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Bezig met laden... Greece: February to April 1941 (Australian Army Campaigns Series)door michael tyquin
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 Meld je aan bij LibraryThing om erachter te komen of je dit boek goed zult vinden. Op dit moment geen Discussie gesprekken over dit boek.  rholland | Oct 23, 2015 |  geen besprekingen | voeg een bespreking toe
Onderdeel van de reeks(en)
As with the failed attempt to seize the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915, the allied campaign to assist Greece against a seemingly invincible German juggernaut was poorly conceived and probably doomed even as plans were made to assist that country. Like any campaign, however, it holds lessons for the contemporary student of strategy, tactics and history. Greece presented singular geographic difficulties for the defending forces, its mountainous defiles dictating the distribution of ports, road and rail routes. The primitive state of the national infrastructure did little to help a long-term defensive posture. Operations in Greece proved to be a nightmare, particularly for logistics units, which struggled with primitive communication systems in rugged terrain over which the enemy enjoyed total air superiority. Poor liaison between the Greek and Commonwealth forces did not help matters, nor was the force deployed adequate for its task. The allies never enjoyed air superiority, nor could they consolidate any in-depth defence in time to be effective. The official British history of the campaign stated that the 'British campaign on the mainland of Greece was from start to finish a withdrawal'. Greece: February to April 1941 explores these complexities, and mistakes through the eyes of the Australian Army Medical Corps. Geen bibliotheekbeschrijvingen gevonden. |
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 Google Books — Bezig met laden...GenresDewey Decimale Classificatie (DDC)940.542195History and Geography Europe Europe 1918- Military History Of World War II Campaigns and battles by theatre European theatreLC-classificatieWaarderingGemiddelde: (3.5)
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Tyquin has covered the campaign in Greece very well and has many supporting maps and figures. Unfortunately these figures fall short because they require detailed reading of the passages (sometimes in a future chapter) to interpret. Having more information such as dates and times associated with unit movements would have made these maps excellent. Information boxes often have a lot of blank space, there is nearly always an extra paragraph or two that could be added. Some books like the Osprey Series don't have a spare cm. This book could fit so much more in just with the editing.
The book does not follow a linear path. It deals with separate actions but does not tie this in clearly with simultaneous missions. This makes the tactical environment clear but completely loses where each action fits the strategic situation.
Just some extra editing and little more detail would have made this an exceptional book. Instead it is probably best for those with a specific bent on military command procedure. The main staff discussed are the most senior commanders and the middle level commands which were so important on the tactical level are not mentioned.
Now, some points that interested me were the way that Tyquin (being a military man himself) was able to give explanations to why officers took certain actions when they often ended up badly. Other authors such as Mike Carlton in Cruiser are scathing when an officer makes what is the wrong decision. Tyquin regularly demonstrates that individual decisions at the time were often the best ones but that overall they could not have seen these decisions would lead to worse problems in time.
So close to being an excellent book... yet so far. (