Hugh White (1) (1953–)

The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power by Hugh White examines the China as a rising power. He is a professor of strategic studies at Australia’s National University and formerly a a senior official at the (Australian) Department of Defence from 1995-2000. White has an impressive background and well versed in in foreign affairs.

Three things are needed for a nation to be considered a super power: Military strength, political strength, and economic strength. During the Cold War, the United States had all three strengths. The Soviet Union had the political and military strength; and managed to fake economic power. Americans worried about Japan's rise as a power starting in the 1970s. Although Japan still has the third largest economy in the wold, it has no military power and limited political power. Today China rising, not as fast as it had earlier, but still rising.

China today exhibits economic power. It is a regional military power and arguably a political power (keeping North Korea on a short leash is not working well). Previously, military power has been demonstrated by large naval fleets and aircraft carriers. China does not have the naval strength to invade Taiwan, but enough of a navy, particularly submarines, to make an on coming carrier fleet ineffective. The image of military might has changed since the Cold War. There is little doubt that the United States has the most powerful and technological military in the history of the world. But not all battles are fought head to head. The United States failed in Vietnam and the USSR failed in Afghanistan. Unless the United States can get it's military to China, it's military threat is ineffective. Granted the US has nuclear weapons, but what would it take to use them in Asia and risk nuclear retaliation?

United States has a long history as a power in Asia. Even during Vietnam, when things looked bad for the United States in Asia, Kissinger and Nixon opened relations with China. China gained political clout and the United States retained its role as a power in Asia. United States and China are not the only players in Asia. Japan, although a major economic power, relies on the United States for military security. In the event of conflict with China, what would Japan be able to contribute and what risk will it take for the United States to remain a regional power? South Korea has a vibrant economy and also enjoys United States' protection, but its primary concern is North Korea either defending itself or reunification. What is Russia's role on Asia?

China presents a different challenge to the United States. Our economies are intertwined and as the top two economies the world, the world depends on our peaceful existence. Although China has a miserable record on human rights and repressing its population, it is not exporting revolution or communism. China wants stability and with it a growing share of influence. United States has three options: confront China, share power with China, or leave Asia. The American public may lean towards confrontation, but that is not always practical . Leaving Asia would not serve America's economic and security interests. Sharing power may be the practical solution and the option that White supports. China's rise will unlikely lead to the old Cold War bipolar world. Examining China's rise in power and the effects it has on the United States presents an interesting study of how two major powers who are not enemies can go about sharing power and not create havoc in the world. An excellent read on current foreign affairs and one of the larger challenges facing the United States.… (meer)

here is no doubt that this latest Quarterly Essay is deeply depressing to read. Without America is unequivocal about the fading power of America and that we in Australia face the prospect of China becoming the dominant power in our region. You don’t have to be xenophobic to fear this: it’s a straightforward matter of China not sharing the democratic values that we are used to. We are used to having democratic elections, freedom of speech, freedom from censorship, the rule of law, judicial independence and the end of capital punishment many decades ago. Chinese authoritarianism isn’t going to suit the larrikin Australian character at all.
But what this QE makes clear is that Australia has had its head in the sand. Obama’s ‘pivot’ was a failure but we believed it because we liked and admired Obama. We’ve been backing America as a reliable ally when all along it’s been demonstrating that it its strategy in Asia is failing, while at the same time we’ve been relying on China for our economic survival. The mantra that we do not need to choose between China and America is would be laughable if things were not serious: we often need to choose, and not having an intelligent, coherent and bipartisan strategy is not helping us to negotiate our way in uncharted territory. Even before Trump, American foreign policy towards China was nonsense.
Instead of hiding our collective heads in the sand, what we need to do is to strengthen our ties in southeast Asia, and we need to ensure that Indonesia in particular becomes a strategic asset rather than a liability in the new Asia. It will be the fifth biggest economy in the world by 2030, and still we send journalists there when they don’t have a word of Indonesian to interpret what’s going on. (Indeed, I suspect that the last Australian journalist to speak a local neighbourhood language was Sean Dorney reporting on Papua New Guinea). Indonesia is our biggest and most powerful neighbour, and there are worrying signs of the erosion of democratic reforms and the slide towards authoritarianism and away from secularism yet it remains a mystery to us*. India is also vitally important to us because it also has a vested interest in limiting China’s power, but the best we can do on Australian TV is repeats of Joanna Lumley’s excruciatingly Raj-ridden travelogues.
To read the rest of my review please visit https://anzlitlovers.com/2018/09/15/without-america-australia-in-the-new-asia-by...… (meer)

http://shawjonathan.wordpress.com/2010/09/11/quarterly-essay-39/

As with every Quarterly Essay, this issue includes correspondence on the previous one. There are no fireworks in the discussion of QE38, David Marr’s Power Trip. A couple of journalists add corroborating anecdotes about Rudd’s leadership style (David Marr describes these as symptomatic of ‘a new, and welcome, spirit of indiscretion’; I read them as a bit of a pile-on). Kerryn Goldsworthy deftly despatches whole swathes of attack on the essay and dispenses a little relevant information about literary forms. James Boyce corrects and enriches David Marr’s understanding of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his probable significance for Rudd. In responding, David Marr replies almost entirely to criticisms that were made elsewhere: perhaps it would have been polite to give those critics the right of pre-reply here (he quotes Sylvia Lawson and Allison Broinowski and gives them a one-word reply: rubbish).

Hugh White’s essay, Power Shift, is about something other than personalities and politics as horse race:

"Our leaders, and by extension the rest of us, are assuming that Asia will be transformed economically over the next few decades, but remain unchanged strategically and politically. It is an appealing assumption because the past forty years have been among the best times in Australia’s history, and it has been easy to believe that American power would continue indefinitely to keep Asia peaceful and Australia safe. That has been a cardinal mistake."

The essay proceeds with the logical clarity (though not the soul-destroying aridity) of a PowerPoint demonstration. ‘Since 1788,’ White says, stating the obvious but unsettling truth, ‘Australia has always enjoyed a very close and trusting relationship with the world’s strongest power, and we just take that for granted.’ Well, not for much longer – and we need to think about this. The main history of our times, he proposes, may not be in the place that’s getting the most attention:

"The day-to-day management of the [US–China] relationship gets a lot of detailed attention, but presidents and other senior figures avoid substantial analysis of America’s long-term intentions towards China. One reason is 9/11. For almost a decade, America’s political leaders have convinced themselves that a small group of fugitives on the run in Pakistan poses a bigger challenge to America’s place in the world than the transformation of the world’s most populous country. Future historians will find that hard to explain."

To be fair to White’s argument, he goes on immediately after this to acknowledge that Barack Obama signalled that the blinkers were coming off after his visit to China in November last year. All the same, he has a point.

It’s a very interesting essay, which I recommend as an antidote for the personality-preoccupied, narrative-driven writing that accounts for most political commentary in our newspapers these days.… (meer)