This is one of the immediate post-war books that provided a "blow-by-blow" accounting of a number of campaigns in the Near East. The book goes into great depth on the Gallipoli campaign, the Mesopotamian Campaign and the Palestine Campaign. As for the Mesopotamian Campaign, it clearly marks the distinction between the pre- and post-Kut surrender operations.

The book is rife with some of the post-war angst and second-guessing of some of the commander's decisions during the war, and is also marked by a bit of emotion against the enemy, and overly superlative adjectives associated with many of the actions of British commanders. While a detailed accounting, this book looks at the campaign from the macro level, without discussing to any great degree, many of the external factors that drove some of the decision-making during many of these campaigns. The official histories do a much better job, with greater detail than this.

Of interest to collectors however. While attributed to a 1917 publishing date, the book actually covers operations leading into 1918. Clearly a mistake. ( )