Account of the decades long war against the Moro tribes of Mindanao. This was the first war against Islamic insurgents. Of the many U. S. military personnel who served in the Philippines during the war was Captain, later General Pershing, who believed that diplomacy and economic development would lead to a more stable peace. However, when necessary, military action was appropriate. ( )

This book about America's first extended ground conflict with a Muslim society can't fail to resonate with current events, and Arnold seems to do a fine job of capturing the ebb and flow of how policy drove whether the American army undertook aggressive moves or not. While certainly not written to point fingers, the governorship of Leonard Wood can't help but to compare unfavorably with that of, say, John J. Pershing, if only because of Wood's grand-standing drive for distinction led him to sanction acts that are hard not to describe as genocidal.

As for what would have been the other option, apart from not getting involved in the Philippines in the first place, Arnold suggests that the American invaders failed to recognize that there was more of a social structure to work with than they cared to admit. Of course, this would have meant a tolerance for the superficially Islamic tribal culture of Mindano and the Sulu Archipelago that was unlikely in an army and government in a hurry to impose order and commercial development, and had absolute conviction that they were in the right. ( )