I started this book long time ago and then due to the other things I kept it on TBR list until recently when I sat down and finished it.

And what a book.

Author starts with differences between approaches to training, command and general view on war between two main opposing forces during WW1 - British army and German army.

Author starts with the overview of the general state of officer cadre in British and German armies and way officers were trained and what opportunities were provided for career advancements. Obviously Germans had military set as a more popular choice for a career than it was case in British army. Although in both armies at the time social status of aspiring officer candidate played the role, Germans had system more oriented towards what you might call meritocracy - officer candidates were hard pushed through various commands and there were high expectations for every one of them. This enabled Germans to pick the best and keep the army vibrant and open to discussions on various fields and themes of war-fighting. Of course this is not to say that Germans did not enter the war with some very wrong preconceptions but their approach to war and the people chosen for the lead positions in command allowed them to adapt. Not that it helped them in the end but it definitely almost gave them victory in 1918.
On the other hand British army was a more rigid organization that relied on orchestration of war operations from central point and thus preventing the actual fighting elements to use their own initiative. I especially liked umpiring approach description used in British army - something very near to the German approach - basically giving allowance for initiative but without any direct higher echelon support (basically if it works all good, otherwise oh boy).

Both commands were skeptical when it comes to general quality of their troops - I guess this was related to social differences between officers and ordinary troops, but also sheer horror of front-line and constant bombardments and its effect on human psyche - but Germans proved to be more people oriented, in lack of better words. They gave their troops more trust, local officer or NCO was given as much autonomy as possible to execute the task at hand. This reduced (again, to a degree, since in WW1 there was no way to avoid devastating barrages or deadly concentrated machine gun fire - remember there were no APCs or IFVs at the time, everything was done on foot) their casualties and gave them flexibility in combat operations. But [again due to the huge attrition rates] this gave them very narrow chance to gain victory but once this opportunity was missed they decided to surrender.

After this very detailed overview of recruitment and training, we are given application of these elements - comparisons of both armies offensive and defensive actions (both development and experimental unit, major offensives and approaches to what will be later known as elastic defense). The very different views on war and command is visible in British army interpretation of captured German manuals. These chapters are truly great.

Book shows that while huge armies in WW1 did result in huge casualties, it also provided both sides with required manpower to test and develop new ways of fighting war. This only proves that with big battalions one can model whatever force required. With limited forces, no matter how precise, when war enters attrition phase (and it will always enter attrition phase between equal powers) that is not possible, there are just no sufficient resources in that case. Basically WW1 was a major test ground that crystalized the ways every future war will be fought. But starting point was very much like beginning of this century - attempt to use counterinsurgency army to fight a full continental war.

Highly recommended. ( )