Ludwig WittgensteinBesprekingen

The point ------->

Me: :)

That was a weird language game mister Ludwig...

No entendí nada (tal y como predijo su autor) pero lo disfruté bastante.

Kosuth uses Wittgenstein's critique of language as a basis for examining the concept and functioning of art. Associating art with indirect assertions where meanings cannot be said directly but can only he shown through the structure of its own articulation, Kosuth refers to this as art's self-referentiality and defines art as "a play within the meaning system of art"; he argues for an art that considers the uses of the elements within the work and their function within the larger cultural and social framework. Brief biographical notes on some of the 84 participating artists.

Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. More understandable than I thought it would be. Very interesting, although I wonder if it solves a problem no one needed solving in any real sense. But W would agree as he determines philosophy is an action, not a problem solving mechanism and even the action is suspect, at least so far as logic is concerned because nothing can be said linguistically about the world with any logic. But did we need to prove that logic is not complete? Goedel obviously proved it can not be, but even on a practical level, philosophy can analyze ideas without needing to conform to mathematical logic. One doesn’t need the other necessarily. Still his dismantling of the idea of the logic of language was fascinating.
From intro by Russel: a philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical propositions” , but to make propositions clear “. (Xiii)
3.328 if a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam’s maxim. (If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning.)
5.6 the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
7 what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence

As is typical of a philosophy book, is filled with sentences that are written really badly or are straight up crap. But it has some cool stuff and it doesn't use much jargon, so at least you recognise that you're reading bad writing instead of thinking you are but being unsure. It's mostly an extended interrogation on what it means to understand a word, what language is, what the relation is between a word and your mind is, stuff like that. There's some interesting thoughts here, definitely, but it's a frustrating read cause it's often hard to extract them from the text. I guess that's partially to do with the translation but I really wanted a rewrite to make it sound more natural. Maybe that's unreasonable but it's just badly written, that's all.

Edit 11/04/2014: ok check out this cool passage:

"465. “An expectation is so made that whatever happens has to accord
with it, or not.”
If someone now asks: then is what is the case determined, give or take a yes or no, by an expectation or not a that is, is it determined in what sense the expectation would be satisfied by an event, no matter what happens? a then one has to reply: “Yes, unless the expression of the expectation is indefinite, for example, if it contains a disjunction of different possibilities.”"

Look at that 2nd sentence. It's *literal nonsense*. I checked the older translation, it's rendered perfectly there. But in this super duper translation they've apparently managed to completely mess up a simple sentence.

I give up. Most of the book has been frustrating, past some cool stuff at the start. Occasional interesting stuff in between lots of really obvious ideas expressed in confusing language, probably to make an argument I can't follow because the language is so unclear. I'm sorry, but this is ridiculous. I may well be stupid but it's unfair to expect people to somehow follow ideas if you can't communicate them at all and you have to guess and read people who interpret it for you. Also that's probably pissy but whatever. I'd rather read a book by someone who works hard to put these ideas in clear language than waste my time with frustrating, draining, completely unfun books.

So yeah I stopped reading at #475. Maybe I'll come back to it when I'm in a better mood or more interested in philosophy. For now... nah sorry.

CUPRINS

1. Cuvant inainte la editia a doua - pag. 7
2. Nota istorica - pag. 9
3. In ajutorul cititorului - pag. 33

4. Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus - pag. 97

5. Note - pag. 191
6. Lista de simboluri - pag. 206
7. Indice - pag. 209

The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. [...] Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.

Reading Wittgenstein is like reading Feynman, each sentence clear as it sits, but getting harder and harder to follow or even remember as my reading goes on.

Dizem que a expressão “não li e não gostei foi pronunciada pela primeira vez por Oswald de Andrade quando perguntado sobre um livro de José Lins do Rego. Como Oswald não gostava de Zé Lins, respondeu prontamente à pergunta com a tal frase. Deste Tractatus o que posso dizer é que li, sim, mas provavelmente não entendi e destarte naõ gostei. Achei-o cacete? De modo algum. É tão curto, conciso e sumário que a monotonia não tem vez. Cheio de platitudes, porém. Mais achatado do que chato. Um Tratado absurdo? Um Tratado falso? Ah, isso sim. Achei-o com base fluida e mal sustentante para uma filosofia aparentemente irracional. Wittgenstein parece-me mais um conman intelectual, ou um bluffer filosófico. P.ex. a inteligência humana NÃO depende da tolice humana para moldar a realidade. Os limites da minha linguagem NÃO significam os limites do meu mundo. Quem vive o presente NÃO é necessariamente um ser feliz. As fronteiras da minha linguagem NÃO são as fronteiras do meu universo... E assim por diante.

Perhaps one of the only philosophical masterpieces that you can read in a couple of days, or perhaps even in one afternoon if you're a quick reader. I cannot pretend that I understand everything about this book, neither can I pretend that I even get the essence of it right. However, I feel amazed by the brave attempt of Ludwig to literary 'cut the crap' out of the philosophy. His insight that the laws of logic are tautologies is brilliant. We cannot talk about the things that matter most to us (and we can realize this). I think this is the idea that Wittengenstein explains and proves in the last dramatic statements of the Logico-Philosophicus. And of course, those last two statements are nearly poetry. 'Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.' This is an anti-climax and a climax at the same time: the disappointing note with which Wittgenstein throws us back to our own worlds and our inability to understand reality.

