shirt army harassment became common. Ironically, the Nazis, particularly after January 30, 1933, were the ones responsible for most of the ruckus, both spontaneous and state planned and sanctioned.

Fear of others has always proven an effective and useful way to absolve oneself of responsibility and push off frustration and anger onto another. Hitler didn’t invent antisemitism in Germany; it has a long tradition that intensified in the 19th century, when it practically took over German universities. It didn’t require much to convince Germans they lost the war and suffered during the Weimar because a group of Jews and international financiers were manipulating things for their own gain. Immediately after assuming the Chancellorship, Hitler and his Nazis began their legalized and systematic oppression through boycotts, deprivation of goods and livings, and outright murder. Readers will find it interesting that genealogy, that is, proving one’s purity, because a passion for many Germans during the first hundred days.

The question always raised and still unanswered is whether Hitler and the Nazis achieved control through violence or persuasion. Fritzsche doesn’t answer it either, but it appears it was a combination of both, though it would seem that a large portion, though not the majority, were predisposed to authoritarian rule, and Hitler and his gang were the heralds with the most appealing message backed by clinched fists.

Readers will find Hitler’s First Hundred Days a revealing read, especially today. ( )

Law, Order, National Unity, and Fear Kill Democracy

We often hear how fragile democracy is, especially today when our own nearly 250-year old one is under daily seize by those charged with preserving it. While somewhat flawed by organizational issues and a grayish style, University of Illinois historian Peter Fritzsche nonetheless does readers a great service by illustrating just how fast things can change. The change comes when those with anti-democratic ambitions take over, even when they have the support of only the minority, as did Hitler and the Nazis in 1933.

So, how did Hitler and his cohorts do it? For starters, it was their intention to do eliminate fledgling German democracy. Part of Hitler’s genius rested in his insistence on gaining power politically rather than by open revolt. He took full advantage of conflicting political factions in Germany at the time: those wishing authoritarian rule; those continuing with democracy; and those embracing communism. After Hindenburg agreed to his chancellorship, Hitler moved swiftly to rally the skeptical and quash recalcitrant opponents. He sealed the deal by crowning his regime with a sort of democratic legitimacy, the March 5 elections, the last in Germany until after the war.

Hitler benefited from Germany’s seething post war psyche. Onerous conditions placed on Germany by the Allies, a wrecked economy, lots of idle hands, the disbelief of losing, and the belief that a nefarious cabal engineered defeat, these created fertile ground for Hitler’s message, that the country needed to rally around the national spirit and unity of 1914, to recapture it in a new Third Reich (the first two being the Holy Roman Empire and the German Empire that ended in 1918). This proved a powerful idea for German’s of every stripe, whether they liked or disliked Hitler’s methods. After Hitler took the reins in 1933, regaining the glory of Germany’s past, its rightful place on the world stage, this became a powerful motivation for unity. The Nazis engineered the expression of this national unity in a variety of ways: masses marching, uniforms, patriotic music, mass gatherings, and focused media messaging, especially via radio.

Then there was people’s desire for law, order, and stability. The years after WWI ended were pretty tumultuous and some would say licentious, especially in Berlin. Political rivalry, as well as poor economic conditions, caused much of this agitation. Street fighting became common and once the Nazis had built up their brown shirt army harassment became common. Ironically, the Nazis, particularly after January 30, 1933, were the ones responsible for most of the ruckus, both spontaneous and state planned and sanctioned.

Fear of others has always proven an effective and useful way to absolve oneself of responsibility and push off frustration and anger onto another. Hitler didn’t invent antisemitism in Germany; it has a long tradition that intensified in the 19th century, when it practically took over German universities. It didn’t require much to convince Germans they lost the war and suffered during the Weimar because a group of Jews and international financiers were manipulating things for their own gain. Immediately after assuming the Chancellorship, Hitler and his Nazis began their legalized and systematic oppression through boycotts, deprivation of goods and livings, and outright murder. Readers will find it interesting that genealogy, that is, proving one’s purity, because a passion for many Germans during the first hundred days.

The question always raised and still unanswered is whether Hitler and the Nazis achieved control through violence or persuasion. Fritzsche doesn’t answer it either, but it appears it was a combination of both, though it would seem that a large portion, though not the majority, were predisposed to authoritarian rule, and Hitler and his gang were the heralds with the most appealing message backed by clinched fists.

Readers will find Hitler’s First Hundred Days a revealing read, especially today. ( )