This is a very nuts and bolts looks at how the US and China communicated from the 1949 break in relations until the 1972 Nixon-Mao summit. Xia looks largely at state-to-state relations and the difficulties when there are no formal channels. He finds that, even without these channels, the two governments always showed a willingness to communicate. The back-channel nature of these communications hindered their effectiveness, but Xia looks at other factors as well.

Most importantly was the cultural assumptions that each brought. Having vastly different world views, each saw their positions as naturally reasonable and were surprised when the other side disagreed. Domestic politics also undermined each side's ability to compromise. To complicate matters further, neither side understood the other's political process so they were less understanding of the other's domestic considerations. In addition, individual actors made a difference. If George Marshall had arrived in China prior to Hurley's mission, the US might have regained the trust of both sides.

This is a good survey of a difficult period. Xia uses American sources from the USG and some Chinese documents (which were necessarily more limited because of the PRC's more restrictive classification process). He also looks at a large amount of Chinese language secondary sources and memoirs, which would be difficult for most American scholars to access. Nevertheless, his impressive research did not lead to substantial new understandings. Instead, he provides a strong survey of the events and decisions with only limited interpretation. ( )