A brilliant piece of philosophy. These are the notes of Wittgenstein trying to cope with the problem posed by Moore. 'I know this is my hand' - is this sufficient proof for the existence of the external world? Wittgenstein clarifies what he means by Sprachspiel, what the rules of this game are and why such a remark cannot be placed inside the game. It is genius at work: raw and unedited (with hilarious side notes). It is a very personal account of what philosophy for this great Austrian meant.

On Certainty is a philosophical book compiled from Ludwig Wittgenstein's notes collected over four periods in the eighteen months leading up to his death on April 29, 1951. The focus is on issues raised by G. E. Moore, particularly those surrounding knowledge and doubt. Some of the key ideas explored include the concept of "world-picture" and the nature of a ground for your beliefs. The requirements of doubting are discussed at length along with references to concepts introduced in the Philosophic Investigations.

12/11/21

12/11/21

With Wittgenstein there is a concern with the actual use of language – what is the problem and how we can illuminate/imagine a method for going forward. It is among other things a process. Observation precedes explanation and may yield only a description of the reality of a particular situation. (109) That means we should try to understand that Wittgenstein's own philosophical activity is like bringing words back to regular use (out/above/below the realm of “metaphysics”).

What is the process of trying to understand what it means to know something? Is there any conflict within a language game? There may be infinite variations in our everyday experiences; if so, how can we reach a resolution or should we seek that as a useful goal?

We should consider the use of comparison and noticing similarities. Sometimes that may bring insight. However the text often provides an invitation to enter into a dialog about the meaning of life and how one might understand the proper end of one's life. (language and dialog)

I am reminded of “the search” --- “What is the nature of the search . . . The search is what anyone would undertake if he were not sunk in the everydayness of his own life.” - Walker Percy

That is we are not looking for philosophical statements but the reality of what is here in everyday language. One wonders if this is a method for escaping the “everydayness” of life and the seeming incongruity of such a process? (117) One key for escaping the everydayness of life is recognizing the situation of a “fish out of water” and thinking in a way that you may become just that.

Our imagination may be a tool that allows recognition of just such a situation. (129) I personally am intrigued by the effect on my imagination of listening to music – different effects result from different types of music (Liszt or Ligeti). Whatever the means you may choose it is important to realize that language can do many things if we only look at the way we use words. We should aim to see clearly if possible. (Observation)

QBB-1

I have read through this one three times: once hastily to get a feel for it; and twice carefully with Bertrand Russell's 1922 introductory text in between. During this last reading I kept some notes and constructed a diagram. It was this diagram that began to homogenize my scattered thoughts. At first, I didn't even realize that I applied Wittgenstein's point 2.1: "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (9).



Looking at my elementary little diagram, I began to see something familiar. This dualistic metaphysics has its root in Kant's transcendental idealism from [b:Critique of Pure Reason|18288|Critique of Pure Reason|Immanuel Kant|https://d2arxad8u2l0g7.cloudfront.net/books/1348663530s/18288.jpg|1072226]. For Kant, there are two worlds: the noumenal and the phenomenal. As regards my diagram, Kant's noumenal world is the analog of the box labeled WORLD and the phenomental world has its analog in my box labeled CONCEPTUAL MODEL. These names aren't exactly synonymous, but I don't feel like changing them. The main point is that the noumenal world is reality as it is in itself, and we cannot access it. We cannot access, for example, the substance of objects. The phenomenal world, on the other hand, is the reality we experience through our senses.

For Wittgenstein, the main composite object we construct in order to interact with facts in the noumenal world are pictures. We picture facts, as he says early on. But this picture is the amalgamation of thoughts which make up propositions which make up a language. Yet herein lies one of the main thrusts of the tractatus: how do we assert a logically complete and infallible language with which to deal with phenomena? This was a major sticking point for me during my first two readings, because it seemed to me (especially at the very end of the text) that the whole argument ended with the destruction of metaphysics. This I based chiefly on point 6.54: "...he who understands me finally recognizes [my propositions] as senseless...." (82; and, indeed, many critics feel cheated at this point--the end--of the text).

Perhaps, though, this interpretation was due to my heightened skepticism for the usefulness of philosophy these days. I took a note at some point that says "the purpose of philosophy is to clarify thoughts and nothing more." And, indeed, one of Wittgenstein's goals is to use Occam's razor to excise any bit of symbolism/grammar/syntax/etc. deemed unnecessary. Which then causes my question to resurface: what would be left? Towards the end of the work, it seemed to me that Wittgenstein proposed the area of the mystical being the destination for of Occam's shavings.

