Lawrence M. Solan

Intriguing overview of the employment of linguistic justifications by judges to explain their decisions. Solan's take is grounded in legal realism: Judges pretend that language demands a particular outcome, when if fact that is rarely the case (as shown the existence of dissenting opinions). Instead, judges have reached a decision on some other basis, perhaps equity, and then root around for a convincing rationale to convince the public that theirs was the correct outcome.

When describing the linguistic explanations themselves, Solan's perspective is predominantly analytic, whereby syntax is reduced to symbolic relationships and conclusions obtained through contemplating those formulae. While a valid tradition, this approach demphasizes the natural use of language, which may seem the more obvious way to view the language. I disagreed with several of his preferred readings on what were the more natural readings of contested phrases.

None of this detracts from his major arguments. Indeed, it tends to support them: language can only rule out readings, but provides little guidance when choosing between equally valid interpretations. Judges' confident assertions to the contrary.… (meer)