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Steve Call teaches both American and military history at Broome Community College in Binghamton, New York. During his twenty-year career in the air force, Call held many command and staff positions, including liaison officer with the army and Pentagon staff officer. His Ph.D. in military history is toon meer from Ohio State University. toon minder
Werken van Steve Call
Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq (Texas a&M University Military History) (2007) 12 exemplaren
Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in Afghanistan and Iraq (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History… (2010) 7 exemplaren
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Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in A… door Steve Call
Interesting tactical air controller view of CAS and other things
As far as I know this is the only open source book on close air support. So is no piece of art and the author bias, pro air force, it's clear but the fact that is not a memoir, or a detailed study of a big battle in which CAS is only a part of the story, it's what makes this book good.
Besides that it is a little bit dated, centered on the early days of the GWOT. But at the same time this is a good thing as it shows how some procedures where developed on the battlefield.
Besides that it is a little bit dated, centered on the early days of the GWOT. But at the same time this is a good thing as it shows how some procedures where developed on the battlefield.
Selling Air Power is a classic academic monograph: a tightly focused analysis of a tighly bounded topic. The topic is post-1945 self-promotion by the newly independent United States Air Force. The focus is its use of mass media -- primarily film, news stories, and articles in popular magazines -- to make its case. The problem is that too much interesting material, and necessary context, lies beyond his self-imposed boundaries.
The book it at its most effective when analyzing article-length non-fiction published by Air Force officials and supporters during the late 1940s and 1950s. The material is accessible, but obscure, and Call effectively catalogs its principal authors, themes, and narrative approaches. The book’s coverage of film is less compelling, since it focuses on six ftitles -- from Strategic Air Command to Dr. Strangelove -- already familiar to, and much analyzed by, historians. Other categories of sources, from novels to comic books and television programs, receive correspondingly less attention. As a result, the study as a whole feels pinched where it should feel expansive, and timid where it should feel bold.
Lack of context compounds the problem. Debates over the role of the Air Force and the efficacy of air power were shaped by memories of World War II, the experience of the Korean War, the evolution of U. S. nuclear strategy, and the gradual emergence of the ballistic missile as a means of delivering nuclear warheads. Call neglects those subjects almost entirely, leaving readers (no doubt inadvertently) with the impression that Air Force self-promotion was primarily (even solely) responsible for changing public atittudes to air power.
Readers deeply interested in the post-1945 image of air power, and in the interservice rivalries of the forties and fifties, will find this useful. Others, though, are likely to find it too tightly focused to be interesting -- much less indispensable.… (meer)
The book it at its most effective when analyzing article-length non-fiction published by Air Force officials and supporters during the late 1940s and 1950s. The material is accessible, but obscure, and Call effectively catalogs its principal authors, themes, and narrative approaches. The book’s coverage of film is less compelling, since it focuses on six ftitles -- from Strategic Air Command to Dr. Strangelove -- already familiar to, and much analyzed by, historians. Other categories of sources, from novels to comic books and television programs, receive correspondingly less attention. As a result, the study as a whole feels pinched where it should feel expansive, and timid where it should feel bold.
Lack of context compounds the problem. Debates over the role of the Air Force and the efficacy of air power were shaped by memories of World War II, the experience of the Korean War, the evolution of U. S. nuclear strategy, and the gradual emergence of the ballistic missile as a means of delivering nuclear warheads. Call neglects those subjects almost entirely, leaving readers (no doubt inadvertently) with the impression that Air Force self-promotion was primarily (even solely) responsible for changing public atittudes to air power.
Readers deeply interested in the post-1945 image of air power, and in the interservice rivalries of the forties and fifties, will find this useful. Others, though, are likely to find it too tightly focused to be interesting -- much less indispensable.… (meer)
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- 4
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- 28
- Populariteit
- #471,397
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- 3.5
- Besprekingen
- 3
- ISBNs
- 7