But for the sake of argument, let's say endeavor to list the totality of things that are the case. We would happen upon Russell's paradox, which proves a self-referential error that occurs when trying to assert a set of all possible sets, because said set would have to include itself. This same type of issue arises when Wittgenstein proposes a language that includes everything that is the case--the facts; the pictures; the symbols. And even disregarding the paradox of Wittgenstein's friend, could we achieve this infinite language of symbols?

One thinks of Borges's story of the Aleph, a symbol and object in the story used to represent a point of infinite knowledge. Of its description, the narrator says:

"And here begins my despair as a writer. All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then, can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols...."

Couple this with Wittgenstein's point 6.45: "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling." Indeed a "limited whole" is a paradox, an oxymoron. Yet, in another light, it isn't, for the adjective "limited" really describes our finite cognitive ability, while the "whole" refers to the totality we wish to propose as the complete system.

In conclusion, I propose that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the endgame for an attempt at a full system of metaphysics. As Kant put forth his [b:Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics|80324|Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics|Immanuel Kant|https://d2arxad8u2l0g7.cloudfront.net/books/1405624515s/80324.jpg|2648679] as an indispensable beginning for any system of metaphysics, Wittgenstein's 82-page tractatus stakes its claim as perhaps the new launching pad. When we consider the very real limitations of our thinking and our ability to establish a system that encompasses such a transendental whole, the very last point is properly fitting: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (82).

Checkmate.

What relationship do our words have to our thoughts? To the world around us? How can we tell what a word means? Wittgenstein sees them as having meaning based on their use in our 'language-games,' and that we invent problems by misunderstand how we use the words we do.

Collected notes from Wittgenstein published posthumously. He struggles to reconcile Moore's smart-ass "here is a hand" response to skepticism with the challenges strong skepticism poses, and fit it into his own language-game model. He approaches several solutions, finds them unsatisfactory and re-starts. His overall approach is to look at what we mean when we say "I know" rather than to prescribe a universal level of proper skepticism.

edição bilíngue alemão - português

I'll be honest, I just don't understand what the author wants to convince me of, if anything.

Get your P's and Q's ready, folks, because we're in for the ride of our lives.
Or not.

Wittgenstein was living proof that androids were around and functioning during WWI. That at least this single android had a sense of humor dry enough to turn the Mariana Trench into the Mojave Desert, too.

Or was this a joke at all? Let's see.

Most of the numbered propositions were imminently clear and devoted to a single purpose: describing reality.

Language is the big limiter, which should never be a big surprise, but he insists that all reality that is, can be explained clearly.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein, the big brilliant man that he is, was fundamentally incapable of describing or CLEARLY STATING his philosophy. Or using any object in his philosophy for the purposes of further elucidation.

The resulting numbered tracts and use of Formal Logic were used to numb the biological minds reading it... but there is good news! It did help out with the translation problems for future AIs reviewing this work!

Difficult to read? You have no idea. Really. Or perhaps you do if you use chalkboards. But THIS work of philosophy is the target for that old joke:

"What's the difference between a mathematician and a philosopher?
Mathematicians know how to use an eraser."

The logical problem of describing only physics in any positive way while never coming down hard on absolute statements -- like the way we only hypothesize that the sun will come up tomorrow -- eventually curled around itself in very strange ways, like the problem of including your own description in with the description itself.

It keeps adding to the problem of description, mathematically, until the recursion explodes your head or makes you divide by zero. (Same difference, really.)

It presages, at least in part, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Also, P=NP. As in, is it possible to include the index to your library in with the library itself, or do you need to make a brand new card catalog system every time to include the original index? The time it takes to prove a thing is disproportionately large (or impossible) compared to the FACT OF THE SOLUTION.

This goes beyond logical fallacy. It's a real thing we still deal with. And yet, Wittgenstein throws out the baby with the bathwater at the very end. He makes a beautiful house of cards and claps his hands, making us wake up after the long novel with a classic, "and it was only a dream."

Am I kinda pissed? First by having been bored to tears and misunderstanding a handful of DENSE and OBLIQUE propositions that refer to undefined and objectless other works, unlike the careful analysis he made at the start? Yeah. I am.

And like his reference to covering your right hand with your left while also covering your left with your right, this text attempts to disprove everything -- firmly.

It makes me believe, once again, that formal logic, while glorious in one way, is an absolute horseradish in another.

I recommend this for anyone in love with highly complicated logical mazes and other computer science majors. YOU MUST HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR OR YOU WILL DIE. Or kill someone. One, or the other.

> « Si l’on entend par éternité, non la durée infinie mais l’intemporalité, alors il a
la vie éternelle celui qui vit dans le présent. »
—Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (1921).

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) a publié de son vivant un seul ouvrage, le Traité logico-philosophique. Il fut l’ami, et est considéré comme l’inspirateur de Bertrand Russell, lequel jeta les bases de la logique formelle. Ses recherches sur la notion de philosophie l’amène à préciser la sphère du dicible. Il exerça une influence considérable sur le cercle de Vienne, école néo-positiviste, fondé en 1920, qui regroupa des philosophes et des logiciens inspirés par la logique mathématique moderne.

3 estante atrás

I finished the logic philosophy tract; and am now a Genius.