Donald J. Stoker

Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present by Donald Stoker is an examination of war theory and the practice of the United States in a period where the United States did not have a single declared war. Stoker was a Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War College’s program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California for 18 years. He currently is a Visiting Fellow and Fulbright Visiting Professor of International Relations, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Austria.

Why America Loses Wars is a scholarly look at war and peace. Stoker draws heavily from Clausewitz to form his thesis and uses recent history to support his thinking. Kissinger would agree with America's most significant reason for losing wars -- lack of long term strategy. Machiavelli would also give the nod to not finishing the conflict correctly. America, by far, has the largest, strongest, best-equipped military in the history of the world (despite what national leaders say). We lost in Vietnam, effectively lost in Korea, have been to Iraq three times, and Afghanistan without a decisive victory. With that being said, in the first Iraq War, Colin Powell was heavily criticized by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney for not developing a military plan for Iraq. Powell said he could not produce a plan until he had a clear political objective for the military action. That is probably one of the most important demands of a military leader in recent history -- a clear objective for the military operation. Compared to the second Bush and his war on global terrorism, his father was much more decisive in setting a goal. The younger Bush's war on global terrorism as an objective has been compared to "war on an abstract noun." It may sound good, but it is not a tangible objective.

War in America has taken a turn. No recent president wants to admit being at war and that started with Truman and the Korean Conflict. Truman committed troops without a declaration of war; in fact, World War II was the last declaration of war issued by the United States. Now, if the war is popular congress usually goes ahead and funds the conflict, until it becomes unpopular. At that time, the military is forced to curtail its activities, and a quagmire develops. An actual declaration of war would help in several ways. First, it would require congressional approval which may not be expedient, but it would question and examine the goals of the conflict. Secondly, the president would need to present a clear objective to Congress rather than rally the American people to a cause. Consider: With proper thought, would America drop a winning conflict in Afghanistan to start a new war in Iraq? With proper thought and planning, would America have been able to achieve its goals in Afghanistan in less than seventeen years?

Stoker examines limited warfare and what the term means and what popular opinion makes it out to be. We are not a nation that is afraid of going to war; in fact, it seems we are too ready to go to war, just not finish it. War has become much like our infrastructure. We love to build great works; we don't like to maintain them. A critically important book combining theory and recent American military actions.… (meer)

The author is a professor of military strategy at the U. S. Naval War College. The writer assumes that the reader has a reasonably broad body of knowledge about the war and begins his narrative at that point. It is a technical analysis of the military history of the war that I found a bit impersonal and at times rather dry. I felt the author should have followed the lead of Herman Hattaway, the author of How The North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Hattaway's book was a similar technical analysis of the military history of the war. He made good use of a large number of quotations from Bruce Catton, a writer with a journalist's eye for the human side of life, through the pages of his book and made it more engaging. This author had some interesting ideas but in my opinion history is first and last about people and this book lacked the personal touch.
The premise of the book is that the South lost the war because of their failure to create and implement an effective military strategy that met their political needs. This comes straight from the maxim of Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by other means. I agreed with several of the arguments which the author made to support this premise. At the beginning of the war the South possessed a mass of wealth in the form of a large cotton crop. Instead of selling the cotton and buying weapons they established an informal embargo to force England and France to come to their aid. They had memories of the French aid to the colonists which helped make the American Revolution successful. England and France did not come to their aid and it was not until the second year of the war that the South had decent arms for their soldiers.
In his assessment of the political leadership of the two combatants the author is very critical of Jefferson Davis and gives passing marks to Lincoln. Davis had much better experience for the task. He graduated from West Point, served in the Mexican War and was Secretary of War under Buchanan. The only experience Lincoln had was a short term in the militia in the Black Hawk War. The difference was that Lincoln was a better manager and he was open to learning instead of assuming that he knew everything. Davis would have preferred the position of commanding general and took his role as commander-in-chief very seriously vetoing bills passed by the Southern Congress that he felt impinged on his powers in that role. At the same time although vastly outnumbered he insisted on attempting to defend every mile of the perimeter of the Confederacy. As a consequence the South quickly lost the forts that controlled the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers and then New Orleans, the largest city in the Confederacy.
While acknowledging Lee's tactical skills the author uses Lee's own words to describe his strategic failings. Lee is quoted as saying that the great victory at Chancellorsville did not bring to the South one acre of conquered territory and the Northern casualties would quickly be replaced. Lee's failure to win any battles on Northern territory doomed the South to defeat. In contrast Grant by 1864 was pressing the South at several critical points. The South was outnumbered and forced to wage a defensive war which they could not win. Grant kept Lee engaged in Virginia while Sherman destroyed the productive capacity of the lower South.
I did find reading the book worthwhile and learned a good deal. The author displayed a deft command of a large body of knowledge about the war. The author's big picture analysis of the war added a new level to my understanding of the history of the Civil War. While I could spend a lifetime reading about the Civil War I have the urge to move on to another topic. In the last year I have read two good books about Medieval history and I would like to learn more about that era. So many books, so little time.… (meer)