This is a superb narrative history of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The Russian premier Nikita Khrushchev, for reasons that are still clouded in some mystery, agreed to place nuclear weapons on Cuba, within easy striking distance of the whole of the southern and eastern United States. America worked vigorously to have Russia back down and remove the weapons. The diplomatic and political conflict escalated to such a pitch that, for two weeks in October 1962, the possibility of nuclear war seemed very real and very near. Finally, Russian resolve broke, the weapons were removed and the Cold War relationship moved on.

The first 100 pages of this book give us the geopolitical background and context within which Russia, Cuba and America were governed and how they saw each other, both inn terms of their society and the personalities in charge.

The crisis itself is handled in much detail, mainly because of the vast archive of available documentation, but also, amazingly, because President Kennedy recorded almost all of the senior meetings at which the crisis was discussed and policy was developed.

Kennedy comes out of this book very well. It is clear that many in his senior team, both politicians and military, wanted war regardless of the consequences to the wider world or their own countrymen. Kennedy consistently looked for diplomatic and political solutions, showed great empathy in trying to understand his opponents’ thinking and was prepared to be personally criticised for taking what he felt was the safest path rather then the most popular one.

The message from this book is that the whole episode was clouded by a fog of misinformation and disinformation and there were many points where even quite minor decisions could have resulted in catastrophe. In his final chapter Hastings draws a disturbing parallel between what happened in 1962 and what is hapenening today (2023) in Russia and the Ukraine.

Highly readable and highly recommended. ( )