A thorough and believable analysis of the Soviet-Nazi war, this is not a book for those who do not know a lot about the campaigns. Nor is it a dramatic popularization of the action. It is an excellent book for understanding the reasons for what happened, and in its cold prose clearly renders the horrors of it all. ( )

Well-researched but excessively detailed, and although the author makes a point of saying that he (fortunately) does not clutter the text with minute graduations of officer ranks and titles and such, there are still an enormous amount of names and proper nouns of all sorts, often with the original Russian or German name in parentheses, which sometimes make the text a bit clunky. Also, there are times when individual facts are cited without giving sufficient context, or making it clear exactly what importance the fact has, or what insight it gives.Especially in respect to cases where he cites the numbers of certain kinds of weapons each side possessed, and production numbers and so on, I sometimes felt that I was not really given a way of understanding exactly what I was being told, or judging what all these facts actually meant....On the whole, though, the load of statistics is heavy but mangeable.

He does, however, make an effort to cover all of the different aspects of this war, and, despite the difficulties of this, given the massive scale of the war in question, he covers many different topics and aspects of the conflict. Foremost, of course, he gives a very through campaign history of the Russian war--including descriptions of all the major operations (e.g., BARBAROSSA, Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kursk, BAGRATION, Berlin...) and analysis of the results ('explaining victory and defeat')--as well as some treatment of other topics, such as Nazi crimes committed in German-occupied areas, Soviet partisans, Soviet reprisals against 'collaborators', Lend-Lease and Western contributions to the Soviets, Moscow's attitudes towards Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Uprising, brief biographical sketches of (especially Soviet) commanders, and short discussions of the strategic objectives and military theories of both sides. Maps and geographic descriptions are also adequate, and mention is also made of the weather (e.g., the rasputitsa, or muddy season).

Although it can be very heavy reading--there were many battles fought on the Eastern Front, and not all of them were as famous as Stalingrad--it's fair to say that this book does provide alot of information on the Nazi-Soviet war, especially for the Russian side, and it's not a terrible introduction to the history of this immensely destructive war.

(7/10) ( )

The Soviet Union incurred 10 million dead (of which 3 million were POW's) from military action in WWII. Add to that, another 17 million Soviet civilians perished because of the war. By comparison, the British lost 350,000 and the Americans 300,000. The Germans lost about 4 times as many men on the eastern front than on all other fronts combined. Obviously, the war in the east was far greater in scope, deaths, cost, and duration than the war fought by the United States in Europe.

Evan Mawdsley's "Thunder in the East" is a well researched and argued description of the war on the Eastern Front. The action in that theater was more complex than is generally understood in the West. Hitler thought he could knock Russia out of the war in a single dramatic campaign: Operation Barbarosa. He could then turn his attention to a general war with Britain and the USA.

Although the Soviets were unsuccessful in negotiating the Germans, they did reach an accomodation with Japan that avoided a two-front war.

Mawdsley attributes early German success to superior military effectiveness, which interlinked elements of leadership, doctrine, organization, equipment, and personnel. The latter included outstanding professional leadership at the operational and tactical levels. The Wehrmacht actually was inferior to the Russians in quantity of artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The two sides were equal in quality of equipment except for radio communication, where the Germans excelled. Both sides relied on horses for transportation, but the Reds were the only ones with a significant cavalry. The Red Army was unsuccessful in the early going because it had prepared for an aggressive offensive war "in depth," rather than the defensive war it was compelled to fight when the Germans made the first move. The Red Army was deployed too far forward and had no defense in depth; hence the Germans advanced very quickly once they attacked. The Germans expected the early victories to cause a collapse in Communist rule, but the Soviet state proved to be more resiliant than they expected.

Once the German invasion stalled in front of Moscow and Leningrad in late 1941, the war was pretty much decided, although it took three years of bitter fighting to end it. Millions of prisoners were taken by both sides, and over 50% perished in captivity on both sides. Mawdsley criticizes the Russians for not doing better in their first offensive in late 1941 in front of Moscow when the German attack had petered out. The Germans were able to maintain themselves on enemy territory for 3 years despite being inferior in manpower and equipment.

Mawdsley credits Russia's victory more to an overwhelming superiority in numbers of soldiers and weapons than to bleak Russian winters. The Soviets started with twice the population of Germany and many more weapons. In addition, the Red Army improved in quality of tactics as the war progressed. Further, it was greatly aided by the supply of Studebaker and Ford trucks from the USA. Mawdsley argues that each side was equally hampered in movement by "General Winter."

The latter part of 1942 is often seen as the single turning point of the war, but Mawdsley disagrees. The Russians had not suffered their last defeat and did not fully gain the strategic initiative until seven months after Paulus's capitulation at Stalingrad.

By the end of 1943, however, it was clear that the Soviets would win whether or not the Western Powers opened a second front. However, once the Normandy invasion was successful, Britain and the US were closer to the German homeland than the Russians were. The Russians made an all out effort to take Berlin at almost any cost to be there ahead of their "allies."

Mawdsley's book is well organized with a perceptive conclusion to each chapter. The flow of the narrative suffers, however, from his devotion to thoroughness and accuracy. He spends an inordinate amount of ink on the names of the various military units (each side utilized hundreds) involved.

(JAB) ( )